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PANEL INTRODUCTION
The following panels are modified transcriptions of the discussions that
took place during this Symposium. The views expressed by the panelists
are completely their own and do not represent the thoughts or views of their
employers in any way. Additionally, redactions have been made to the
transcripts to further ensure anonymity.
Participants in the Symposium included chief compliance officers from
the nation’s leading banks, securities institutions, and industrial
corporations. To encourage a free and open exchange of views, it was
decided that the names of the panel participants and the companies with
which they are affiliated with would not be included in the trasncript of
proceedings. The goal of these panels was to help define and clarify issues
in the C-suites of many companies, and they face challenges in defining
what is appropriately within the scope of their job descriptions. In the
safety of an academic setting, panel participants sought to suggest areas
which would benefit from a clearer definition of their roles and
responsibilities, while not advocating for specific changes in laws or
regulations.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
M = Moderator

M1: I am an adjunct professor at the Law School. I teach a course in
consumer financial service and sometimes a course outside of the Law
School in other semesters with a colleague. It is a great school to be
associated with and I am very happy that they agreed to do this program
through the Business Law Review.
The reason we are here today is because a colleague of mine, Steven
vonBerg, who was in my class, now works in my law firm, and was on the
American University Business Law Review. So when I said “hey, let’s do
something in the academic setting in a safer environment he said let’s do it
through the Law Review.”
I would also like to thank a couple of colleagues who have done a lot of
work on this too. Tom Sporkin, who is my partner and an AU Law School
Alumnus, was really instrumental in bringing this together and Lori
Sommerfield who is counsel at our firm and helped to put the panel
together, so thank you both.
The origin of the panel was from a meeting that took place earlier this
year. M2 and I were out in Palm Springs. M2 gave a talk—it was a
meeting of regulators, lawyers, and bank executives; probably about 40
people or so—and she gave a talk about the perils of being a Chief
Compliance Officer. She talked about the fears that compliance officers
have and particularly at that time, there was a regulation that was proposed
by the New York Department of Financial Services that required
compliance officers to certify to the adequacy of their AML policies and
procedures at their firms and that was causing great concern, but it was not
the only thing. There was an article in the Wall Street Journal at the time—
The Most Thankless Job on Wall Street Gets Tougher 1 or something like
that—so there is this sense that this profession which has grown up with
not a lot of rules around it needed more thinking on what this role is, what
responsibility it entails, and how the role should be carried out. In other
words: what are the risks and what steps we can take to make the Chief
Operating Officer (“COO”) job safe for talented professionals that we want
1. Emily Glazer, The Most Thankless Job on Wall Street Gets a New Worry,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/now–in–regula
tors–cross–hairs–bank–compliance–officers–1454495400.
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to attract because it’s such an important job? We were having breakfast
after her talk and I said, “you really have to raise visibility to this issue.”
So, with her encouragement, I wrote an article titled The Compliance
Officer Bill of Rights in American Banker. 2 It is a short article—it is in
your handouts—and that did cause a stir. M2 and other compliance
officers got together and began talking about what can be done.
There is a sense that it is best not to go out there as a compliance officer
and advocate for yourself but, at the same time, you do have to step up and
say there is an issue here and something that has to be dealt with. So we
decided that having an academic setting, somewhere we could think
through what the issues are and then publish that thinking in a way that was
useful to the dialogue.
When you think about how laws are made—they are made by judicial
precedent, as people in this room very well know, because of the tradition
of the law. They are made by legislation, by regulation, by enforcement
actions, and examinations. The interpretation of the law is also influenced
by legal professionals and academics who write and develop thinking in the
academic setting. As a result, we do have some ability to set out the ideas
that emerge from this meeting and maybe they will have some influence on
those other sources of law.
I have written on the board here what I think the role and the
responsibility of the COO, the risks associated with being a COO, and the
steps to make COO job safer for talented professionals as I said before.
We’re going to have a series of panels [and we’d like to have plenty of
audience participation]. We are all in this conversation together. This is
not a lecture, this is a sharing of ideas.
I am not going to do traditional introduction of panel members and their
backgrounds. I really think it is best to have them introduce themselves
because it really is a question of how did they arrive at this profession?
What was their career path and what were some of things that prepared
them? What sort of background do they bring? So I think it is better for
them to tell their own stories.
As we call on each person they can talk about how they wound up in the
job that they are in and then we can talk about the subject of our first panel.
Our first panel is going to really be a definitional panel. It will set the stage
for all that comes after and so without further ado let me introduce—well
first I want M2 to say a few words.
M2: First, I want to thank everyone for being here to participate in the
panel. We encourage you to ask questions about the profession and to
2. See generally Jeremiah Buckley, The Compliance Officer Bill of Rights, AM.
BANKER (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the–compliance–
officer–bill–of–rights?tag=00000156–32ee–d79b–a377–3efe1d240000.
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challenge the thinking. For all of you who were instrumental in making
this happen, I am quite grateful. As you know, other forums and
universities are having the same dialogue so it will be interesting to see
what comes out of this discussion. So thank you all for being here and I
look forward to having a productive day.
M1: Just as a reminder, we are observing modified Chatham House rules
here. No media and press are here and no regulators are here. We want to
have a free discussion. This is for the purpose of having the students write
up a summary of proceedings which I think will be very valuable. Students
are assigned to each panel to take notes. Rather, what we are concerned
with is helping to bring the ideas forward. In addition, we are asking that
there not be a discussion of particular current events regarding any
particular institution, but to keep remarks general on the subject and not
focus in on any particular pending matter. When this is through, if there
are people who would like to make a contribution to the law review in
terms of a paper or comment, even if you are not on a panel, please feel
free to do so. So let us get started.

PANEL I: EVOLUTION OF THE CCO
ROLE & EXPECTATIONS OF CCOS IN
TODAY’S REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
M = Moderator
P = Panelist
A= Attendee*

P1: Hi, I am the global head of financial crime compliance at
[Redacted]. I have been there since 2005 and, in a prior life, I was a federal
prosecutor in Manhattan and before that, I was with the U.S. Treasury
Department (“Treasury”) as a senior policy advisor to the Undersecretary
for Enforcement.
I got into compliance by accident. I became an expert on money
laundering policy while I was at Treasury. I took that expertise to my role
as a federal prosecutor and pursued cases against the heads of Mexican and
Columbian narcotics cartels from a financial perspective. Great line of
work—you meet a lot of nice people. I eventually graduated to whitecollar crime and securities fraud.
Then when it came time to leave the U.S. Attorney’s Office—that
roughly coincided with September 11, 2001 and the PATRIOT Act passed
the year after September 11th—broker-dealers needed anti-money
laundering officers and Ray Kelly, who was a mentor of mine at the time,
former Commissioner of the New York City police department,
recommended that I consider doing a job like that. I really liked being a
prosecutor. I did not really think I was cut out to be a defense attorney so I
liked the idea of sort of being a policeman on the inside. And so, for the
last twelve years that is what I have been doing. I loved wearing the white
hat. Now I sort of wear the beige hat and I enjoy it greatly as well.
When M1 asked me to talk about the evolving role of the compliance
officer, the thing that stuck out to me more than anything else is the fact
that compliance officers generally, and specifically in my industry, are
facing the specter of personal liability in ways that they never have before,
* Special thanks to Chauna Pervis & Emily Wolfford for their tireless work in
transcribing Panel I.
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which is a daunting notion. I cannot go to jail; there are far too many
people in there that know me there.
And this specter of personal liability trails a number of significant cases
against compliance officers that have occurred within the last couple of
years and a lot of policy announcements of the sort that M1 and M2 were
referring to and a lot of rhetoric among members of Congress, the press,
and the like. I have worked with people like Mary Joe White, Preet
Bharara, Andrew Ceresney, George Canellos and I completely accept the
representations they have made when they say they carefully weigh
recommending cases against compliance officers and only do so when the
evidence clearly supports such action. That typically occurs in one of two
ways: (1) when compliance officers cross the line by engaging in
affirmative misconduct or obstruction, or (2) when regulators have
concluded that a compliance officer exhibited some “wholesale failure” to
do their job. No one disputes the propriety of pursuing an enforcement
action against a compliance officer who engaged in affirmative
misconduct. The controversy therefore centers around the enforcement
actions that allege in a wholesale failure to do their jobs. Within this
category there have been a number of highly publicized cases. Some of
them occurring in the Investment Advisers Act and some in the Bank
Secrecy Act/anti–money laundering context. The facts of these cases are
obviously different, but presumably they all gave rise to this conclusion
that there was a wholesale failure to execute for which compliance officers
were allegedly responsible.
What I have been struggling with is that if the evidence so clearly
supported the conclusion that there was a “wholesale failure,” why then is
there this perception—and it absolutely exists—among compliance officers
that they are being targeted or unduly singled out? There is also empirical
evidence to support this perception. For example, a DLA Piper survey
performed earlier this year indicated that eighty–one percent of respondents
surveyed said they were at least “somewhat concerned” about their
personal liability. 1 Sixty–five percent said that the recent statements by
people in the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) had caused them to pause when considering
their future roles as CCOs. 2 There was also the Wall Street Journal article
that M2 was referring to, which reported that three dozen senior
compliance executives had left their jobs in 2015—three times the number
from the year before. Anecdotally, I can confirm that a number of my
colleagues are rethinking their roles in this industry due to the specter of
1. See DLA PIPER’S 2016 COMPLIANCE & RISK REPORT: CCO’S UNDER SCRUTINY
(2016).
2. See id.
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personal liability. So I take as a given that prosecutors and regulators are
weighing carefully this idea of bringing cases against compliance officers,
and that they only do so when there is clear evidence supporting it. I also
take as a given that the perception that compliance officers are being
targeted remains. Given that both conditions prevail, that there has to be
some other explanation for the fact that the perception of targeting persists.
I came up with three or four theories as to why this may exist. The first
is there is the multiplicity of enforcement actions. When the average CCO
sees that enforcement cases against compliance officers are being brought
by the SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and
Treasury then it is the aggregate effect of these actions that is causing them
concern.
The second possible explanation is what I would call the “lowest
common denominator” factor. When you read some of the statement of
facts in the settlement documents relating to the actions against compliance
officers, in many cases you think, “that was egregious; that was a
‘wholesale failure.’” When you read others, however, you may not
necessarily reach that conclusion. In many cases, it seems more like the
compliance officer was being held personally responsible for nothing more
than trying to do his or her job in a complex and challenging business
environment and perhaps not executing that job flawlessly. I think that the
idea of less than perfect execution is something that every compliance
officer faces. When the average CCO reads these settlement documents,
and it does not appear that the facts are as egregious as the allegation
“wholesale failure” might suggest—then they start to wonder—I think—
whether they could find themselves in similar circumstances.
The third possible explanation for the continued perception of targeting
can be termed the “solitude factor.” In most of these recent enforcement
actions, the compliance officer was the only person whom was charged
personally. In most businesses that I am familiar with, there are business
people who are engaged in the commercial activity that drives those
businesses. There are also control people in legal and in operations and the
idea that the compliance officer is the only one being held personally
accountable is perhaps contributing to this perception of being targeted as
well.
The last possible explanation is recent trends in regulation and policy.
On the one end of the spectrum, you have the DOJ’s new policy requiring
enhanced focus on the roles of individuals in cases of corporate
misconduct. On the more disturbing end of the spectrum, you have a
proposed rule by the New York Department of Financial Services. This
rule actually requires CCOs to certify to the efficacy of their anti–money
laundering controls and face criminal penalties for false or incorrect
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certifications. Thankfully, the insane part of the rule was ultimately left out
of the final version. But by that time, however, the damage in terms of the
impact on the collective psyche of compliance officers could have been
done.
So if we take regulators at their word that they are bringing cases when
the evidence warrants, and that they are carefully considering those cases,
but there remains a perception of targeting that is not going away, then
something has to be done to shift that perception. Indeed, if something is
not done shortly, the potential chilling effect on talented people who have
been, or would be, compliance officers, could be significant.
M1: Thank you. Now getting a retail bank perspective, I think we would
like to hear from P2.
P2: Good morning everyone. I work for [Redacted], I am the head of
Fair Lending. I work in a social justice function and I love what I do.
I was fortunate to be in and out of the government and I would
encourage all of you. You do not need to be wedded to being in the private
sector or being in the government. Being in and out of the government is a
good thing. You heard P1 talk about how he was in the government and
how you build relationships while there, which you can bring to the private
sector. So do not focus on the money so much. I know many of you
probably have loans coming out of school, but focus on where you want to
be and what you want to do.
Piggybacking on some of the liability issues here, three things I want to
talk about quickly are: (1) your relationships with business partners, (2)
compliance versus legal, and (3) resources and capacity that can drive some
of these compliance issues.
I will start off with the relationship with business partners. Historically,
compliance has not always had a seat at the table. However, in my
experience today, compliance does and should have a seat at the table. But
from a regulatory expectations standpoint, there is this whole new kind of
credible challenge. When you are sitting with your business partners, you
are expected as a compliance professional to push back on them, ask them
tough questions, and tell them “no” when the situation demands it. You
have to make sure the compliance management systems are in place. And
if they are not, do not sign off on things just because you are worried about
your job, your bonus, your boss’ job, or boss’ bonus, and escalate, escalate,
and escalate. I still think there are many people in the compliance world
who have not fully realized that concept. Until folks really buy into that,
we are going to continue to see these liability issues come up on the
compliance space.
So when we think about Compliance versus Legal, it is not an
either/or—both are integral to the process. The lawyers are interpreting the
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law and telling you what you ought to do. But from a compliance
perspective, sitting in a financial institution, you are looking at your entire
compliance management system and you are thinking about what your
business lines are doing, what you need to do to ensure you have coverage,
and you are complying with the law. So it includes monitoring and
testing—you know, these are all terms that you probably do not pick up on
in law school. These processes take a lot of time. It is a quasi-edit type
role.
The reporting lines for compliance, initially reported to legal. However,
today Compliance and Legal are separate functions, which are co-equals.
But that has moved now, from a best practices standpoint, it is no longer
forced under legal—it’s an independent function, a second–line function.
It has raised visibility and the type of individual we need working in
compliance. Many compliance officers have law degrees today. But, if
you look back ten to fifteen years ago, many people in compliance did not
have law degrees or did not even have master’s degrees. So we are looking
at a very different profile for the compliance professional today. When you
think about it, the legal folks are still in the mindset of defending the
company. But compliance needs to be there as well. We are the check on
legal in many respects. To say this may be technically right, but from a
regulatory standpoint and transparency standpoint, we need to be open. We
need to be sure we are thinking longer term on these issues. I think many
of our legal partners are getting that, but there is some way to go. I think
there are some folks who have been institutionalized; who have been there
twenty to thirty years and they still have not been brought into some of the
new paradigm. We really need to be open and transparent when identifying
issues—raise your hand quickly, remediate them, stop them. Get ahead of
them because the reputational risks if you do not are just tremendous in this
environment.
For you guys, you are all potentially looking for jobs. With the liability
issues being abundant, the pressure from the regulators, we are all going to
be needing lots of folks going forward. It is a growth area. You have the
general compliance teams; you have the special compliance teams, like
anti–money laundering (“AML”); fair lending; and some other horizontal
functions. Think about where you want to be in that role—being a
generalist can be good, being a specialist can be good—but I would sort of
say compliance, overall as a profession, is a good place to be. So, with
that, I am looking forward to having some questions.
M1: Thank you. Now we would like to hear from P3. We have a
banking theme on this panel; we have a lot of securities represented here.
P3: Thanks M1. So first, off the bat, I have dreamed of becoming a
compliance officer since I was about five years old. Actually when
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thinking about what to say, I think M1 and M2 really covered the broad
issues. The revolving door—there is a lot of criticism of the revolving
door—but the revolving door is actually a really positive aspect to the way
legal and compliance probably need to function in the finance industry.
Meaning, we are a really complex industry at a time where the regulatory
environment has ratcheted up to a point where you really need to have
people who understand the complexities of what we are dealing with. I
think that has really come to the fore with me.
First off, when I look at the path to the role that I have taken on at
[Redacted]—I started as an attorney doing investment management and
litigation. I was talking to M2 before, toward the end I represented a CCO
in a case against M2’s office where the CEO ended up in prison for years.
I still have a lot of stress for remembering that. And that led me to want to
join the government. So I went to the SEC. I was at the SEC for thirteen
years. I have to say during that era, from the dotcom bubble, the financial
crisis, etc. and the aftermath of the financial crisis—many of you have seen
the Big Short and there is a narrative at the end and it discusses how people
were promised, that people were going to jail and there would be an entire
restructuring of the government. 3 [Redacted] and I are beneficiaries of
that. There really was an entire reorganization at the SEC and it did
actually involve bringing a lot of cases, reorganizing, being a truly much
more efficient operation—thanks to people like [Redacted] and others who
did that service. So when I think about what got me to compliance after the
SEC where I had the position of running the Asset Management Unit—
which was a newly formed division within enforcement to just look at
investment advisors—it was very much about what I could do in the private
sector that would most suit my skill set. Compliance is so directly related
to what I did in government because I had knowledge of the investment
advisory industry and then was really able to apply it in the private sector.
When I think about my days back in the Asset Management Unit, it was
about setting priorities; about setting how we would look at the industry.
Really what I do today is setting strategic priorities about how we deal with
the regulatory and enforcement efforts globally. So it is very much related.
A few other points I wanted to draw on. In terms of CCO liability, I do
think that it is uncertain whether the political changes that are going to
occur will actually affect personal liability. I do think it has quieted down
significantly since there was a large outcry in 2014, 2015, at least from a
securities perspective. If you look at how the SEC itself reacted, there was
a lot of divisiveness within the SEC about charging CCOs. You saw some
of that calm down.
3. THE BIG SHORT (Plan B Entertainment 2015).
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I do think in terms of some of the theories why this is happening, if you
look post–financial crisis, there was clearly an aggressiveness by regulators
to want to go after individuals. That is one part of it and that is combined
with the regulations themselves. If you look at the Investment Advisors
Act, 4 it is such a low bar to bring a case against a compliance officer
relative to senior executives at a corporation. So if you are looking to be
aggressive and bring cases, especially difficult ones, you can surely bring a
case against a compliance officer who simply has not executed on the
policies and procedures in place. I do think though, there is a fairness
element at the SEC. I do think it is a changing regulatory environment. I
do have more discussion points, but I am sure we will get to that in the
discussion.
M1: So I mentioned the next speaker will be P4 who will bring you the
view from his experience at a major industrial company and his career that
led to there. When P4 finishes, I would like to have a little discussion of
the differences in what is expected of compliance officers in securities,
banking, and the general corporate setting; but we will come back to that.
P4: Thank you. Good morning. It is always great to come to these
panels and hear the perspectives of my colleagues, especially from other
industries. I think that it is tremendously valuable. I was on the phone
with our Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), she said, “it’s great you are
here to talk about the new generation of law students and what the climate
is out there.” So I would be really interested to hear from you all as we go
through this.
So to tell my story about how I became the CCO, I think someone used
the word “accidental,” and well, I am an accidental CCO for sure. I started
off as a government contracts lawyer working for a small firm here in
Washington, D.C. But my career path really underwent a big transition
when I went in–house in the late 1990s. I think a good thing about a
compliance team is you bring a lot of different perspectives and
experiences from your past. I have hired federal prosecutors, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents, and forensic accountants. They all
bring tremendous experience and perspective to the role. But from my
perspective, I did not have any of that. I was never a regulator; I did not
work in government. So what did I do that was different? I did deals.
Okay, so in 2003 I moved to Texas and I was doing commercial deals
with big banks, telecommunications companies, and other IT companies. I
was the [Redacted] lawyer for [Redacted]. Somebody on your team needs
to know how to do that deal at the end of the quarter. You’re doing that
billion-dollar software deal and there are 15 minutes left before midnight,
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–1, et seq.
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you understand what the pressure is and how decisions or calls are made in
that moment, and that if they are picked apart years later, it’s a completely
different dynamic. That is something that I did. So, I was very involved
with not only government, but also commercial deals.
How did I get into compliance? In May 2006, I get a call from the
general counsel of the company I worked for at the time. He says, “I need
you to go to Tokyo.” And I said, “well that’s in Japan isn’t it?” He says
you’ve got two weeks to decide. So I moved to Japan with my entire
family. I walk into the office and they say, “P4, what can you tell us about
American law?” I thought “this is going to be a very long three years. I
needed to carve out a role.” So in that job, I got into compliance. Why?
Because that company had some serious compliance issues. I am not
telling you anything secret because I have sat at my computer on a Tuesday
morning and it is just a normal Tuesday—and this is the life of a
compliance officer just a little—you sit down, it is a normal Tuesday and
all of a sudden the Internet explodes. I am watching a continuous loop of
fifty investigators in Japan, in dark suits, with briefcases, all walking into
the branch office in Osaka. This loop is just running over and over again
on TV with the company’s logo in the background. I am like, well
something has gone wrong. What happened was that the Japanese
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission was investigating
several companies and, long story short, there was a lot of revenue issues
going on. In my world, it’s really about the global perspective so you
really need to know how business is done all across the world and how
things play out differently. In Japan and many other places outside of the
U.S. this relationship-based contracting or relationship-based business and
people will tell you: I did this thing simply because I wanted to maintain
this relationship. And I’m like “that’s great, except that thing was illegal
and is not consistent with how an American company is regulated.”
That was my exposure to compliance—I hadn’t really had experience
with it, but I was thrown into the middle and then came back and did
corporate litigation handling not only U.S. cases, but big international cases
as well. And I think someone made the point about Legal versus
Compliance and it is interesting because when you are the litigator, you are
defending the company. Your goal is to create a narrative of the case. I am
going to cabin the bad facts or manage them away and I am going to try for
a good resolution whether it is settlement or at a contested proceeding. I
am not going to worry so much about the systemic issues because maybe I
am creating a bad record that screws up my litigation narrative. You are
very focused on that specific case. But the compliance officer can come in
and say, “we got to take a big step back, is this just an isolated incident, or
do we have a systemic issue, do we need to look at our procedure, what
kind of message are we going to send to the people that may have been
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involved in this?” Do we need to discipline them? But then the
compliance officer and legal can start being pulled in different directions.
Legal says, “well that is my key witness, you have got to keep him warm,
the regulators are asking a lot of questions of him.” So these are the type of
dilemmas you confront as a compliance officer.
My next step, after doing that litigation job, was I got a role with the
[Redacted] corporation, which was growing. That company expanded from
2 people to a centralized global organization. This is another evolution that
in the span of a few years the company went from something that was very
small to something that spanned literally the planet. In that role, I
ultimately wound up creating what was in effect a Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) unit inside of the company. We had prosecutors,
forensic accounts, agents, and auditors. We would just pick up allegations
and go off and investigate them, take appropriate actions, and deal with the
regulators as needed. It was not a secret that the company was under
scrutiny as there was a public federal court order. Now I am a CCO at
[Redacted] and it is interesting to see the difference in the role.
I really wanted to talk about the “why” of my role right now and I’m
interested in the reaction of my colleagues in financial services. For me,
the “why” really starts with culture and values. I know that sounds soft,
but it really is not. If you really think about the effective high performing
companies, they are the ones with the strong values and the strong cultures,
and those strong values and the strong cultures are baked into their
operations, policies, and procedures. There is an article in the Wall Street
Journal about just that—how culture is a product of how you operate your
business. So I really feel like I have a seat at the table in terms of talking
about organizational transformation: how we are going to have the best
culture, how we are going to do business, and how we are going to compete
with the best companies out there—whether it is Google, Facebook, other
high tech companies, I am going to go compete with them. I think that is
really the why for me.
Then there is the how, which is that you really need to be comfortable in
this CCO role that has ambiguity, at least from my perspective, right. You
usually come into an organization and you are not sure you fit, are you in
legal, do you report directly to the board, what is your dotted line, what is
your direct line, what are your resources? You really have to have a lot of
comfort with ambiguity and you have to develop that network across the
company to really build the wall and get the kind of seat at the table. You
need that seat and that appropriate authority, and influence, you need to be
able to manage risks, identify risks, mitigate risks, and drive the
organization to deal with it.
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I will just wrap up here so we can get into the discussion. The
conversation about liability is actually really interesting. It is obvious in
financial services there is a lot of anxiety about it because I think that area
is the primary focus of where you see these enforcement actions. I am
deeply troubled by the whole concept. I feel a little more distance from it
in my corporate field, because maybe that does not apply to me because I
am not a broker dealer; I am not in a financial services firm, but I don’t
think we should be so sanguine, actually. There is no reason why an
enforcement action could not come after us as well. I would like to really
talk today about the framework by which compliance programs are really
starting to set. So what is it actually that a compliance officer is being held
liable for? Is it really an operational failure or failure of the business? We
mentioned that failure is the first line of defense. I absolutely agree with
that. And so it is really, if you are building an effective compliance
program and that program is working, you should be getting credit for that.
If there are aberrations or rogue employees, or things—bad things
happen—that in some respects is a function of any large organization.
Period. End of sentence. There will be some degree of issues with any
large company. There would be some degree of crime. So this kind of
funny thing that goes on with this strict liability-ish standard and
expectation of zero defects and no crime is not true. You are always going
to have issues; it is just: how do you respond to them? It is how do your
functions, how do your procedures, how do your controls, and management
respond? Those are all fair questions. But the idea that nothing will ever
go wrong is not something that should be the standard, nor should it be the
standard that a compliance officer is held to. I really wonder whether we
are having the level of conversation around that that we need to and I think
actually that this forum and scholarly work around it would actually be
very valuable.
P3: Just to play devil’s advocate on the CCO liability front, post–
financial crisis—when we were looking at a lot of the cases right—there is
the notion that if you have a compliance program that is either complicit
with the business or completely out to lunch, there ought to be some form
of liability. I remember we brought a case against a compliance officer
who went to Brazil on sabbatical for years, but was still in the compliance
officer seat. So there are those kind of extreme cases and there has to be
some form of accountability. I agree. But sitting in this seat—I feel this
everyday—that some things are outside of your control. When an issue
happens, say in Asia, you suddenly have accountability for what is in the
environment and whether that should or should not be the case. It does
create a forum on the positive side of accountability about compliance.
Clearly things are a little off the rails in terms of just going after and
targeting compliance officers.
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P2: Isn’t the issue really the response aspect of it, right? It is being able
to identify issues and address them in a timely manner. But it is another
thing when you have the right systems in place, you are doing your testing,
identifying issues, and you have the right response, but then the business
does not want to respond in the right way. Then you have to raise your
hand, go around them, and do the best thing for the company. That is
where I think the liability issue arises. How you insulate yourself from the
liability issue is to have those systems in place to identify. We cannot be
held accountable because of some rogue businessperson out there, but we
can be held accountable if we did not put systems in place to identify the
rogue people.
P1: I share P4’s view that, when something bad happens, the regulators
are coming in after the fact and using the bad facts to leverage a firm’s
compliance program, and the conduct of its compliance officer’s, to 20/20
hindsight. While the applicable legal standard is that a firm must have a
risk–based, reasonable set of controls, mistakes or imperfections
nevertheless become the pretext for enforcement actions. I think that is
definitely something that we are witnessing in the securities industry and it
is a de facto standard to which no one can adhere.
M1: What would be great is if we could try to articulate a standard that
we could live up to.
P1: “Risk-based and reasonable.” That is the standard, and for years the
regulators applied that standard when they conducted their examinations.
The problem, I think, was that in the wake of the financial crisis, many
regulators were subject to severe criticism for being asleep at the switch.
What has evolved in response to this criticism is an approach whereby the
regulators seek to hold firms accountable for not having a perfect control
environment. While not consistent with the applicable legal standard, the
approach enables regulators to avoid being criticized in the future for being
too soft.
M1: So is it a corollary to risk-based and reasonable, amplifying on
reasonable, and in some way articulating something that serves as a shield
against the “gotcha”? You’ve described the phenomena and you’ve
described how regulations have changed and you’re raising your hand and
saying this is not right and is going to drive talented people away from the
business, and so our best ally in the company is not going to be there. But
is there a way that we can then as lawyers, how do we amplify risk based
reasonable to add something and I get uncomfortable with a Yates memo or
somebody who is temporarily in a position of deputy assistant whatever,
and then they make a pronouncement and now that’s where we have to go.
We need something more, I think, and we need something that if it could
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emerge from our thinking might be adopted by regulators, but it’s not going
to be easy to find. So P3, have at it.
P3: If you look at the regulatory scheme that we are in, you have all the
active State Attorneys General who will aggressively pursue actions. Even
when, in some cases, there is a lack of evidence. We have historically seen
cases where they will compete with federal enforcement officers at the SEC
or DOJ. The way I do my job is I judge my reasonableness in terms of all
of the judgments I am making on a daily basis. Clearly, if you are within
that range of reasonableness, there is safety in that. That is what I rely on.
If there is reasonableness in what I am doing, I feel it falls into a range of
reasonable conduct. If you are dealing with a fair regulator, then they are
going to be looking at your conduct as a whole.
M1: The problem as described is that the regulator is also under pressure
from Congress, the public, and the media. So they say, “we have to do
something,” and of course who is the easiest target? The compliance
officer. There’s gambling going on in this casino! And I think particularly
to your point P4. In your village, you have a town and M2 has a state. I
think there’s as many people employed by P4’s company as live in
Vermont. Maybe that’s not quite right, but it’s close to it. They do have
jails in Vermont. So, I guess the question is—if there is stuff that happens
in your company and all of a sudden you do not feel as comfortable—even
though you have done everything to a reasonable standard—when the
overzealous prosecutor comes after you, is it enough to say, “look this is
not fair, we do not have to go to district court to find out and have me have
hire expensive defense counsel?” That is just a thought.
P1: I think P3 put his finger on one of the biggest problems. If we were
simply all managing to one regulator, I think it would be easier to manage
his or her expectations. But last year my program was examined forty–nine
times by twenty–seven regulators in twenty–two jurisdictions. Many of
these regulators have overlapping jurisdictions and often they are not
coordinating with one another. The standard that may have been set
pursuant to the regulation is then translated into an independent version of
policy and practice by each agency. So you do not have a common set of
practice guidelines to govern how the examiners are conducting themselves
on a day–to–day basis. This results in a range of definitions as to what
constitutes “reasonableness.” I think the idea of having some forum where
the regulatory bodies themselves can come together and establish common
standards would be ideal.
M1: Now in the banking space, there is something of that flavor.
P1: Absolutely, and that is a very, very positive step. We have a manual
that sets common standards for AML compliance. We understand that the
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issues set forth are what we will be tested on, which is extraordinarily
helpful in that respect.
A1: I was just wondering what the panel thinks about whether the
regulators themselves need to be educated a little bit about the function of a
compliance officer in an institution. In looking at some of the enforcement
actions that come out, sometimes I get the sense that as M1 said; you are
looking at the compliance officer as an easy target. But regulators do not
really understand that it is the compliance office that builds the framework
and it is the operators of the business who are performing the day–to–day
jobs that have to make sure they are performing in a compliant way. A
great example of this is the Ted Urban case, which I know we are going to
talk about later, but I think the regulators just got it wrong there. 5 I think
there is a limited understanding of the role of the compliance officer.
P4: Okay, so in the past senior corporate officers (“SCO”) and CCO
cases that we saw, there clearly was a commission debate at the time in
addition to active lobbying. There clearly was an outpouring of people
revolting to the notion that CCOs should be charged. I think the SEC
would at least be fairly hard pressed to bring a case like the Black Rock
case. 6 I am not suggesting it would not happen, but clearly there was such
an outcry after that, that it would seem difficult now. Now how that
applies to other regulators, I am not sure.
P2: I think that is an excellent question. As CCOs and Legal, we tend to
have such deep knowledge of our businesses and as such, can be quick to
respond directly to questions from regulators. However, one of the ways
you insulate yourself, or at least start to address it, is to encourage your
business people to respond first and explain how they implement
compliance and what their role in it is. By showing that they own these
issues, it will help us delineate the roles that we have as the second line of
defense. At least it would help begin the conversation. That is how I
manage it and how we manage it at [Redacted].
A2: I think A1 makes a good point; that there is a value in educating
regulators on the scope of the program. However, I really want to get back
to that point that you were picking up on M1, because what I think is
happening is, with the structure of our regulators, they have rulemaking,
supervisory, and enforcement authority, so they are making all the
decisions. They have a tremendous amount of power that is unchecked by
any balancing power. Many of them have ombudsmen, but they are
useless. They do not serve the function of balancing the extreme power
that regulatory agencies have. It is very difficult to get regulatory action
5. Urban, SEC Rel. No. 402, 2010 WL 35009288 (ALJ Sept. 8. 2010).
6. Blackrock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,

Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).

208

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6:2

into the federal court system. So if you believe that a regulatory agency is
exceeding its authority, you basically have to commit harikari by taking it
into the court system for redress. I think one of the big problems with the
structure is, when you have regulators with that much authority in a highly
politicized environment, they are compelled to exercise it. I mean
[Redacted] and the other heads of the agencies, when they are called up to
the Senate Banking Committee and yelled at by congressmen for not doing
their job, what do they do? They go back and exercise their rulemaking,
supervisory, and enforcement authority and they slap on a bunch more
Memorandums of Understanding (“MOUs”) on organizations in the
industry, which have a constricting effect on economic development and
growth. So I think the problem is a structural one with the regulatory
agencies not having a built-in judiciary–like function where their power
can be checked.
M1: I know [Redacted] and I have had this discussion. I am not
optimistic about changing the law. My background is eight years on the
Hill. I was the [Redacted] of the Senate Banking Committee back in the
1970s when the consumer financial services came about and all that stuff
was created. Each of us have our backgrounds and mine is a legislative
background where you could actually pass a law. Harder to do today, I
grant you, but we should be thinking about what changes would be
necessary and how could we build a consensus around the idea of some
standard for compliance officer responsibility. This standard should build
on the risks, current standards, and, if we can find it, some mechanism to
appeal to reason. I do not know if this is possible, but what can we do?
Some of you are saying the ombudsmen are ineffective and that the
regulators are under pressure and highly motivated to take action. A
compliance officer—whose role has changed drastically over time—has
much higher visibility and much more responsibility that is not yet clearly
defined. He or she sometimes reports to the general counsel, sometimes to
the chief risk officer, and sometimes to directly to the board. It is still
evolving. How do you define the role and responsibility more clearly and
have a place you can appeal if you are being challenged for something that
was not reasonably within that role and responsibility? How would you do
it? I am asking all of you.
A2: That is part of our discussion that is in the next panel, so I do not
want to get into that totally, but I think that the only thing you can do in the
current environment as a compliance officer, is make sure you find yourself
in a company with a supportive manager and supportive board who really
want to do the right thing. Then you can develop internal policies that they
adopt to clearly delineate responsibility within the company. So, when
something goes wrong in an area, it is clear who is accountable and
responsible. In most cases, that will not be the CCO. However, in some
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cases, it should be the CCO, if he or she goes off to Brazil for two years; in
that case, it is appropriate. The scope of the CCO’s responsibility, both
from a subject matter and structural supervision perspective, within an
organization needs to be defined. Right now, the only way to do this is to
define it internally within your company, working with your management
team and your board. You have to have enough authority within your
company in order to create those positions. I think a lot of the struggle
with compliance as an evolving issue, is that many compliance officers are
too low in the organization to be able to exert that positional authority to be
able to get their colleagues to accept that responsibility for certain things.
When you are not a member of the management committee, it is a lot
harder to get somebody who basically is your boss to agree that they are
going to do something. When you are their peer and you say, “look, I
cannot do this,” then you are going to have a much better opportunity.
P1: I think that is the recipe for success within the enterprise. There are
many examples within every industry of corporations that set the right tone
from the top. But you still have the problem of multiple regulatory bodies
pursing their own agendas. There may be questions about whether this
duplicative or triplicative approach is really having the right impact on the
efficacy of compliance programs. How much time are you spending
responding to examinations as opposed to actually unearthing bad things or
preventing bad things from happening?
A2: Yeah, repeat that statistic you said about how many exams you
encountered.
P1: Well, that was last year. My compliance program had forty–nine
exams by twenty–seven examiners in twenty–two jurisdictions.
A2: There are only fifty–two weeks in a year.
P1: That does not include investigations. Do not get me started.
A2: There are only fifty–two weeks in a year, so how much time did you
have to spend on forty–nine exams? I am sure each one of them lasted at
least a week.
P1: Well most of them are obviously occurring simultaneously.
M1: I am in awe of what you guys do. Honestly, I am.
P1: I think I was mentioning to M2, I used to chase international
narcotics traffickers for a living, yet my hair got grey doing this job.
Whether we agree that compliance officers are being unfairly targeted there
is consensus among regulators that the chilling effect is real, sufficiently
concerning, and that there needs to be something done about it. You can
start in the securities industry where there is at least a common jurisdiction
among multiple regulators. You can bring them together to come up with
agreed upon guidelines that would govern each regulatory entity when it
evaluates compliance officer conduct and assigns personal liability. You
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could also convene a group of advisors who represent the industry as a
whole and who could provide input to facilitate the development of
guidance and standards. This would help cultivate a feeling among the
regulated that they have had a say in the process. If you started in one
industry where there is this phenomenon of overlapping jurisdictions and
compliance officer liability is a very, very current issue, that might be a
good place.
A2: I do think we are on the cusp of political change, that a commission
like the SEC that obviously has a different political bend, would be
supportive to standards around compliance officers. If you look back at the
dissents that happened as a result of the Blackrock case, 7 and I think the
SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises case 8—where they said
you cannot hold compliance officers responsible for the actual
implementation of policies and procedures—and like P1 is saying, if you
actually could build real standards around, what I think is this third prong,
of what is reasonable in terms of having these policies and procedures at
your firm. If you do this, then you are clearly in a position to set the norms
of what is now clearly a hindsight review of people’s activities as it relates
to specific issues.
P3: Yeah, so I think this is really a fascinating discussion. I am still
struggling with this idea of focusing on the role rather than the program. I
mean, I would love to see guidance on what an effective program is and
then maybe have legislation that is a defense in the U.S. based on an
effective program.
P3: I come out of the FCPA world and there was that moment when they
were pushing for compliance defense in an accident of incredibly poor
timing—it was around the time that the Walmart case broke in the New
York Times, right, so it is dead. As a result, the DOJ then has to work in
conjunction with the SEC to issue FCPA guidance. But the problem then
is, it is the curse of discretion. The thing is, the government will tell you
that they will take care of you and give you credit for the compliance
program. The government will not prosecute the corporation, just the bad
actor that is responsible. But that turned out to be a bit of a one off and it
just does not get there. I think we need to have some legislative standard
that says, look, if you do this, this, and this, then that is an actual defense.
As a result, you can start shaping regulator behavior and supporting a
company’s programs around that.

7. See Blackrock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,
Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).
8. See SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 4116 (June 15, 2015).
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P1: That is fantastic—you know, the United Kingdom version of the
forum court practice is that there is an affirmative defense for adequate
procedures.
A3: I was wondering if you could talk more about the new
administration, their potential plans, and how you see that affecting the role
of the compliance officer, especially in financial institutions.
A2: I can address that; it is going to be great.
M1: I think it is very hard to predict. I have been in Washington for a
long time and I think that is always very hard to predict. But I think new
people bring forth the opportunity to provide new ideas.
I think that we have actually covered more in this panel than we planned.
I think that the suggestion of focusing on one agency is very interesting.
P1: But my idea is slightly different. I would focus on a few agencies
and I would focus on one issue to start, which is compliance officer
liability. I would try to herd the agencies in the securities industry with
primary responsibilities. You know that would be interesting, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), SEC, FINRA, and
New York State Department of Financial Services all working together.
M1: A2, you have been there, right? You were there for seventeen or
eighteen years?
A2: Nineteen and a half.
M1: Nineteen and a half, okay. You got a little time off for good
behavior. But what do you think? Do you think this approach will
resonate or could resonate with the SEC?
A2: So in other words, suggest that an agency create . . .
M1: Well, I guess the SEC would be the primary agency to take the lead,
but not alone.
M2: Let me ask the question differently, so A2, do you think there is
value in us answering the question for the regulators, can we set reasonable
boundaries for liability? Because they do not want us to take their tools
away from them so they are going to say no.
A2: So, a couple of things. I know as it was mentioned earlier, the
revolving door is great and I would love to come back and talk about that
more. However, I think of regulators as a revolving door within these
agencies. I do not think you are going to get a regulator who is close
enough to the issue to believe that it is personal to them. It has got to come
from you all: from the CCOs that put out those standards and basically say
these are best practices and we are going to hold ourselves to these
standards. I know that every year there is this CCO forum at the SEC and I
have assumed you have talked there and probably also attended. I do not
know if that is a forum in which these types of standards are discussed.
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P4: I mean that is a good idea. Another one, is there are advisory boards
at the SEC. Actually as this was all happening, I did call a senior person at
the SEC to suggest more advisory boards—it was in the middle of all this
debate and so many advisory boards—but I do think there will be a new
opportunity in the new administration.
A2: Is it grassroots from you all or is it something that the regulators will
take on their own?
P1: For many segments of the financial sector you will not accomplish
anything if it is just one agency because there are so many agencies that
have oversight responsibility. So I think if it is going to work, it has got to
be a little more ambitious. I think you posed a very good question, A2,
about whether this would need to come from the people being regulated
first. But frankly, I think that, politically, there would be a perception that
anything coming from the people being regulated would be too convenient,
too self–serving, and as a result, I think it would need to come from . . .
M1: One thing, I do not know if it has to be so formal as to where it
comes from. If we are able to develop something that seems to offer better
protections and are able to advance the concept that is real—that unless you
have protections, we are not going to have quality people wanting to be in
this position. People are turning down seven figure incomes because they
just do not want to take the risk and that point has to be made. Now I have
always found that what you need is one person in a position of power to
make it their cause. If one commissioner decides this is something that I
am going to start to talk about all the time and is able to recruit people at
sister agencies. You have more people believing this is really an issue.
Now I do not know if there is some vacancy in the Commission at the
present time. But I mean really, it is having someone who really is willing
to speak out.
P4: I think it is important to also look at the current construct of
lobbying by compliance officers. The National Society of Compliance
Professionals (“NSCP”) represent the compliance professionals, but when
you compare it to, say for example, the American Bar Association
(“ABA”), and this specific level of the ABA, I think there is probably a
need to think about who is the organization that is representing the interests
of compliance officers. I am active in the NSCP and believe that it is
somewhat effective, but you really need organizations that these agencies
are going to respond to.
The other thing I would say and that we have not talked about this as
much, but when you look at the dissolution of Compliance versus Legal,
you know there is still this perception that Legal drives really the function
of Compliance. Not all across the board, but I would say that starting in the
early 2000s—and this is really financial services driven—big organizations
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began to move people from operations and from back offices into their
compliance office. I have seen this happen, and so as compliance evolved
from 2004, through those crises, and through the late financial crises
through today, it is attracting a different set of people. But I do think we
have evolved enough to be the advocates that we need to be for ourselves.
A4: I want to build on what you were saying earlier about having one
person build or be the champion of a cause and the SEC, Chair [Redacted],
announcing yesterday that she will be stepping down before the end of the
current Administration. I think that she really pushed the SEC to adopt a
policy of forcing companies and individuals to admit misconduct when
they settled cases with the SEC. So what kind of changes do you see with
her stepping down? She was sort of the champion with pursuing
companies and individuals to admit misconduct. Do you see any change
under the scope of the new SEC?
M1: I do not, myself, think that there is any real issue. It sets an
environment, but I think there is a general view that individuals should be
held to task. Our question is, what is the right thing to focus on in a
compliance program. I think that the general consensus is still on
individuals having to pay and I do not think that is going to change
necessarily under a new administration.
P1: Nor should it if we are talking about affirmative misconduct or
obstruction. The issue that we are hung up on is how you define a
“wholesale failure” on the part of the compliance officer’s compliance
effort.
A5: Is there an analogy when we talk about who should take the lead and
whether we can find a way toward an affirmative defense, if not all the
way? Drawing from the international context where we have seen
collective action and executive industries step up as a group. There,
industry players sort of set their own standards. I think we could argue
about how effective it has been in the international context especially when
we look at [Redacted], but is there an analogy to be drawn, and if so, what
are the lessons to be learned?
P3 Hmm . . . you ask a great question. I think there is real room to take
what has been going on in the international space and [inaudible], which
has a compliance defense and I do not see the issues as all that different, I
mean there are different regulatory requirements in the different industries,
but the fundamental premise of if you have an effective compliance
program, how does that actually get recognized? We should actually be
more like partners with the regulators than in this sort of quasi–adversarial,
bizarre relationship where there is so much discretion on one side and a
lack of understanding on the other side. I think—and I put the Brazil
situation thing on the side because if some company really thinks it is a
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good idea to have the CCO go away for two years and says [Redacted],
then of course your management will fail and you will not have an effective
compliance program—I think that is a different issue.
But if we really are committed to good compliance, then we really
should be partnering and we should be talking about how to deal with
aberrations. If there is true misconduct, there are many of laws and
prosecutors to deal with that. But criminal wise, how we are doing this, I
think, is the wrong direction and maybe the new world will take us there.
I really want to focus on the fact that enforcement is a good thing and we
should not get back to the position where the public thinks that everyone is
sort of getting a pass and companies are not having a grip on compliance.
It always sort of starts from effective compliance. It is really the
consequences of how companies and how management are dealing with
things when they happen and whether they are doing so forthrightly,
transparently, and in a way that actually supports their business and the
general public policy.
P2: With regards to the young lady’s question about what may come out
of the Administration, it is to be determined, but one of the things I hope
does not come out is the message that compliance is no longer important
and that we should under–invest in compliance, as was the norm ten to
fifteen years ago. As companies—regardless of what administrations do—
we have to think this is crucial from the senior management down. We
have to want to get it right because of the ethics, the culture, and what we
want to say for our business.
M1: And that is a critical piece of it.
P1: That is precisely right. What we are focused on is not the propriety
of information or the propriety of enforcement. What we are focused on is
a set of circumstances where you may have misdirected enforcement and
the perception that compliance officers are being unduly singled out
[inaudible].
P1: That is the perception. Whether it is accurate or not does not really
matter. It is the perception we need to combat.
M1: We have talked about defining the role more precisely: saying what
is in, what is out, getting some description of what you would actually have
responsibility for and that is going to be different where you have direct
responsibility, and where you have roll up responsibility. We had a
discussion about that at dinner last night and we are going to get to that.
But I think that with this evolving role—the fact that the general counsel
office is supposed to set the law and you are supposed to act as the
compliance officer implementing it—a tension exists. One of my friends
wrote an article that says the nine most dangerous words are “where does it
say I cannot do that?” So if the Legal Department has the idea that the
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business people want it, nothing says they cannot do it, and if the business
people get charged, there will be minor fines, so why not go ahead with it?
That is where the compliance officer comes in and tells them to wait a
second. There are others who have responsibility—the CEO has
responsibility—but the compliance officer is supposed to be sounding the
alarm. Do you think that enough compliance officers have a seat at the
table when the decisions are being made as to first instances of programs
and do they have the ability to influence the way business customer facing
programs and other programs are implemented? I do not know whether
you feel they have sufficient voice in that process.
P1: I think it depends. There are plenty of businesses where that is not
the case. But I think the industry leaders are taking that approach and have
taken that approach for some time.
M1: So part of whatever pronouncement there might be from an agency
could both offer a safe haven and also empowerment by saying that this is
what is expected.
P4: I totally agree. I mean this goes back to the discussion around what
is the role of Legal versus Compliance and it is still evolving. Clearly, it is
different within different organizations, but compliance is a much different
job than being the general counsel or the lawyer. It really is about insuring
that you have the right processes to enable compliance with the law. I
mean that is how I look at my job. There needs to be more empowerment
of CCOs and articulation of the difference between Legal and Compliance.
P2: If you happen to have a good examination team and you have built a
solid relationship with them, they can help you drive messages home when
they speak to the Board of Directors—when they see certain things, making
sure that the right resources are put into compliance so we can get where
we need to be. A weak regulatory environment does not help any of us to
do our job. We want a balanced regulatory environment. I think that is
where the conversation should go.
M1: P2, to your point, I think what may happen now. I think no one can
predict what will happen because on one hand, there has certainly been a
finger pointed at Wall Street and business abuses by the candidate who
won. On the other hand, there is certainly a business environment—
generally as you said in certain areas, perhaps in fair lending—weighing
how much enforcement activity there is. So I do not think there is an easy
to predict what is going to happen moving forward, but I do not think a
“populist” candidate would want to abandon the effort to make sure that
corporations are held to standards. Again, I do not think, but I do not
know.
P4: If you look at so far what has transpired with the transition team and
Paul Atkins taking over that transition team, if you look back at the policies
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you see in the mid–2000s it was very much about—the Republican side
was very much about—not penalizing corporations and not being as
aggressive as it relates to corporations. If that is a theme, that certainly will
roll down to places like the SEC. That is my prediction. Obviously it is
way too early to tell.
M1: This is all speculation; really it is hard to tell. I think that if we
come back, first, there is a clear need for a definition of a CCO’s
responsibilities and role. Second, there is a need for clear articulation of
the risks that are causing concern. Third, there is a need for some method
of providing certainty and safeness for a compliance officer recognizing
that the village will have some criminals. Thus, you have to have a police
force that is trying to do the job. I think that is where we come up, but we
have to find a way to try to get one area where people are leading the way
for others. Any other thoughts?
P2: What does a good compliance management system look like? What
is going to be an affirmative defense? So that is the starting point. How
are all the different regulators going to be looking at and how are they
going to be applying those standards uniformly? If they are all applying
these standards uniformly, then we can figure out how to put it into the
legal framework.
M1: P3 there is going to be a significant burden on you to articulate this
in various ways. We have here various industries, general corporate,
securities, and banking. It is going to vary by industry. But from what I
am hearing there are enough common themes that some general set of
standards can be developed for the different industries and further tailored
to the companies.
P3: I think you can have some general principles. I think there are some
fundamentals to effective compliance. These fundamentals take different
shapes—whether it is in financial services—and then you really have drill
down to policy and procedure. However, when you are talking about
values, culture, policy and procedure, and incentives—the bucket. Do we
have commitment from management? Do we have the right policies and
procedures? Do we have third parties? What are we doing about training
and education? That means different things in different industries, but I
think some fundamentals can be flushed out. I think that if you actually get
some authoritative credit for managing an effective compliance system that
would a start to creating some parameters around this individual liability
issue we are talking about. It is like if you think of yourself as a chief of
police, with a police force, in your little town and you have a one percent
crime rate, you are a hero. You are doing your job. However, if the
officers are on the take or violating people’s civil rights under the table,
that is a different issue. You do not get prosecuted just because there is a
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spike in crime. This is the kind of issue that we are trying to wrestle with.
I think that you need to give some form of credit, that there needs to be
some degree of a safe harbor within the program, and that in no way should
it be viewed as way to let people off the hook.
P1: You will incentivize them to have the best program.
P3: Exactly, it is not about letting people off the hook. It is about
encouraging positive behavior and sophisticated risk management. Back to
your point on empowerment. Any sophisticated company that wants to do
well in the market is well advised to have a focus on a strong risk
management program. Leave regulators aside. What is new? How are you
managing it? How are you mitigating it? How are you complying with it?
How are you building your culture? If you are doing that, you are going to
be successful. Your people are going to be more invested in the purpose
and the mission of the enterprise; rather, than: self–dealing, cheating,
stealing, or whatever that undermines companies. We have so many
examples of that, so there are incentives in there as well.
P2: But the risk appetite is a key piece too. Because people think about
risk appetite differently, having that guidance around it is also extremely
important.
P3: Very important.
P2: That becomes a key component to how you think about it.
M2: So we talk about a compliance program primarily preventing and
detecting. A good compliance program will kick up issues and who knows
where the root cause is going to take you. It can take you to bad
programming, to bad software, it can take you to bounds of the
organization; you have no way of knowing where it will go. I think it is
important that we set some boundaries. We are sort of on the outcome
side, but did we think through the process correctly? Most of us would
argue yes, we did think through the process. What we learned was that the
real debate concerning our principles was about how we thought through
the process. If you think about banks, we have legacy systems. Who
knows what we are going to find when we start digging deep, but you know
if you start digging you’re going to find something. I think we have to be
really careful and educate the regulators about boundaries. Are the
boundaries doing what they are supposed to do? You cannot stop a bad
actor, right? People are making bad decisions every day and people are
making good decisions every day. P1 I think you had mentioned, that there
is a healthy intellectual tension between Compliance and Legal. And the
question really is how do you define what is legally permissible versus
what is beneficial? That goes back to your risk appetite and your tolerance.
It is not enough to say this is not beneficial for us you. You have to be able
to prove that you thought through the impact vertically into the business
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and horizontally across the entire enterprise. Again, it is demonstrating
how you think, how you govern, and how you deal with discoveries that are
uncomfortable—and that is going to vary based on everyone’s scenario. I
do not want us to be too prescriptive in terms of the boundaries because the
scenarios are going to differ and the facts are going to differ. As a CCO
you are making decisions every day based on the information you have at
that moment.
M1: M2, so what standard?
P2: The answer is really that there are many things that are permissible
and not to the benefit of your customer. If it is not to the benefit of your
customer, even if it is legally permissible, you just do not do it.
M1: Sort of an Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts and Practices
(“UDAP”) standard? 9
P2: Yes.
P4: That would be a very nice thing; except, in the financial services
business that I am in, conflicts are present every day. I mean you make
fees off of your customer base and I think to me it comes down to what is
that threshold around conflicts that you are able to mitigate and that you
should not have at all?
M1: Let us try to articulate a more precise standard along the lines that
P1 suggested. Where is the forum where that enhanced standard should be
fleshed out so it can be presented?
A6: I think in the banking sector, it is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) because the FDIC is a board that comprises
[inaudible].
M1: I am not saying that. I am asking on the side of the compliance
officers, where is a good place?
A1: How about the financial services round table?
[Head nods from panelists].
M1: In your case, the clearinghouse. The trouble is that when you look
at this in any number of organizations, compliance officers are going to be
far down the line in terms of what they are going to make important to
them. I am not even thinking in terms of priorities. I am thinking of what
is the best forum where this could be further developed after our panel.
How does a dialogue develop?
P1: One way, to gain a little traction on the issue is to bring to the table
former regulators and either current or former industry leaders with
sufficient credentials, irrespective of their political inclinations, to begin the
dialogue around the issue. This will generate some momentum and then,
obviously, at the right time you can reach out to one agency with the hope
9. 15 U.S.C. § 45, et. seq.
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of getting a buy in. This would hopefully lead to a buy in by another, and a
sort of a domino effect would occur. I do not think for a minute that it
would be easy to achieve coordination among a bunch of different
regulatory agencies with competing jurisdiction. If it were not difficult,
there would be one agency or several that would work very well together.
But it is certainly an issue that is worth exploring. If you operate under the
assumption that it is a bad idea to deter talented people from pursuing the
critical role of a compliance officer, then something must be done to
combat the perception of targeting.
P4: I guess your perspective can be clouded by the daily accountability
that you are dealing with. I agree it is a fantastic job. But the discussion
that we are having sometimes can really get in the way of having the right
perspective around what a great job it is.

*

*

*

PANEL II: A CCO’S APPROPRIATE
SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES
M = Moderator
P = Panelist
A= Attendee*

M: Our next panel is going to turn more precisely to defining the Chief
Compliance Officer’s (“CCO”) role. What I am going to do is let everyone
introduce himself or herself and say how they got to where they are now. I
think background is important. [P1], could you start us out?
P1: Sure, I started out as a lawyer. I worked as a commercial litigator
and bankruptcy practitioner. More specifically, I worked with creditor’s
rights and with Article 9. I went on to become in–house counsel for a
company because my wife told me I needed to spend a little more time at
home because private practice was sending me around a lot. In 2005, my
employer asked me to become the CCO. Like the people here, it was very
much an accidental journey into compliance. But once I got here, it was
the best job I have had. It was a very exciting role.
P2: As some of you may know, I am a Professor of [Redacted]. I have
been teaching for over twenty years now—it is hard to believe. Before I
became a professor, I worked as a community organizer and then went to
law school.
You might wonder what I am doing on this panel—and I wonder that
myself [laughter]—but there are two relevant areas to what I think about, to
what I write about, and to what I teach that relate to this wonderful
program. One of them is Labor and Employment Law and I believe that is
why I was recruited here—even though the type of Labor and Employment
Law that I do is probably different. But still, I am fascinated to hear this
discussion about defining best practices and seeing the really important
function of compliance officers and how do you do that—through
employment contracts, through best practices documents, or whatever I am
sure we will be talking a lot at this panel.
The second relevant area is from my legal ethics teaching. I had been
thinking about and writing a little bit about the changing nature of the legal
* Special thanks to William Warmke & Seth Weintraub for their tireless work in
transcribing Panel II.
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profession and the work that legal professionals do. More specifically, I
think, is the move towards more interdisciplinary–ness and the way in
which many lawyers or people who have gone to law school will go on to
have jobs that are not traditional legal jobs. I think in a compliance
officer’s space, you are working with business management and I know
many come from business school. I hear a lot about compliance officers
using organizational psychology, finance, accounting, investigating,
auditing, testing, and data analytics. There are a lot of fascinating ways in
which the law plus a bunch of other disciplines come together in the
compliance officer’s role. As a result, I think that it is going to be a really
exciting area that many people—some of whom go through law school and
some of whom go through other disciplinary doors—will go into. I am just
really excited to be hearing how the role is evolving and its importance. I
am also excited to hear about this concept of how legal is not really in
touch with the organization, and then you have got the compliance officers
who are actually working to make sure the organization complies with
regulations.
M: I think they are both in touch with the organizations, but in different
ways. You modestly did not mention that you were an editor on a law
review. You did not mention your experience having grown up in East
Pakistan, substantial periods of time in Romania, Australia, and Turkey.
That is a fascinating background. But more importantly, we are in a
recruitment effort here to get people with your caliber of interest to help us
in this definitional process. We are hoping to recruit you to our cause.
P2: Well, I am already recruited, but how much time I have is another
question [laughter].
M: So, with that, let us get started.
P1: The topic of this session is to try to define the role more particularly.
I think from the discussion we had on the previous panel, it is pretty clear
that trying to manage the scope of your responsibility is one way of
limiting your liability. If the scope of your liability can be defined, you can
put some corners around what your liability is.
So, having a law background, I started by asking what do the law and
regulations say? There is not any law or regulation that defines the scope
of a compliance officer. What there is, are the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
for how prosecutors can give credit to corporations if they have an effective
compliance program. 1 Chapter eight of the Sentencing Guidelines provides
some insights into what an effective compliance program is. 2 Additionally,
within the financial services industry, in 2008, the Federal Reserve
1. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
2. Id. ch. 8.
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published a document called the Compliance Function of Banks, which
provides some definition of the role of compliance and what an effective
program looks like. 3 Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”) recently came out with standards for overall risk
management, which provides some insights into what should be included in
a compliance program. 4 Finally and most recently, on December 7, 2016,
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”)
published an interagency compliance program rating system for consumer
compliance programs. 5 While this system is limited to consumers, it still
provides some framework into what is expected of a compliance program. 6
So, why do I tell you about all those documents? Well, thinking about
the role of the compliance officer, you have to think of it in terms of (1)
what is the subject matter scope that you have responsibility for in your
organization, and (2) what are some of the structural elements of a program
over which, as a compliance officer, you are required to have oversight. I
think of it in two ways. One is the oversight piece and the other is the
management piece. As far as the program elements, let me start talking
about subject matter scope first.
If you read the documents, particularly chapter eight of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, it basically says that a compliance program—in
order to be effective—must provide coverage for all laws and regulations. 7
This even extends to the financial services space with guidance from your
regulators. 8 So statically, all laws and regulations—that is your scope—is
pretty broad. How do you peel that back? The answer goes back to our
prior conversation; looking at officers with other responsibilities is really
important and something that you can do if you have a board that
understands. I will just give an example. In the financial services space,
regulations came out after the financial crisis, requiring institutions to do a
comprehensive capital adequacy review. There were prescribed methods
by which that had to happen. Essentially, financial management
institutions had to assume scenarios that were going to impact their
organization and business model using economic modeling—i.e. whether
3. FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 08–8 / CA 08–11, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS WITH COMPLEX
COMPLIANCE PROFILES (2008).
4. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, M–CRG,
CORPORATE AND RISK GOVERNANCE (2016).
5. See generally FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC–2016–0003,
UNIFORM INTERAGENCY CONSUMER COMPLIANCE RATING SYSTEM (2016).
6. Id.
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
8. See id.
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you had enough capital on hand to weather the storm. They came up with
these crazy scenarios with twenty percent unemployment lasting for three
years, and a series of different scenarios you would come up with, and you
would model that out. I do not know anything about modeling; I do not
want to know anything about modeling. Our Chief Financial Officer
(“CFO”) has people within the Finance Division that do that work; so why
should I, as the CCO, need to get into all of those weeds? The answer is I
do not believe I need to. I think the CFO has responsibility for those
aspects of the program—to the extent he has an obligation to comply with
law or regulations that define how he does that. As a CCO, I just need to
be aware that the CFO has an effective program in place that is following
the most recent guidelines. As CCO, all you have to do is say, “ok, let me
take all of that and break it down in my organization and let me get my
board behind me to define who is going to be responsible for what.” For
example, in my organization, I am responsible for consumer protection
laws and regulation. This means that I am responsible for anti–money
laundering regulations and overseeing our ethics program. As a result, I
think about things like insider trading and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act 9 in my ethics program. Fortunately, I do not have the size of the
company as some other panelists. Consequently, my concerns in that
regard are not as great as others. But that is the scope of my program—
basically, those three areas. If things go wrong in those program areas, I
am going to be on the hook for that. However, if things go wrong in our
labor and employment law, if we are not following the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 10—say we have employees wrongly categorized as between
exempt or not exempt employees—our Human Resources (“HR”) head is
going to take the hit for that, not me. That is because our board has defined
that as HR’s responsibility. Consequently, I think one of the things that
you have to do first when you consider the scope of your program, is to
define the pieces that you are responsible for managing, recognizing that
you have a responsibility of oversight over the whole program.
I have put on the white board a list of the elements that are identified in
those documents that I talked about in the beginning. I think it is a little
helpful to walk through and to talk through them a little bit. First, what the
documents tell you is that compliance programs are required to educate
board members on what the legal expectations are and the risks that exist
within the company. Second, compliance programs have to provide
effective reporting to the board and senior executive management so that
the board can decide what risk tolerance they want to adopt. This means
that the board has the obligation to adopt a risk tolerance and you, as a
9. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, et seq.
10. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
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compliance professional, need to help define that risk tolerance as it relates
to compliance with rules and regulations. Then, there needs to be a clear
tone from the top to create a culture of compliance within your
organization. If your organization does not have the core value of doing
the right thing, go and find another job as a CCO. Otherwise, you are
going to have a really tough time in that job and you are going to be one of
those people who is more likely to be prosecuted than not.
M: Could I stop you for one second? Just looking at the board, how do
you educate the board? Additionally, when you talk about risk tolerance,
are you talking about risk of violations or what type of risk are you
referring to?
P1: It is the risk of violations at the end of the day. But you cannot have
risk tolerance that says, “it is ok to violate the law so many times.” You
cannot set a tolerance like that. Rather, it is compliance’s endeavor to be in
compliance with all laws and regulations and we have to put in place
programs that effectively manage the risk of us having systemic
breakdowns. I love the analogy that was used earlier. We create a legal
framework and an enforcement network for our village. We do not expect
that we are going to have no crime, but we expect that we are going to have
a small amount of crime and we are going to address that crime quickly.
M: In other words, we are not going to have a cop on every corner, but
we are going to have a reasonable number of officers patrolling trying to
prevent crime? It is not that we have no tolerance for criminal or improper
behavior, but we can only spend so much in this area, so this is the risk we
must take? That is the reasonable approach? But in your organization,
how do you relate to the board?
P1: With respect to the board, what I tend to provide the board is
information about the consumer protection laws and regulation with which
our business units have to comply with. For example, I inform the board of
the different issues that arise as we are offering those products, services,
etc. When we are testing programs, we identify issues and then inform the
board as to what they are.
M: How do you do that? Do you meet with them on a quarterly basis?
P1: I meet with the Audit Committee of our Public Company Board
quarterly, and I meet with our Bank Board ten times a year. Our subsidiary
Bank Board—a Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) 11 committee—is meeting ten
times a year and I report to that committee at every meeting. I report to the
Board of the Public Company Audit Committee once a year and typically
report once a year to the full Board.
M: Do you have to report through someone or do you go direct?
11. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5311, et seq.
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P1: I am speaking directly to the board. From a supervisory perspective,
I report up to the Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”) of our company.
M: Is that pretty much the common model at banks?
P1: I would say it is more common for the CCO to now report to a CRO
rather than to a General Counsel (“GC”) in the financial services space.
There are some institutions where the CCO is a peer of the CRO. There are
also some institutions where the CCO reports to the Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”). In our organization, I am not on the Management
Committee, but the CRO is.
M: Just a few more questions. When you are reporting to the GC or to
the CEO, is there this sense that the CEO is trying to make this company
successful and you have to get on the team? Do you see reporting to the
GC—who is generally on the CEO’s team—or the CEO as having any risks
for an institution?
P1: Not so much. At some point, you have to have a leader over
everything; so I do not feel that at all. There has to be some person who is
responsible for the workings of the company. That person has to have an
appropriate balance between risk management, long term revenue
generation, short term hitting targets, and so forth. I think you try to align
in an organization where they take a longer view.
A1: When compliance officers report to the GC, it relies heavily on
having the compliance officer having a great relationship with the GC. So,
if you have a lawyer as GC, you can have a tension between the buck
stopping at the compliance officer versus going over the compliance
officer’s head by going directly to the GC. I think that is a model that
comes under pressure, obviously.
P1: No, I think that is true. In two of my past organizations, they started
out reporting to the GC, but my program was moved to reporting to the
CRO.
M: We have one question. I do not want to break your flow too much,
but I think it is good to have dialogue.
A1: It is not just a risk of fines, it is a reputation risk and business risk
because in some cases if we have too many violations, then we cannot do
things like open branches, at least in the banking industry. So, when we are
talking about risk appetite, we do have to characterize these other issues
that are very tangential to compliance.
P1: That is a good point.
P1: That is a great point which leads to the second thing up there on the
white board, which is the independence expectation of the compliance
function. One of the things that the documents say, is that you have to have
a compliance officer that has sufficient authority and sufficient resources,
both human and technical. There has to be an organization structure with
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clearly defined roles and delegation of day–to–day responsibilities.
Finally, the organization structure has to be both independent from the
business—particularly with respects to monitoring and supervision over
practices—and yet, at the same time, highly integrated with the business—
particularly with respect to the design, the implementation, and the
monitoring of controls that exist within the businesses. As a result,
designing that framework is pretty exciting; it is a pretty exciting challenge.
You have to really become a system engineer or process engineer that
understands how the business process works. You have to help design
where the control points and where they should be in process. You have to
help figure out if they should be systemic controls, automated controls,
manual controls, a second review over the control, or a detective control.
That is the example I like to give when I talk to my business managers.
Look, when you have a high–risk situation, you are going to want to have a
very strong and robust control system.
Let us think about it like an automobile. There is a high risk that if you
crash in an automobile that is devoid of controls, that you will fly through
the windshield of that automobile. There is a significant risk and you will
probably die. But if there are automated controls—like airbags that sit
there in front of you—and there are automated monitoring controls that you
all see—like that annoying light or dashboard thing that goes off and tells
you to buckle your seatbelt and that your passenger side airbag is on and
working—this risk is significantly reduced. If you have a high–risk
process, you want to build both these automated control and automated
detection mechanisms into your process. Consequently, you have to work
with businesses to help them understand what a control is and where they
need to put it in. And that is where you are highly integrated. However,
you also have to have a high degree of independence because you have to
come around with your testing arm and say, “hey, are you really doing that
right?” You have to take an independent sample and an independent look
to figure out whether your controls are actually working.
M: Can you please talk more on the subject of testing and audit
committee compliance relationships?
P1: The internal audit function has a broad responsibility to look over
the entire control framework within an organization whereas compliance is
a little more granular. Compliance is looking for specific controls within
business processes to attack legal regulatory risks. Essentially, the audit
function is a little broader.
P2: I have a question. When you sit down to negotiate to take a job as a
CCO, you are talking as if your role designs a lot of this once you take the
job. But something must have existed before and a part of your job is to
actually design. So, how much of that is negotiated? Are you negotiating
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with the employer about what exactly what your job is going to look like?
Are you memorializing this in an employment contract?
P1: I have changed jobs in this role twice now and in it is a very delicate
dance. On the one hand, when you are talking with the CEO and business
partners, you want them to love you and to think you are going to be their
partner and their best friend. But on the other hand, you are going to help
them get through a weirdness that they have to deal with in their business.
That is one of the exciting parts of the job, but you have to convince them
of that. You have to feel that your CEO and your board are going to
support you when you have to be the one to tell the business that they
cannot do something, or that they cannot do it the way they want to do it.
That is a very delicate dance and you have to judge based upon the
responses that you get from the board. For example, when I interviewed
with the Audit Committee Chair and the Board Committee, I got a high
level of confidence that they would have my back. But you should go
further and interview with the executives to see whether they are going to
be willing to listen to you when you are trying to talk with them about the
control environment. If you get the sense that you have got a whole bunch
of cowboy business leaders that are not interested in collaborating and
cooperating with you, your job is going to be miserable.
P3: You are starting to see the law firms getting happy drafting
employment contracts because a lot of risk officers are being very explicit
in their contract negotiations, especially because there is a shortage. So,
you are basically playing musical chairs.
M: Do you think that if we began to have a little more definition around
what the regulators expect, it would drive the negotiations process?
Because then the CCO could say, “yeah, you have got to cover that and I
cannot take the job until it is covered because the regulator expects you to
cover that.” A little more definition around it makes it a little easier to
have that discussion, right?
P3: I think that is a good place to start. We keep speaking of things
other industries do, but if you think about the banking industry—which is
answering questions of financial soundness—the question is will it impact
capital? That is a totally different question. That is why this is very
important. Is it that you have a regulator who is only looking at the
financial soundness? Or do you have new regulators who could care less
about the impact on earnings or capital and are concerned exclusively with
consumer protection? Is it possible that what satisfies some regulators does
not satisfy a consumer protection regulator? To further complicate matters,
you also have the securities regulators. They are an enforcement agency.
It is a totally different question that they are answering. Finally, you have
to be concerned with international regulators.

2017

PANEL II

229

Consequently, compliance officers are being very specific about their
authority to hire and their budgets. They are starting to negotiate how
much they have in reserves if they take this fall because they know they
have to have a successful execution. As a result, it is quite interesting
hearing these CCO call to say, “hey, would you think about this
provision?” We have never talked like that before. But since this CCO
liability piece has not been solved, they are trying to get specific terms in
their employment contracts to have at least some defense or boundaries
around what they have the authority to do.
P1: I was not so specific in my negotiations; I wish I had maybe talked
to you first [laughter].
M: What is the name of the compliance association you mentioned?
P1: I haven’t heard of it.
A2: National Society of Compliance Professionals (“NSCP”).
M: In my view, I thought what might emerge from this Panel is at least
some suggestion as to what those items for discussion are that you should
discuss with your employer before you take the job. But, we took off . . .
P1: No, that is all right. We should continue to have these thoughts.
The next part of the compliance program that is on the white board is
having an effective risk assessment. Basically, I think the way this works
in most organizations is that you identify all of the laws and regulations
that apply to each of your respective business processes. In effect, you map
the requirements of those laws and regulations and apply them to the
processes and to the controls. Then through your testing, you determine
whether those controls are effective. Finally, you determine what your
residual risk is. Essentially, you assume what the risk is in the absence of
control. Then you look at what the control framework is, how well you test
it, and you get a residual risk. This helps management figure out where to
place resources to create an effective control environment. Obviously, you
have to have policies, procedures, and controls.
You also need to have awareness education and training. There are
actually three levels of education. The first is you have to be aware of a
risk. All employees within the company need to be aware of risks of
compliance.
Second, you have the education piece, which is really what you want to
do for your more senior executive management and maybe middle
management of the firm because they are the ones who are designing the
processes and designing the controls. As a result, they need to be really
educated on the risk, what happens if it goes wrong, how you can control
for it, and that kind of thing.
Third, you have training, which is for your employees to teach them how
to react. You need to train soldiers that are in the military because you do
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not want them to have to, when they are sitting in a firefight, take out their
manual to figure out how to use their AK–47. They have to know how to
use that and they have to be prepared by knowing exactly where to aim and
how to shoot it. You want your employees to react and to react
consistently all the time. It is that kind of training; it is very procedural.
You want them to do the right thing and do it the right way.
Fourth, comes monitoring and testing. Compliance officers have
functions that report up and are essentially audit functions. But they are
targeted audit functions that look at the control framework for the controls
that exist in the organization.
The fifth element you are supposed to have is an enforcement element,
which I thought was interesting. I forgot which of the documents I read
this in, but it said compliance programs need to provide incentives to
comply and disciplinary action with the respect to noncompliance. And,
so, we do a lot of the latter, most of the time. But I do not really have a lot
of great incentives to comply. I do however have a lot of negative
consequences. For example . . .
M: You could use some gold stars [laughter].
P1: Yeah [laughter]. But, for example, if a company does not
completely require training, they are subject to written warning and they
can be terminated if they do not finish their required training. This is a
very clear concept in some industries. They get a black mark on their
public record, which is available for anyone to see if they are a registered
representative. So that is one way in which we enforce compliance.
One of the other areas that they talk about in the programs, is having data
analytics and reporting. This means being able to analyze data within your
firms to be able to quantifiably determine what the amount of risk is in
your processes, and then being able to report that up to your board. This is
really hard stuff. Figuring out how to quantify the risks associated with
non–compliance is difficult to do, but I am not making this stuff up. This is
what the documents say our programs are responsible for doing.
Then, after we do all of this within our own organizations—we make
sure we are compliant—we then have to figure out how we make sure all
the third parties we engage with that provide services in support for us have
effective compliance programs in their organizations as well. As a result, I
have a whole third–party unit that works with our third–party vendors.
This unit goes through and pesters the third–party vendors with
questionnaires that ask them how effectively they are training their
employees, how effectively they have policies and procedures, and whether
they are testing. We get that information back and then we kind of say we
have done our diligence and we can rely on the third party.
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In respect to those third–parties, we also have to have change controls in
place. This is one where the intersection of law and compliance is
probably the most demonstrated. Here, change can happen through a
couple of different ways. One way it happens is because the laws and
regulations of the expectations change. When they change, what I do is I
rely on my GC’s office because they monitor the laws and regulations in
our organization. The GC’s office comes up with this memorandum that
they send out. This memorandum says, “hey, the law changed, here are the
new requirements.” We take that and we work with the business partners
to whom that law applies to help them make changes in their control
framework if, and when, it is necessary. As a result, you would need to
rely heavily on the law department to help you in that process.
Another way you have change is if your organization changes. If your
business lines progress and begin to do something different, you have to be
able to detect that. You have to be able to identify the body of existing law
and regulations that may apply to that new process, product or service.
You have to be able to effectively help build the control framework
necessary for that change if they have changed their business.
Additionally, change occurs within the systems. This is where I think
we probably lose most of our hair. That is when technology systems
change. For example, when they make a code change. You have to have
testing protocols in place to make sure that changing the code in that way
does not negatively impact something else down the line. I have learned
far more about regression testing of analytic models and regression testing
of systems than I ever wanted to know. And they certainly did not teach
me that in law school.
One of the other areas that they talk about in the programs is tracking
issues and actions. When issues are identified—whether if it’s from the
regulators or from our auditors—from our compliance testing, we identify
the issue, we identify things that are broken, and we have to fix them or
management has to fix them. We are held accountable for making sure
management fixes them.
Lastly—then I will stop talking and we can get into more discussion—is
complaint response. Basically, the notion is listen to your customers. If
your customers are complaining about something, there is probably
something wrong with your process. Listen to the complaints and use that
as data–mining. It works to a point. The problem is, I think, as consumers
become more educated and they just want a better result, they can game the
system. It is sort of like when I used to litigate, when writing pleadings,
the plaintiff’s lawyers would say the victim was rendered disabled. You
will have consumers who will contact them and say I have been unfairly
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treated, I have been deceived, and I have been abused. The lawyers threw
all the acronyms because they are trained and they know what that means.
But we listen to complaints actually as part of our jobs. So, that is what
the expectations are of a compliance program. A compliance officer is
required to oversee all of that for all laws and regulations and manage that
for whatever subset of regulations your board defines as your
responsibility. Yours is going to be different than mine because we are in
different industries.
M: So, you have said this is what the literature tells us and this is what
we must do. Is there a consolidated presentation of that?
P1: No.
P2: He is going to write it [laughter].
P1: Before we talk about tools, I want to pick up on something you
talked about because it is one of the things that concerns me—and I have
the responsibly of overseeing ethics in our organization, as you do.
Monitoring employees, I mean how much monitoring is really necessary in
order to assure compliance space? You know, is more monitoring always
better, or is there some point at which we are monitoring our employees too
much? I mean we can do a lot by monitoring utilization of systems. I can
tell you when employees badge in in the morning, I can tell you when they
badge out at night. I could mine that data and tell you whether employees
are cheating, or if they are working enough hours. I could mine data from
their computers to see how many times they are going to—well, we can
block websites and we do—but if I want to mine how many people are
going on to websites other than the corporate websites, I can do that. There
are lots of things we can do to data mine to monitor employees. How much
is enough? Is it really ethical? Do we really need to do that? When is it
enough so that we are doing our job, but not so much that we are infringing
upon what most normal people would think of as general privacy?
P2: I think that is an area where the law is in flux and very variable
depending on what state you are in and what statutes exist. So, there you
have got both sides. On one side, it is too much monitoring where you may
run into privacy problems and on the other side, too little could be
dangerous.
P1: You are going to get me to go into a tirade here, but when you talk
about big data, particularly . . . Yes, we have a question.
A3: How much of a role does the CCO have in company’s data retention
and destruction policy?
P1: I hate that policy; I try to run away from it [laughter]. It can be very
technical. And there are actually people with certifications on how much
stuff you should keep and retain—records management stuff. Honestly, I
think we have a records retention policy that is overseen at our company by
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our head of security. I am going to make sure it stays there and does not
come to me [laughter]. So, I abide by it. I apply the policy to my program
but I am not responsible for setting it.
P3: Some large firms have a Chief Data Officer as well. So you are
starting to see a role of a data office. A lot of data security and record
retention protocols are somewhat in that environment. Most of them are
moving away from the CCO dealing with that.
I want to speak to the privacy issue. I think it really has to be driven by
your ability to identify conduct and concentrate on areas where it is heavily
manual and easily manipulated. If you are targeted, I think you are going
to have to go deep enough to give yourself reasonable assurance. But
where you can easily identify, I think you should, probably because we
know it takes a long time . . . most of the time people’s judgments change
based on what is going on. So, think about it in that context.
P1: Right. For example . . . oh yes, question.
A4: As technology increases, will it be easier and easier to get more
access to what your employees are doing? As a result, how much are you
responsible for monitoring what your employees are actually doing?
P1: That’s precisely the point I was getting at. Technology is going to
allow us to do more and more monitoring. The example I was going to
pick up on is, I could think of scenario where we get our employees to
agree that we have the right to run a credit check on them to see how they
are doing because we are in the financial services industry. In theory, I
could do polls on people’s credits and if you have a very negative and nasty
credit score, I might put a higher scrutiny on you because you are a higher
risk for stealing from the bank because you have a lower credit score. I
mean it’s like financial profiling of our customers. Should we be doing
that? Is that ethical? Is that right?
P2: I think that is something you would want to talk to your legal
counsels about because I do think there are benefits and risk on both sides.
All kinds of bells go off in my head about the possible privacy violations
and regulations. You would know better than me. I could just think of a
handful of things that could be problematic. I can also see that you could
run a risk of being sued for negligent hiring. For example, if you hired
somebody that ended up being a bad apple and you could have detected it
by using what people typically do and researching applicants. If you did
not do those things, you could be sued. So, I think that’s where a legal
advisor would be key.
P1: It comes to the point that we are being charged as compliance
officers with an increasing level of liability. As a result, we have to do our
job more effectively and do more monitoring to make sure that there are
fewer bad people running around our community. That there are less
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people in jail. What does that do? It becomes an infringement—not that I
am a card–carrying member of the ACLU—but it really does tend to
infringe upon the personal rights and the liberties of individuals. If we do
our job really effectively, we may totally run all over what people may
think are individual civil liberties as employees of a company.
P2: I do not think there is a line. But there are things that are more
clearly work-related and, therefore, appropriate for monitoring versus some
things that are heading into an area where there is sort of a balancing,
because even those common–law tests . . . the courts are still doing this
balancing of individual rights versus business interests, so you are getting
into an area where more things are problematic. But some things are
obviously okay, right? That would be the advice I would give an employer.
A7: My question might push us right back towards saying we need a
standard across the industry. But we talked a little about how when you are
thinking about creating these analytical frameworks, you face an
enforcement action that the desire to get that cooperation credit is going to
be great. However, on the compliance side, do you think about those
second order effects when the enforcer comes knocking and you have these
robust monitoring frameworks? If the regulator or the prosecutor gives you
cooperation credit, do you then hand it over? How does that influence your
decision on the front end? Should it?
P1: I think that for most organizations that are faced with regulatory
enforcement actions, there is not a lot of benefit in trying to fight. You
typically lose a certain amount of control over what you are going to do.
You typically cede control to the regulator who tells you what they want to
see you investigate, and you do it because you want to get out from under
whatever enforcement order you are facing.
A7: I am more talking about backwards-looking. So, in the employee–
employer relationship, maybe it is easier to say you sign a contract so we
can watch what you are doing. Then when the enforcement action comes
down, we read the contract and the regulator or the prosecutor says, “ok,
give me what you have got.” You say it is okay for us to have it in this
relationship, but how are we going to hand that over as a corporate entity
going to the government?
P1: If you have it, you have to give it over.
P2: I do not think the law has even started to deal with all of the ways in
which traditional protections apply in the data algorithms world.
A8: Going to the idea of monitoring and going to the basic level, as a
CCO, what would you say is an effective application of all of these
regulations and laws? What is an effective way of building this culture of
ethics and, I guess, a beneficial and productive workforce at the lowest
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level? Do you see those going hand in hand or do you consider them two
different operations, just monitoring?
P1: That is a great question. What you are pointing out is that a highly
controlled environment may actually result in a culture of compliant ethical
behavior. I guess prisons are very highly controlled environments and the
culture that exists within them tends to not be a very good culture where
people care about each other and try to do the right thing. Yet, they are
highly controlled. I do not know that I am convinced that increasing
physical control over human beings in a social space is necessarily going to
result in the kind of culture that most of us want to live in. I think we
would all rather develop a culture where the goodness comes from within
and is encouraged by those around us. I am not entirely cynical [laughter],
but I think that is the sort of conundrum we are dealing with.
M: So, part of a compliance officer’s role is to create and to explain why
compliance with the given rules makes sense and is in the interest of the
individual and the company. It is not necessarily giving out gold stars, but
rather convincing people that this is the way that your behavior is in the
interest of our company and this is why it is essential to you and our fellow
employees. Is that part of . . . do you have an education training that has a
cultural aspect to it too?
P1: Yeah, it is a little bit of indoctrination. We have a . . . it is almost a
religious indoctrination into the culture of your company. You cannot hire
enough compliance officers to watch every employee. You have to hope
that you hire mostly good employees and that they will be your force
multiplier to help you in your programs.
M: As you see new threats—we are certainly seeing significant threats in
the cyber area—we see this pattern where the company is at fault for not
having protected itself. You see this interesting conundrum where the
government is telling the company that they are there to help you and they
want to guide you. As a result, the company feels like they have to
cooperate more with the government. However, there is also an evolving
expectation that because the government is regulating these things, they are
going to start tagging you. As in privacy, there is an evolving set of laws.
How do you as a compliance officer decide where you are on the spectrum
in terms of moving from (1) letting us all try to get this right to (2) “hey,
we have an enforcement issue here?”
P1: I do not know that there is a magic formula for that; I am sure there
is not. I think you have to evaluate it on case–by–case basis, looking at a
variety of different factors. We are starting to think about that in the
industry; about how do you measure good cultures? We do an employee
opinion survey. On that survey are some questions about ethical behavior
that are designed to illicit responses from employees to help us gauge
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whether our employees are more ethical than not. We use that as measure,
and it is kind of a bad measure.
P2: Do you hire psychologists to create those and validate those survey
instruments?
P1: The third party that we hire does that.
P2: Ok.
P1: The third party that facilitates the survey creates those questions.
A9: Employee engagement culture is huge right now. How do we enable
thinking and innovation when there are so many controls in place?
P1: One of the questions that came up around big data—I forgot who
raised that—but we talked about it in the context of monitoring employee
behavior. I do not know if the people—the common public—are aware
how much we use that to monitor customer behavior in financial services.
Because for our anti–money laundering programs, what we are required to
do under this program, is when you come in our door and when you open
an account at any financial institution—even a credit union—you are
required to give information to us. We ask you questions about your
anticipated activities, about who you are, about your citizenship, and about
your occupation. In my case, we created models because we are a very
large online bank. We have a model that creates scores of whether you are
more likely to be a problem for us from a money laundering perspective.
Then we monitor transactions in your account. We have very sophisticated
transaction monitors that sit on top of every transaction that you do every
day. When one of those alerts occurs, there is an individual—who
probably earns compensation between, depending on where they are,
$40,000 and $120,000 a year—who takes a look at the alerted transactions
on you. They then do a bunch of things. First, they go out and look; they
Google you to see if there is any type of negative news. They use some
sophisticated big data aggregators to find out everything they can about
you, such as: where you live, what you do, and everything else that they
can. They pull that into a file. Then they make a decision about whether
the activity they observed in your account was suspicious. Then they file a
suspicious activity report, which unbeknownst to you, goes to the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).
If you are criminally
prosecuted by one of our Department of Justice colleagues—and keep me
honest on this—you are never entitled to ever receive that information.
The scarier part is that we are required to keep all of the data we collect and
law enforcement is entitled to get all of that information just by asking.
They do not have to issue a subpoena. They just say, “hey, you filed
Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) on so–and–so, let me have your
investigative file.” The expectation on us as an industry, is that we are
doing more and more to pull together the profile so that when law
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enforcement asks us, we turn all of that over. The nature of that
investigation—and it has always been bothersome to me—is that as a
defendant in a criminal action, you are never entitled to get that information
from law enforcement.
A9: But does that not get litigated?
P1: Well it was, but the Supreme Court upheld it.
M: So, back to . . .
P1: Sorry, I digressed a bit [laughter].
M: Back to our discussion, how do we create an overall expectation that
is generic enough that it covers all compliance programs, but can also be
tinkered down to specific companies?
P1: One of the suggestions we discussed last evening—and we can draw
parallels with what has happened in the financial space—is that when
financial records are created and financial statements are created, the CFO
and CEO have to sign off on those statements. What happens is that in
order for the CEO to do so, they get certifications from a variety of other
officers within the organization who are responsible for monitoring those
key financial controls. Those sub–certifications go up to the CFO who will
look at them and then become responsible. The sub–certifications make it
very clear who is responsible for what in the company. As a result, one of
the things that I think would be useful is to define the scope of the
management responsibility of the CCO as opposed to what is the
management responsibility of other officers of the company. Having sub–
certifications from those other officers would give the CCO some comfort.
It would help define the role in a way that would not be confusing later on
when the excrement does hit the blade, and there is an action brought
against the organization.
M: So, that might be a part of that list of responsibilities of what is
within the scope and what is outside of the scope. Is there any duty with
respect to those things that are not direct responsibilities? For example, is
there a duty to make an inquiry regarding something that should have
raised a red flag with the compliance officer? Or would it be better to say,
you report to the board for your issues and I will report to the board for my
issues?
P1: I would like to do the latter if I could. But I think there is a benefit
to the board in seeing the totality of compliance and risk across the
organization horizontally. I think there is a value in collecting the data
from the different disciplines on compliance and pulling that together so
that the board can see it. I think that as a compliance officer—
distinguishing between oversight and management—the duty of oversight
is to not blindly pass forward the information from your colleagues who
have that responsibility. I think you have a responsibility to call out
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anything that is obviously wrong. As long as you are doing that, I think
that is sort of the standard that should be applied.
M: Do you have the authority to call it out or to actually cause a remedy?
P1: I think that is a great question. Partly, I think your obligation needs
to be reflected in the scope of authority that you have. If you are on the
Management Committee—if you have that full seat at the table, and you
are not at the kid’s table—I think that you have more of an obligation to
challenge the . . .
M: So you would have some definition around this. If I am at the CCO
level and I report directly to the board, I am a peer of these other people.
Maybe I then have the responsibility to call them out and say, “hey, I am
going to the board if you do not solve this problem.” Or, if you are not,
then that would be one of those issues that would be negotiated in the
employment agreement.
P3: What you are talking about is a general responsibility for the system.
Every company can articulate this differently depending on its organization
structures. Some CCOs have direct authority, where they are responsible
for managing it. Some companies may have a first line of defense that
actually has an independent compliance organization that is accountable
with oversight. Some of those CCOs are distributed across multiple areas
of the company. Even within these different organizational structures,
there have to be explicit triggers on when certain matters need to be
reported to the board and presented by the accountable executive. The
CCO can clearly designate that if there are any high–risk issues, then
account executives are accountable for reporting to the board. That is a
reasonable approach because you want an expert articulating the risk to the
board. This makes sense for areas not directly in your control because
having clear rules of engagement on how certain triggers will be presented
to the board is reasonable. I am of the view—to the extent that the culture
supports doing what is best—that the reporting lines actually can set a
strong argument if you have direct access. It does not matter where you sit
on the organizational chart as long as you have direct access.
M: So, that is the issue, do you always have direct access?
P3: Yes, and that access goes both ways. Access to sufficient
information to make good decisions and access to the challenges to the
extent that you believe a matter is warranted for debate.
P1: I would agree with that. I do think though, it does not necessarily
have to be a direct report to the CEO. I think organizational structures are
going to be different and there are different subject matter scopes for the
CCO. The CCO may sit at different places in the organization, but it has to
be a consideration. You have to think that this person is going to have that
scope of responsibility. Where, in our pyramid, does that role need to be in
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order for it to be effective? You can define the role differently to make it
effective at a lower level in the organization, but then you cannot hold that
person to the same level of responsibility and accountability as somebody
who has the seat at the executive committee.
P2: That would seem to be something to point out to regulators if there is
an issue. If you do not have power other than reporting up, you should be
held responsible only up until that level.
P1: That level should be based on the level of authority that the position
has in the organization.
A10: I wonder what the answer would be from a regulatory perspective.
Anybody had that exposure? How would you deal with that?
A11: I always like saying that is not my responsibility [laughter].
A10: But if you were an investigator, would you accept that answer?
A11: Handoff points are important. Where something gets handed off
from the compliance officer—and I do not know if that is something that
you can express to a regulator if it ever comes under inquiry—is the point
where they should be no longer liable.
A12: If you are putting yourself in a position where you are vulnerable
because you cannot execute the compliance function because you are not
getting the ability to delegate, with all these responsibilities, then I think
that is a problem. You have to be able to advocate to your organization to
make it clear that you are either going to have those resources or there is
going to be some real vulnerability. I do not think it is realistic that you
can handoff. I am just saying if there are some serious issues and you think
you can hand it off, you know you could really be subjecting yourself to
some further action down the line. You really have to—I mean that is the
really rough part about being a CCO—making sure there is follow–up on
any serious issue that comes in your direction. I am not saying it is a
reasonable standard, but I feel like if you are not showing up and having
action plans in place, there is certainly potential for liability.
P1: I want us to use another example. Companies are separating out the
Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) function from the compliance function. How
does that work within this framework? Well I would argue it would be just
like the CFO, right? So, the BSA enacts a regulation and there are ways in
which you need to manage it. From an oversight perspective, the
compliance officer would have the responsibility to receive information
from the BSA officer. To report on the effectiveness of compliance, that
would be rolled into that function from the reporting perspective. But if
something is going terribly wrong in that program, it would be the BSA
officer’s head that would be in the news, not the CCO. And I think to your
point, it is about making that very clear. I do not know if you do so in a
delegation memorandum, or if you do so in the way you define
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responsibilities in the program with the board. But somehow you have to
make it very clear. Because I think if a prosecutor comes in and sees that
four years ago there was a board resolution that appointed the BSA officer
and there are these four program documents that have been updated over
the past four years, it makes it clear that it is the BSA officer’s
responsibility and not the CCO’s. Even though the prosecutor may not like
you, he is going to be bound by the evidence to follow the trail to the BSA
officer’s desk, I think.
P2: I think you could take a lesson from the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) in the way that it regulates lawyers. 12 Model Rule 5.1 says that
the partners or directors of a law firm have to put reasonable procedures in
place “to ensure” that everyone is conforming to the legal ethics rules, but
they are not personally liable unless they know of a wrongdoing. 13 I think
you could borrow their application because those lawyers know how to
protect themselves.
P1: A young lawyer once said to me, “look, the basic principle you
always have to remember is if anyone goes to jail, it is the client.”
[laughter].
M: How are we doing on time? I see our lunch speaker is here; so, let us
try to wrap it up. We greatly appreciate your willingness to be with us
today. Thanks. [Applause].

12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
13. Id.

PANEL III: POTENTIAL COMPLAINCE
OFFICER LIABILITY
M = Moderator
P = Panelist
A= Attendee*

P1: My name is [Redacted]. I started my career back in the dark ages as
an auditor with a national accounting firm.
M: I have a Public Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) question
for you.
P1: I hope not, because my work was before the PCAOB. I was also
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for four years in
Washington, D.C., in the Division of Corporation Finance and went to law
school at night while I was there. I became a corporate lawyer shortly
thereafter as an outside lawyer with Jones Day and other law firms, and as
a general counsel and a Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) of three New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) listed companies—I basically practiced
corporate, securities, M&A and commercial law. I want to thank
[Redacted] for inviting me.
To follow up [Redacted], my views are my own because no one else will
take responsibility for them, and I am too skeptical and sarcastic for anyone
to want to. So, let me get on with it. As I reflect upon my colleagues’
thoughts on earlier panels, I am concerned about whether the appropriate
level of resources are being brought to bear in the area of compliance
because management’s focus is typically on the quarterly bottom line. I
think in newer public companies the risk is greater and the idea of internal
controls is relatively new because management is focused on meeting
promised projections from the Initial Public Offering (“IPO”). However, in
more established companies—where operational controls have always been
a way of life—only having a few personnel dedicated to compliance issues
is inadequate and does not meet regulator’s or the public’s expectations.
This is a result of corporate officers with MBA degrees seeing
compliance as purely overhead costs that do not produce revenue. I
wonder if they recognize the variable nature of the expenses involved with
* Special thanks to Brian Gauthier & Chris White for their tireless work in transcribing
Panel III.
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a lack of compliance standards across all departments as the company
grows and expands worldwide. I also worry, on the other hand, whether
the scope or at least the regulatory expectation of a corporate compliance
program is too great based on the following factors: the breadth of the law
subject to the CCO’s supervision is too broad; the reticence of employees
to come forward or even discuss potential violations for fear of internal
retribution or public scorn; the attitude of regulators to produce convictions
at all costs; the lack of coordination among regulators; the uncertainty of
the negligence standard in terms of civil monetary penalties; and statutory
prohibitions against indemnification and advancement of legal fees. As a
result, I wonder if the CCO position has become untenable.
So, how do you handle the stresses of being the head of a corporate
compliance program? You can take the advice of a former General
Counsel (“GC”) I worked with many years ago. The GC left three
envelopes for his replacement in his desk drawer for when the job became
too hectic or his boss became too overbearing. He instructed the new GC
to open one envelope each time the job became too stressful. The first time
the new GC became stressed he remembered the envelopes and opened the
first envelope. It said, “blame the former GC for the current state of
affairs.” That note worked for the time being, but after a few more months
past the new GC, yet again, became stressed and opted to open the next
envelope. It read, “blame the prior administration for the lack of
direction.” Several months after reading the second envelope, the GC came
to work to find an FBI agent waiting in his office to question him about a
whistleblower complaint concerning payments to foreign officials. The GC
thought to himself, “wait a minute . . . I did not sign up for this stuff and
then he remembered the last envelope.” He carefully removed the last
envelope from his drawer, took a deep breath, and cut the envelope open.
It said, “make three envelopes.”
In the good old days, when I was brave enough to practice law and naïve
enough to serve as CCO, I had many duties that fell under my purview:
insider trading, “Saturday night specials,” stock option backdating, revenue
recognition irregularities by long–term contractors, off balance sheet
accounting for Special Purpose Entities (“SPEs”), lease accounting issues,
and run of the mill failures to supervise cases. However, now CCOs are
responsible for: international corruption in all colors of the rainbow,
flagrant insider trading by relatives and friends, questionable accounting
and auditing standards by foreign affiliates, bribery in unheralded
proportions, Ponzi schemes of enormous size, money laundering,
cybersecurity breaches of international banking transfers, and investor
advisory frauds. All of this is not to mention the operational compliance
issues that arise dependent on the industry a CCO serves in.

2017

PANEL III

243

By now, the audience is probably wondering why did this guy come to
this Symposium? Rest assured that before you leave I am going to really
throw some nuggets of gold your way, gleaned from my recent readings
and personal scars. Under the Banking Secrecy Act (“BSA”), the
Investment Advisor Act, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and some of the
insurance statutes there is guidance for creating and implementing
corporate compliance policies and procedures. 1
These programs need to be reviewed at least annually to assess their
adequacy and effectiveness.
Additionally, various enforcement
memoranda and statements of best practices also mandate: widespread
dissemination of compliance policies, training sessions with affected
personnel, and reporting mechanisms to ensure violations are reported to
the CCO. In many small to mid–size companies, the CCO function is
usually delegated to the GC for economic reasons. However, I caution that
this economic savings may lead to privilege issues and reluctance on the
part of employees to speak freely when participating in internal
investigations. This affects CCOs and GCs because ultimately charges are
levied against these officers based upon their implementation of corporate
compliance standards. These investigations by the government focus on
the CCO’s attention to detail, the rigor of his or her investigation, the
reasonableness of his or her recommendations for corrective action, and his
or her reports to senior management, the board and its committees.
I cannot emphasize enough the need for a CCO to be vigilant,
inquisitive, and willing to ask the tough questions. The CCO must be
attentive to facts and circumstances that could cause potential harm to the
corporation. Furthermore, CCOs should be unpredictable by scheduling
surprise visits and document reviews of different departments. If the CCO
is negligent, grossly negligent, or reckless in performing his or her
oversight responsibilities it can lead to civil and criminal penalties for the
individual that the company may except from indemnification.
All of the concerns I have discussed are in addition to the reputational
risk associated with the responsibilities of a CCO. As I see it, one of the
significant issues of today is the standard of care that is required when
evaluating a CCO’s conduct. Is one or two isolated instances of inattention
to his duties sufficient? Is disregarding reports of potential violations
adequate? Is casting a blind eye to red flags actionable? Is active
participation in a scheme to evade the company’s policies required? I
submit that leaving these decisions to the discretion of investigators and
regulatory attorneys trying to make a name for themselves in front of an
administrative law venue is unfair, unpredictable, and troubling from a
1. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5211, et seq.; 15 U.S.C. §80b–6 (2012); see U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL ch.8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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precedential standpoint. However, in all fairness, I should note that our
agency law mandates that an agent or employee of a corporation that
commits wrongdoing remains liable for individual damages despite the
principle of respondeat superior. Additionally, Delaware corporate law, to
the extent it may be instructive, acknowledges that the due care element of
the business judgment rule is met if: (1) due care was used to ascertain all
available relevant information before making a decision, and (2) the
decision was made after reasonable deliberation, in the best interests of the
corporation. The only exceptions to using the due care standard would be
in the circumstances that bad faith or egregious conduct has occurred.
However, there is no telling if such a standard would apply to a regulator’s
assessment of a corporate officer’s individual negligent conduct.
Now just to add a little fun to the proceedings, P2 and I have decided to
throw out a hypothetical for discussion among all of you.
In this scenario, the GC and CCO are one person of a public mid–size
international manufacturing company. The GC is asked by his CEO to
obtain a permit in Mexico to develop and construct a facility to produce
coils and chokes for export and final completion in southern California.
The GC is told that this type of permit takes several months to obtain. The
CEO instructed the GC to contact the in–house counsel of the company’s
Mexican subsidiary to obtain the necessary permit. The CEO is a tough,
hard–charging European–style CEO concerned only with results, and not
necessarily the means of producing them. He was reputed to have several
CIA agents on his payroll that knew the ropes of retrieving corporate
documents in several foreign countries. After a week passed, the Mexican
in–house counsel called the GC and informed him that he had obtained the
necessary permit and that the company was authorized to move forward.
Being a young, inexperienced counsel at the time, the GC asked, “how did
you get the permit so quickly?” The response, although welcomed, was
somewhat disquieting, in that the Mexican in–house counsel said, “do not
ask.” The young, impetuous GC was grateful for the result accomplished
and quickly reported the results to the CEO.
After work that night, the GC started to think that as a CCO, he may
want to explore Mexican in–house counsel’s quick retort to his question.
The GC wanted to know if anything had transpired in the Mexican
transaction to obtain the permit that could be construed as corporate
misconduct. I will open the floor to your comments—what might you do,
what might you suspect, and how might you go about it? Have at it!
M: I think we have to call on people.
P1: Do I have to embarrass these people? I do not know these people!
They are not on my roster.
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A2: You should never get to a point where the Mexican in–house
counsel says do not ask. This is because you have vetted the counsel,
trained them, and set out their role. If you are placed in a situation where
he or she responds by saying, “do not ask,” it is because he or she has
already completed the dumb act. You have already received the bad facts.
At that point you must investigate the situation before somebody whistle
blows on the conduct.
P1: However, in this scenario, the Mexican in–house counsel was hired
before the GC came on board, and he never got a chance to vet the guy.
A2: If I was brand new in a job like that, the first thing I would look at
all of my third parties because I would not be able to rely on them.
P2: What if you learned passively that a license was obtained in Mexico
in record time and you as the CCO determined that an investigation was
necessary. You made your first phone call down to the Mexican subsidiary
to start lining up people to discuss the matter. Later that evening as you are
sitting in your office all excited to crack this “case,” you get a knock on the
door from your CEO who says, “I understand that you are looking into the
fact that we have obtained the Mexican permit in record time. I just want
to tell you that the old consultant we used down there was lazy and took too
much time to complete the simplest of tasks. However, this new consultant
that we hired actually completed the job in a timely fashion and that is why
we’re getting it done much quicker. So, it is unnecessary to waste
resources to investigate, you have too much to do.” What do you do then?
P3: Keep digging in anyway!
M: Yeah.
A2: Resign.
[Laughter]
P3: You have to keep going.
A3: I think you have to put yourself in the situation. As the CCO, you
will think, “is he telling me that I may not look at this transaction further?”
Consequently, I would ask the CEO if he was directing me to not look into
the transaction. If the CEO’s intent is to halt the investigation then we need
to have a different discussion because I would have to resign. Because it is
my job to look into these types of transactions and if I find that there is
nothing there, then there is nothing to worry about.
P3: Yes, I do not think you have to be confrontational, you can say,
“thank you for helping me manage my time, but I am going to allocate time
to this inquiry and I will let you know what I find.” Yeah, you cannot force
them to say no, but once you open your inquiry you cannot abandon it.
P2: Is anyone safe to discuss this matter within the organization? For
example, the Chairman of the Audit Committee or the Chairman of the
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Board or someone else that you should feel comfortable going to if you feel
like you are being compromised by, say, the CEO?
A3: Yes, that is why you have the Chair of the Audit Committee.
P2: Do all the CCOs have that reporting line, or that ability to access
such parties?
A3: For public companies that is pretty typical.
P2: Typical? Is it absolute?
A3: I do not know if it is absolute, but I have that ability. It is one of
those rights that you typically do not use for that kind of scenario. But you
do have access to it, if necessary.
P3: You are always reporting to them routinely.
A2: Going to the Audit Committee Chair is sort of like going nuclear. It
is the nuclear option that is available to you.
A3: However, in this context I would work really hard to persuade the
CEO that you need to do some fact–finding about this transaction. I always
attempt to use my regulator or prosecutor lens when looking at these types
of situations. It is always easy to rationalize late at night, sitting in the
office that it all seems fine, I trust these guys, we trust our people, but then
I have to use my regulator lens to recognize that the narrative just does not
stand up. I would explain to my CEO that if there were bad facts it would
look as though he had covered them up. The CCO needs to persuade the
CEO that to protect the corporation, as a shareholder, a CCO should look
into the transaction.
P2: I am going to break this hypothetical out a little bit. What if you are
a CCO that reports to the GC? The GC has complete control over your
budget or has input into resources that you can utilize. What if the GC
deprived you of gathering the individuals that you needed for this
investigation? For example, the GC restricted your access to employees
from the company’s Internal Audit Department or a Chief Financial
Officer’s (“CFO”) department. What would you do? What happens then?
[Pause] Is this not realistic?
A3: In today’s environment that situation does not seem extremely
realistic because then you, as the CCO, would be taking on sole liability.
In those situations, you have no choice, but to get the resources you need.
Do what you need to do.
A2: First, you have to try to convince the GC that it is in his or her best
interest to provide you with the resources needed to complete the
investigation. It is not going to bode well for the GC if it looks like he or
she was causing you to be unable to complete the job properly. It is best to
try and prevail upon their better wisdom, but if that does not work, you go
outside of the corporation and hire the resources needed. You can beg for
forgiveness later when you are over budget.
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A3: What is somewhat more realistic is when it is a matter of how far the
CCO is going to expend resources? Is it a forensic accounting firm or a
law firm? Do you know, how many countries? The CCO position is
similar to running a business; you have to be conscious of costs and
resources.
A2: I would like to work off of that point. To me, it is not so much just
as blatant as I am cutting off resources, it is determining the scope of the
investigation and that is extremely tricky. The CCO has to balance the
predilection of looking too hard for evidence that is not there versus
completing a thorough investigation that does not result in personal
liability. There is also an element of empathy for the business guys that
become a subject in the investigation because everyone finds out about it
and they will become paralyzed.
A4: Is there a middle road? What if you do find that the worst case
scenario has happened? What would you recommend? Should the CCO
go back to the drawing board and apply for the permit again in the proper
way?
A3: Is there a need for self–disclosure?
P2: There is, yes.
A3: If you find an improper payment . . . you have to disclose.
A2: As a CCO, you are in a position to know enough and the question of
self–reporting and disclosure often comes up. Additionally, a secondary
question that is typically asked is, whether that is really in the best interest
of the corporation you work for?
P2: As a CCO you learn about this situation that has been proposed.
However, the CCO eases some of your suspicions, but still you feel that the
facts do not add up. Do most of you feel that the standard a regulator or
prosecutor would use to assess your conduct would be: was your suspicion
of the circumstances a large enough red flag that you should have looked
into it? Is that kind of what we are getting at?
A2: Yes, I think if you are faced with that scenario, as a CCO, and you
believe that there is a big enough red flag, then you need to investigate the
transaction even if the investigation does alienate you from the CEO. A
CCO would complete this investigation to the best of your ability, but
ultimately if the investigation is fruitless, you will be held accountable for
that waste of corporate resources.
A3: The vast majority of cases that the CCO suspects to be corrupt, end
up being correct.
P3: I think you are ruling things out until you have comfort. For
example, when assessing the transaction or receiving the building permit in
Mexico, a CCO would go through each step of the payment process and see
if the step is satisfied. Once the CCO identifies a gap, he or she digs a little
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deeper and when he or she comes up empty he or she moves to the next
step and the process continues until the payments are corroborated.
On the other hand, I have heard in other CCO forums that CCOs of
smaller institutions do not have direct access to the board and they were
unsure of how to handle escalation of an investigation if they were
constrained in terms of resources. I have heard some smaller firms say
they would file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) on their
management. I have heard that they are putting these types of concerns in
SARs and alerting regulators, in essence these CCOs are acting as
whistleblowers.
A5: Using the SAR as a whistleblower?
M: In this scenario, the CCO cannot tell his manager about the SAR
because you cannot tell the person who is the object of the SAR about the
filing.
A2: You are required to report the SAR filings to your board, if the SAR
is about your CEO.
M: I would like to pose a hypothetical based off of the Ted Urban case. 2
As a CCO, you have identified a reoccurring issue that is in need of
investigation. However, the CEO is not allowing you to conduct the
investigation and he will not give you the resources you need. Are you, as
the CCO, obligated to report up to the board about what has happened?
Does the CCO’s duty stop after reporting the CEO’s conduct to the board
or does the CCO’s duty extend to reporting the conduct to the proper legal
authorities?
A2: I guess you can always contact the whistleblower hotline.
M: Now let’s step away from the SARs hypothetical. The CCO has
been told by the CEO to “stop looking at this.” Therefore, as a CCO I have
an obligation to fulfill my responsibility, but I do not have any resources. I
report the CEO’s conduct to the board. Does anyone believe I have
fulfilled my obligation, or as the CCO do I have a duty to go to law
enforcement?
A2: I suppose you could say to the board, “my recommendation is that
we investigate this. I have not been provided with the resources to do so,
therefore no investigation has commenced and I still have unanswered
questions here.
M: I got that. I understand that. I am asking does the CCO then have to
go to law enforcement?
P1: You cannot, if you are a lawyer.
A3: Would you get disbarred?

2. Urban, SEC Rel. No. 402, 2010 WL 35009288 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2010).
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A6: On an issue like this, a CCO is vulnerable. A CCO is going to have
somebody from the outside, whether it is somebody in your position or,
another person that gives the CCO wise counsel on his or her disclosure
obligations as it relates to this issue. After seeking this guidance the CCO
will report up to the board and they are probably in a better place to decide
on those issues. As a CCO I would never, in a troubling situation, rely on
my own judgment because it can only lead to people questioning your
objectivity and when later facts come to light that are indicative of further
red flags, the conduct will be pinned on the CCO.
A3: In this kind of aggravated scenario that we are discussing I would
reach out to privileged counsel—I would not ask for permission. The
privileged counsel and I would look through the options because it is a very
fraught situation and my bar admission, current position, and many other
variables all come into play. A CCO’s emotions will not be on their side in
this situation, therefore the CCO needs a lawyer for an objective opinion.
This is a very delicate question and obviously a CCO has to be credible
and transparent, but also have to be mindful that there are limits to what a
CCO can disclose.
P2: If a CCO does have resources, would this be a matter that the CCO
would want to hire an outside law firm to handle instead of the CCO
looking at it or even having some impartial legal advice? Alternatively,
would the CCO want to ask their staff to do this?
A2: In this particular case, I think outside counsel’s investigation would
be necessary because you are basically looking at internal corruption within
your own firm. I do not happily have a lot of instances of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) situations arise, but if they did, I would say we
have to have outside counsel perform the investigation.
A3: The type of investigation you conduct as a CCO is guided by the
violation you might be dealing with. Everything you see in the FCPA
context is very hard for a CCO to get their hands around sitting at a desk in
the United States.
A6: It depends on the nature of the issue and also who outside counsel is
taking direction from. In my experience, I have seen some outside firms
who are very interested in pleasing the client, and they will start to drift
down the path of compromise between the corporation’s interest and the
conduct that occurred leading up to the internal investigation. However,
the corporation’s goal is to find out the facts, be appropriately aggressive
towards the conduct, and fix the issue so that it does not occur again.
M: Any questions?
P1: How does the CCO find the corporation’s Mexican, in–house
counsel? What if the in–house counsel did not file an expense report
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claiming any unusual payments because the CEO pays him under the table?
Now what?
A2: As a CCO, if you know for a fact that an employee committed
illegal misconduct, the CCO is duty bound to exercise the “nuclear option”
by going to the board and requesting an executive session. After reporting
to the board, I believe that the CCO also has a duty to report the conduct to
law enforcement because the CEO has now committed a crime.
P1: I remember the discussion when they expanded the disclosure
requirements and tried to get lawyers to blow the whistle. If you are the
GC as well as the CCO, I do not think you can go outside the corporation
when reporting misconduct. If a CCO talks to the board and does not get
satisfaction, then his or her only other choice, as a lawyer, is to resign.
A2: Yes, you are right under the ethical rules as a lawyer you have to
resign at that point.
P1: Another question I have is that if you are not the GC, but you are a
lawyer as the CCO, are you bound by the same ethical standards?
A2: As a CCO I do not believe I am bound by the same ethical
standards. I am not personally responsible for representing the company,
that is the GC’s role. My job as CCO is to notify law enforcement agencies
after illegal misconduct has occurred within the company.
P2: As a CCO, do you give employees the Upjohn warnings 3 when
conducting an interview during a compliance investigation?
A2: It depends. So what we do in investigations if there is risk of
external third–party litigation that may result, then we would go to the in–
house counsel and use them as though they were outside counsel . . . and so
that is typically the way that most fair lending investigations are conducted.
P2: So what if you do conduct an investigation in a manner where you
administer the Upjohn warnings to employees? An Upjohn warning is a
statement made before you interview an employee which explains to the
employee that you are a lawyer, that you are representing the company, and
that the company may intend to and will likely assert privilege over this
communication as part of the interview, and that the privilege belongs to
the company, not the individual. So, you are setting the stage for keeping
the information provided in the interview in a privileged context. What if
you do conduct the investigation in this way and later on you get a
subpoena from a regulator asking you to come and testify? As the CCO, do
you feel like you can go to the regulator with everything you learned in that
investigation?
A7: It depends on whether or not the counsel shares everything with me.

3. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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P2: [Redacted], you are a lawyer, right? Suppose you are conducting
this investigation, not counsel, do you ever give Upjohn warnings?
A7: If we are going to conduct an investigation, we are under attorney–
client privilege which is directed through the GC.
P2: Have you ever taken those interviews? Have you ever conducted
those interviews as a CCO?
A7: They go to the GC.
P2: Has any CCO here conducted Upjohn interviews?
P3: Even attorneys who are in the compliance department?
P2: Yeah.
P3: The GC explains that in the role of a compliance officer, you are not
considered counsel. Only the GC can administer Upjohn warnings.
P1: According to the ethics standards you are still subject to the ethics
rules as a lawyer, whether you are acting in that capacity or not.
A7: While you are in the GC’s office and your boss tells you that you are
being promoted to CCO; however, as you assume the new role there seems
to be a struggle with that transition. I have been in a business for seven
years and I am the third deputy general counsel moving to a compliance
role, but I am really struggling with that transition in my role. The business
is also having a hard time figuring out how to define my role within the
company.
A3: There is a debate about a compliance officer’s reporting and
corporate governance role, especially when the person in the position is an
attorney. The CCO is supposed to disclose issues within the corporation,
but because the CCO is admitted to the bar, he or she has a duty of
confidentiality. As a CCO, in many cases you are acting as a legal
representative of a company, in my case, I still consider myself the
representative of the company from a legal perspective. However, I would
not necessarily concede that I cannot administer Upjohn warnings, but I
understand that there is another view?
A2: I would just say that when I reported to the GC, I had more of a
legal role. Now that I do not report to the GC, I would say that I do not
have a legal role. I would say I am no longer representing the firm; I am
the compliance officer for the firm. I bring a matter to the GC’s attention
that I believe needs to be investigated under the attorney–client privilege
because doing otherwise would be putting the company at undue risk.
However, after I alert the GC’s office it becomes their responsibility to run
the investigation.
A6: I think in financial services where examiners come in, you are the
compliance officer and it is very hard to assert privilege over your day–to–
day activities. Therefore, if you are going to take on both roles of
compliance officer and GC, it is easier to do so in the context where there
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are specific parameters around certain legal issues and where you should
have other in–house counsel involved.
A2: I have had the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
request all correspondence with counsel.
M: There may still be something of a difference between examiners in
other industries and examiners in the banking context who have almost
unfettered power. Banking examiners who claim the right to look at
everything.
P2: [Redacted] let me ask you this follow up. If you do hand something
over, are you done with it? If you receive a matter that you think is a
compliance issue and you hand it off to the litigation side to look into, how
do you make sure that it gets dealt with properly?
A2: That is a much more nuanced and difficult question. Let us use the
example from this panel, in this Mexican scenario, as the compliance
officer; I learn that they got a permit in a record amount of time. The CCO
got a rather obfuscated answer from the gentleman from Mexico that
procured the permit and that raises suspicions with me. My alarm bells go
off and tell me this is something that needs to be investigated, and for the
protection of the company, should be investigated under attorney–client
privilege because there could be third parties involved. While I cannot
protect anything from my regulator, I can protect it from other third parties.
There could be shareholder litigation or derivative litigation that could
come against the firm. Thus, I would go to the counsel and say, “hey, I
think this is something you need to investigate and you need to do so under
Upjohn.” They do the investigation; presumably, they only bring me back
in if I need to be involved in the strengthening of control of the compliance
environment somewhere down the road.
Now, if I think the GC does not do a good job, if I think they are dirty,
and they have not done a good job investigating it, well that is a whole
other kettle of fish. As the CCO, I think I am entitled to rely upon the GC
to do his or her job. After his or her investigation is complete and I do not
have enough facts or evidence to conclude that there was a FCPA violation,
then I do not have the duty to disclose. Because at that time, all I know is
that we got a permit a little quicker than normal. It is my obligation to get
it to the GC to investigate the issue, not to manage the way that GC
investigates. Now, if a regulator asks me about that situation in an exam, I
am going to say, “we obtained a permit in Mexico. Here is when it was
requested and here is when it was granted.” If they ask me if I thought it
was obtained kind of fast, I would repeat my prior sentence. I am going to
give the examiner the facts; I am not going to draw conclusions from them.
That is not my responsibility. If the examiner thinks the permit process
was fast, then maybe the examiner needs to look into that. I brought the
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issue to the attention of my GC and, therefore, my obligation as a CCO has
been met.
P2: In trying to come away from this Symposium with some takeaways
as to the difference in reporting structures, are there things that compliance
officers toss and turn at night about in their specific role? Are there things
that compliance officers know toss with one quick fix could be made
better?
M: If we could spend a few more minutes, I cannot recall during remarks
how much we touched on the corporate director’s liability issue according
to Delaware law and whether that offers any wisdom here in the context of
what level of care is expected of compliance officers.
P1: The director’s duty is more one of oversight responsibility and
whether the Board has established reporting procedures that enable it to
receive relevant info, explore pertinent facts, and deliberate adequately to
reach and rationale business decisions. The Board will have to be found
grossly negligent to be liable if it is not otherwise exempted.
M: Is there any learning that we could port over in terms of duties and a
standard of care for CCOs? Should CCOs be subject to a negligence, gross
negligence, or willfulness standard? Is there anything that we can take,
away from the Delaware director’s standards and apply them to compliance
officers?
A3: I think the CCO’s standards will probably turn on a “reasonable
person” test given the general duties and responsibilities of like officers
that develop over time.
A2: What has appealed to me, thinking about Delaware’s due care
standard is that it is more general in nature for a CCO, even though I have
not fully thought about this concept. This standard would allow for a
reporting driven process guided by a reasonableness standard.
M: The ability to point to an already established legal precedent might
give us some ammunition in making that case, but that does not deal with
the direct reports.
A2: But at least this is a standard to build from as opposed to trying to
create a brand new standard of care for CCOs from scratch.
A8: I think you also have to look at was the process adequate? Was it a
reasonable process? Instead of relying on the due care standard.
M: Well, any further questions?

*
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PANEL IV: COMPLIANCE OFFICER
EMPOWERMENT
M = Moderator
P = Panelist
A= Attendee*

M1: Now we move to our final panel, the look of compliance officer
empowerment. We have four panelists today. So first, we will have P1
who is the Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) of [Redacted]. You can talk
about your career and introduce yourself in terms of how you got to where
you are. We have P2, whom you have met before. We have P3 who is
Senior Counsel at [Redacted], but who has had a legal and compliance
career in both government and the public sector and did fair lending
compliance at [Redacted] before she joined us. At the far end is P4 who
has had a career in many different places. I could almost let him tell you,
but the rest of the panel would be taken up with his resume. He is a partner
at [Redacted]. He and I have worked on a lot of things together over the
years, including [Redacted], which explores the role of State Attorney
Generals and other officials who participate in the regulation of the
financial service industry. P4 has a long career in [Redacted] and in law,
and brings a lot to the table here. Now we turn to the panelists. P1, I think
you were going to start off.
P1: Thank you M1. So I will just give you a little background on how I
got here. I started out as a government attorney in [Redacted] and then
[Redacted] which is part of [Redacted], located here in the District of
Columbia (“DC”). After [Redacted], I had the opportunity to go into
private practice. I went to the law firm of [Redacted], which is a Los
Angeles (“LA”) based firm, but I was in the DC office. I spent nine years
there first as an associate and then became a partner. After that I started to
think about going on in–house, and I realized that I loved the practice of
law, but I did not really love the business of law. I was not really interested
in developing business and going out and being a rainmaker, so I thought
going in–house would be a good place for me. I really wanted to be close
to the business and advise the business. I did not want to be an outside
* Special thanks to Chauna Pervis & Emily Wolfford for their tireless work in
transcribing Panel IV.
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attorney on the other end of a phone call on a Friday afternoon where the
client says we just took this action or we just entered into a contract; can
you help us get out of it? To me, it was much more creative to be on the
floor with the business, helping them to make decisions along the way.
One of the partners in the LA office went to be the General Counsel of a
mortgage company in southern California and she asked me if I would like
to join her. Of course moving from humidity and ice to sunny southern
California seemed like a great deal to me. I went to LA and was the
Associate General Counsel for this mortgage company. I learned pretty
quickly that this industry and this company were not really my cup of tea. I
was starting to think about my next move when I got another call from
another partner at my former law firm and he said we have a client, a bank
in northern California that is looking for its first General Counsel. Is this
something you would be interested in? Of course this was the next or
natural progression for my career, so I jumped at the opportunity and spent
nine years as General Counsel of that bank. I was also responsible for
compliance at that time and the Compliance Department reported to me.
Nine years later, along came [Redacted] and it decided to acquire the bank
I was working for. After the merger was complete I left, took some time
off, and then started with [Redacted] as Managing Counsel in the Legal
Department where I was head of the Corporate Transactions Team. My
background, I should have said, is really in securities, banking regulations,
mergers and acquisitions, general corporate, and corporate governance. At
that time, the Compliance Department was just beginning and the company
had hired its first CCO. After a couple of years, the CCO job opened up
again, and I expressed an interest in it. The General Counsel expressed an
interest in me taking on the role, and I have now been the CCO for three
years. I have always loved practicing law and did not imagine that I would
leave the practice of law, but here I am immensely enjoying the role of a
CCO.
Okay so as M1 said, the topic here is the empowerment of CCOs so I
wanted to talk about three aspects of empowerment as I see it for the CCO.
I will give you the three aspects and then I will talk about each one
separately. First is a strong compliance culture, second is a seat at the
table, and third is access to budget, resources, and tools.
We have heard compliance culture mentioned a few times today. No one
has really defined it so I am going to give you my definition of it. Other
people may have different views, but I think in a compliance culture there
is a heightened awareness of the importance of compliance and respect for
legal and compliance requirements as well as the regulatory process. There
is also recognition that compliance is everyone’s job and everyone should
be held accountable. It is a situation where compliance is actually
embedded into business processes, systems, and products. It is not an
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afterthought, nor is it an extra thing. It is actually built in—the controls are
built in to those processes. In a compliance culture, you usually have
resources dedicated to compliance in a Compliance Department. You also
might have the compliance resources embedded in the business line, which
could either be a solid line or dotted line to the CCO. Of course the tone
for compliance is set from the top. I think everyone knows what that is and
we have heard about it today. But what I think is equally important—
maybe more important—is tone from the middle. I think it is really
important for employees to have good leadership from managers to whom
they report. Those are the people who your employees deal with on a day–
to–day basis and it is a manager’s behavior that the employees will
emulate. It is important to have business leaders live and breathe
compliance and walk the walk and talk the talk. I think the CCO should
also have a platform for communicating the importance of compliance
clearly and often to all employees. One of the ways to do that—we do it at
[Redacted] and I am sure some of the other compliance officers here do the
same thing—is that we have an annual compliance week and it is a chance
to put a spotlight on compliance and combine both an educational
component with something fun during the week. I think it is really
important for people to see the compliance team in a different venue.
Compliance is a very serious topic, but to see the Compliance Department
have some fun and make people laugh, I think is a really important part of
compliance week. Last week we held our annual compliance and ethics
week and we actually had a regulator come and talk to our company. His
name is [Redacted] he is the Western Regional Director of [Redacted], our
primary federal regulator. We asked him to come to our headquarters to
talk about the [Redacted] priorities, recommendations, and how he
conducts an examination. We had his talk streamed out to our entire
company, to all of our field locations and it was very effective. It was very
rewarding to me because afterwards, people would come up to me and say
well [Redacted] said this [Redacted] said that. So, obviously they were
listening and got some great takeaways from it. We also had a compliance
Family Feud game where we had the Sales Department versus the Legal
Department and much to everyone’s surprise, the Sales Department won.
Obviously they were listening and are paying attention to compliance.
The second aspect of empowerment is the seat at the table. I think the
CCO has to have sufficient stature and visibility within the organization so
that she is consulted regularly and her voice is heard. I do not know if any
of you remember the old E.F. Hutton commercials—I am really going to
date myself—but E.F. Hutton was a brokerage firm and they always did a
commercial that said “when E.F. Hutton talks, people listen.” That is how
people should view the compliance officer. It is a role where there should
be a lot of respect and people should really listen when the CCO speaks.
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You have heard a lot today about access to the board—that is very
important. You have also heard about other relevant committees such as
audit committees, and some companies may have an enterprise risk
committee. At [Redacted] we actually have a Board Compliance Oversight
Committee. It meets quarterly. I make regular reports to that committee at
every meeting, and we also have an executive session of that committee at
every meeting. Since I report to the General Counsel, this was a control
and safeguard we added to make sure I have independence, and unfettered
access to the Board Compliance Oversight Committee. So we just make
those regular executive sessions a regular practice. At the end of every
meeting the General Counsel and all other attendees leave and I have an
opportunity to share with the board anything that I think is important for
the board members to hear. They also have the opportunity to ask me any
questions that they might want to ask without others present. I think it is a
very effective mechanism. Another aspect of seat at the table is that the
CCO or compliance staff is in business discussions regarding strategic next
steps, changes in the business model, and new products or services. It is
very important for the compliance team to be present when those kinds of
decisions and product development discussions are happening. Because
the worst thing is to have something that is complete, the system is built,
and the compliance team comes in at the end and points out some
compliance issues. It is much harder to get the compliance controls
implemented after everything else is set in motion. Alongside this
communication is also reaching out to other parts of the company. I do
what I call road shows—I will go to our different field offices, I will talk to
people, learn what their concerns are, and give presentations. Some of our
business units have monthly or quarterly forums and they will invite me to
come and I will talk about compliance. So, communication is a very
important part of the CCO job.
Third are resources, budget, and tools. Of course, the Compliance
Department needs adequate resources and budget commensurate with the
size, scope, complexity, and risk profile of the organization. There really is
no one size fits all. You really have to establish the resources and budget
based on the needs of the company. I think the CCO also has to have
access to benchmarking information and best practices information. Going
to training and symposiums like this, I think, is a very important aspect of
the CCO job. The CCO needs to engage consultants whenever she deems
it necessary to either augment her staff or take on special projects. In terms
of augmenting legal counsel, I have to go through the Legal Department if I
feel we need counsel. Of course, if I thought there was a conflict and I felt
the need to not involve the Legal Department, I certainly have the freedom
to do so. I would probably consult with the Chief Executive Officer about
that, but I do have the ability to request outside counsel to the Legal
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Department and sometimes weigh in on the firm that is selected to do the
work. Technology is definitely a plus, I would not say it is a necessity—
you can do a lot with an Excel spreadsheet, but we have a Government
Risk and Compliance system (“GRC”). It is a system where we track our
compliance issues, we build out mediation plans, and we also have our
change management process in there which includes the Legal Department
tracking the laws and regulations as they change. They will then do an
analysis of the change, and they will submit it through the GRC platform.
There is a workflow involved in that platform and it comes to the
Compliance Department. Then we do an impact analysis to see how the
change affects the business and we work with the business to create an
action plan on how to implement whatever changes are necessary. The last
are I will comment on is the importance of compliance initiatives such as
process changes or systems changes, being given priority treatment within
the company. You have to guard against the danger that all of a sudden
everything becomes a compliance initiative. It is important for the CCO to
have some insight into what projects are being prioritized, what are
potential compliance projects, and then if it truly is a necessary compliance
project, that it gets priority over something else that might be a nice to
have.
M1: That is great and nicely organized presentation, really well done.
P4, we will move to you.
P4: Terrific, that is a tough act to follow. That is an outstanding list and
group. First of all thank you for having me here. I am honored and as M2
mentioned I am a lawyer in private practice. I am a partner at [Redacted]
both here in Washington and New York (“NY”) so I am frequently on the
Amtrak back and forth. Much of my practice is actually dealing with when
things go wrong, when companies get into trouble, or when there has been
a serious compliance lapse that usually involves the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) or the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). I am
oftentimes looking at what went wrong. Thus, my outlook on compliance
is from a different perspective than P1, because P1 gets it right on the first
step. I am dealing with companies that oftentimes get it wrong and from
that I have developed a bit of a list—that is very similar to P1’s—in terms
of how compliance officers should be empowered. But, I feel a little
hesitant in speaking to a group as distinguished as this, with M2 and
[Redacted] because you guys are the pros out there and much of what I
have to say you guys are going to say, “that is obvious.” Maybe I will say
something new and novel, but I am not going to bank on it. But
nonetheless, I think that there are six areas that I have seen that are
necessary. Some of these areas are very similar to P1’s. First, are clear
and unencumbered reporting lines. Second, is true independence from the
business lines. Third, picking up from what P1 said about tone at the top
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and tone at the middle, is implied tone at the top. Fourth, would be an
overall budget and economy related to that budget. Fifth, which will
probably be the most interesting part is the regulatory environment that
facilitates, not hinders, the jobs of CCOs. Sixth, would be a separation of
roles between the CCO and the General Counsel.
Reporting lines are so critical and the CCO in my view should report
through either a direct line or a dotted line to a committee of the board or to
the board itself or to an independent committee of the board, preferably an
audit committee of the Board of Directors. Picking up on what P1 said
about how she had an opportunity to meet with the board one on one—that
is so critical. I have seen instances where boards did not hear about a
compliance problem at the company despite the fact that the CCO knew
about the problem and had created regular reports about it. The reason
why, as it turns out, either those reports got reviewed by someone else
when they went up to the board, so the CCO was hesitant to put them in
written materials that could be potentially vetted or scrubbed by someone
else before getting to the board, or the CCO was never alone with the board
to tell the board of the compliance problems afoot. The fact that the CEO
or Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) were present in those communications
might have been part of the problem. So having that clear unencumbered
reporting line to an independent committee of the board I think is
absolutely critical and it is where I have seen so many pitfalls when things
go wrong. Having that CCO that is in the same car as everyone else in the
C–suite is also critical. I would prefer that the CCO be even within the
hierarchy with the General Counsel. Not higher, not lower, and not
reporting to. So, there will be this sort of separation of the General
Counsel and the CCO.
The second point is independence from the business line. Many times I
have seen hierarchies where the CCO reports through either a direct line or
dotted line to the President of a particular business. If there is any
reporting up to the President of the business there is not that independence
that is necessary for the CCO to give and receive information to form a true
view of the situation.
Third is tone at the top, but that is really implied tone at the top and
implied tone at the middle. Many times CEOs will send out e–mails that
will say this is important, do this compliance training and then you will see
or hear stories of the CCOs rolling their eyes about things or saying oh my
gosh this is such a pain. That implied tone speaks louder than the words
themselves. I do not care if the CEO sends out a great e–mail that someone
drafts for him or her. I care more about how the CEO is acting outside of
that e–mail, what their attitudes are in meetings, around other employees,
around their inner circle, and around others because that gets picked up.
Little things make a difference whether it is body language, tone, or
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implied tone they are all so important. You can always tell a great
compliant company by the way the CEO chats or talks in e–mails. Much of
what my team and I do is review e–mails from CEOs, CFOs, and other
employees. You would not believe sometimes what the executive team is
saying about the CCO, “oh he or she is a pain in the butt” or “oh no let us
get compliance off our backs.” Those sorts of attitudes resonate and people
pick up on that, so I mean true implied tone at the top in addition to explicit
tone is very important.
Fourth, having an overall budget that is meaningful and having some
autonomy over that budget I think is very empowering to a CCO. Many
times I have heard and seen companies that have the right hierarchy, seem
to have the right tone and independence, but when I ask the CCO, “well
what happened?” He or she says, “well I only have one person on my staff.
If only I could have hired five or six more people.” Or “I need people, I
need this, I need that.” So making sure CCOs are empowered with a
budget or the autonomy to hire some great people around them is critical
for them to be successful at their jobs. What I have seen in so many
independent investigations that I have been a part of in the 2010 post–
financial crisis is a real cut back on compliance and compliance
expenditures. To give you one example, I saw one instance where the
CCO’s travel budget was cut significantly following the financial crisis.
All companies were suffering at this time in the aftermath of the financial
crisis and, therefore, his budget was cut. In interviewing him in the
independent investigation, we learned that all of the different offices that
that he had not visited in the company in years because of the fact that his
travel budget was cut. Web conferences and everything will only get you
so far. Everything looked right on paper, but the problem was the lack of a
budget and the lack of an ability to dispend the necessary money to get the
job done. There should also be some ability to design and be the architect
of the compliance program. Having the autonomy to build a compliance
program, not to just be put in it and told this is the program and you are
stuck in it, so make the best of it. Instead, the CCO should have the ability
to think creatively, and to make some changes and suggestions within that
group. Fifth, which I should preface my remarks by saying if there is any
press in the room. M1, is there any press in the room?
M1: There is not supposed to be.
P4: Good. Raise your hand if you are a member of the press. Fifth is the
regulatory environment. Interestingly, we had a couple of prep calls as a
panel before the election and so I think what we were thinking about and
talking about might be very different post-election. The regulatory
environment, there has been a tremendous debate at the SEC brewing over
the role and function of CCOs, particularly in a situation where the SEC
has been pursuing a theory called broken windows. Broken windows was
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something Mayor Giuliani did in NY to go after every type of crime. The
theory is, if you stop all of the little stuff it will resonate up. A street
merchant violating the law, would not graduate up to being a murderer, for
instance. And I think there is some real truth and value to that in a criminal
law context where things are a lot simpler and the rules are a lot clearer. In
a situation particularly in financial services firms it is not so clear. These
rules are amazingly complicated for us, and all of our firms, to decipher
sometimes, and certainly difficult for those in the CCO position to figure
out. There is a lot of gray area and uncertainty in the interpretation of
certain provisions. Not to mention, a situation where CCOs themselves
become caught in the cross for what amounts to be a negligent violation of
a paperwork–type provision of certain rules and regulations. This really
raises serious questions about focus at least from a regulatory standpoint. I
recommend to you all a reading of the various speeches by former
Commissioners Dan Gallagher and Lewis Aguilar on the role of the CCO.
There was a debate between the Commissioners about this. I think it is a
healthy debate to have and I think that debate will probably continue up to
and into next year, about whether we want to from a regulatory standpoint,
empower you to make decisions. Part of the debate was whether the CCO
should be the first one to run into a burning building and to make very
tough decisions on the fly or should there be a regulatory system where the
CCO runs from the burning building to avoid personal liability? That is a
very serious question that is going to have to be dealt with in the coming
months and years. But the point being that CCOs sometimes have to make
very difficult, what I would call battlefield decisions, and the CCOs do not
have the luxury or time to say, “let me sit back and analyze the law, let me
call up a law firm like [Redacted] and have them do a memo to analyze
this.” CCOs have to make decisions on the fly, sometimes with incomplete
information in an environment where sometimes the rules are as clear as
mud. So that is the point I think on the regulatory environment. I think
that the regulatory environment can be improved to facilitate a CCOs job
and make sure that CCOs are not hesitating to run into a burning building.
I equate this to the obstetrics and gynecology (“OBGYN”) community.
You hear and you read about how few people are going into the career of
delivering babies because of the risk of liability being so high and severe.
We do not want to scare people away from the very tough job of being a
CCO. We want to have the very best and brightest and continue to have
the best and brightest get into these roles and be the CCO.
Sixth, is the separation of the CCO and the legal function. To me, I see
this again from problem a standpoint where the CCO is wearing a few
hats—a legal function and a compliance function. There really becomes a
question from a legal standpoint as to whether the CCO functions like
lawyer having his or her communications covered under the attorney–client
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privilege, or is the CCO functioning in a compliance role where the
communications might not be covered by the attorney–client privilege. If a
compliance officer is also wearing a role that looks like a legal hat, it is
often a fight with regulators, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and others if it becomes a
problem later on. So I will tell this story—M1 always likes to say I have
had a bunch of different roles in my life and hopefully I do not look too
much like a journey man—but when I was leaving government, I was
approached to be a CCO and a General Counsel of a fund and I said I was
not going to do both. The fund was rather small and could not afford to
hire two people, so I would have had to do both. I told them I was not
going to do it just because I think there is a tremendous risk to wearing
both hats. That pretty much summarizes my thoughts on the matter and I
will turn things back over to M1 and M2.
However, I want to summarize Luis Aguilar and Commissioner
Gallagher.
Commissioner Gallagher talks about the number of
enforcement actions by the SEC against CCOs and there have been a
number of high profile ones in the last years. There was one involving a
gentleman named Ted Urban, that is public, and one involving BlackRock
and a few others out of the SEC. 1 Commissioner Gallagher says that these
enforcement actions chill CCOs from wanting to be more proactive and
running into the burning building. On the other hand, Commissioner
Aguilar says look at the number of CCOs we have and the number of
enforcement actions we have. 2 The number of enforcement cases is
actually really small here and you are making a mountain out of a
molehill. 3 I think it is not about the number of cases you bring, but the
chilling effect one case might bring in the industry.
M1: You know [Redacted] from [Redacted] was here. He was the first
speaker and he very nicely laid out that issue and a number of reasons why
there is this chilling effect. I think everybody on this—who is here—can
speak to how making people comfortable and attracting people to the
business and to this role is hard and people are walking away from it.
There are many good people in this role, but still, this is a growing area and
more are needed.
P4: I rarely see an enforcement investigation, particularly in the financial
space, but I have been involved in public issues of work or non–financial
work. But I rarely see an enforcement investigation that does not involve
1. See Urban, SEC Rel. No. 402, 2010 WL 35009288 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2010);
Blackrock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065, Investment
Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).
2. See Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The
Role of Chief Compliance Officers Must be Supported (June 29, 2015).
3. See id.
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the CCO having to give testimony to the SEC. I appreciate that the SEC
has to do their job and need the listed information, but getting that through
some of the testimony is really disconcerting—there is a lot of scrutiny of
the CCO if something goes wrong. As a practical matter, a CCO cannot
guarantee that no one in the organization will violate the regulation. There
is always going to be someone that will circumvent the controls—someone
who sat through your training year after year and signed certifications
stating that, “yeah I get this, of course I will say something if something
goes wrong and then they go around and circumvent it.” There is always
going to be that person out there in the organization and you cannot
guarantee as a CCO that there will be complete and total compliance from
everyone. You just have to do your very best and I think that’s the point.
M1: I know you were not here at the earlier panel, but there was a great
point made by [Redacted]. He said they have 60,000 people at his
company and that it is a small town—and small towns have to have jails—
and if you take a small town that is not a small town, and there are 300,000
people, that is like a small county and they have jails too. 4 People go awry.
I think we should move on to P3.
P3: Alright. Thank you M1. For the second half of our panel, P2 and I
are going to switch gears a little bit and talk about protections for the CCO
because that is obviously a critically important aspect of the CCO role. So
as P4 was just mentioning in light of the personal liability that is presented
by the SEC enforcement actions that have been occurring as of late, it is
important to understand what avenues are available to the CCO to protect
him or herself. Some of the issues we are going to be looking at are
questions like, is the CCO protected by their company through either
permissive or mandatory indemnification? If not, what other alternatives
exist for self–protection? For example, directors and officers liability
insurance, or other types of insurance that might be coming on to the
market. Do any laws or regulations exist that would limit indemnification
payments on behalf of CCOs? Those are some of the issues we are going
to be looking at and we thought we would start with a discussion of
Delaware law for several reasons. First of all, Delaware is an appropriate
source of law to review because of course so many companies are
incorporated in Delaware. Also, many states model their own laws on
Delaware law. Many states also follow Delaware judicial decisions on
corporate law matters, so it is really a model law in many respects. With
regard to indemnification, Delaware law permits, but does not require,
broad indemnification for directors and officers provided that they act in
good faith and are serving the best interest of the company. Generally,
4. See Panel I, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV.173, 195 (2017).
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Delaware law is pretty permissive on this point concerning
indemnification. By including language that a corporation has the power to
indemnify “any person,” it basically reflects that a corporation has the
ability to choose whom to indemnify as part of its internal procedures,
provided again that the individual acts in good faith and believes their
conduct was in the best interest of the company. So based on that
perspective, the Delaware law is permissive in nature—there is a bit of a
limited opportunity for protection for directors and officers if the
corporation decides not to include the CCO within the ambit of a covered
employee. Delaware does mandate indemnification in one particular
circumstance, and that is where either a present or former director of an
operation has been successful on the merits in defense of any type of
enforcement action or proceeding. But then it only covers expenses, which
would include attorneys’ fees that are incurred in connection with a
successful defense. But one way that a corporation can get around this
issue in trying to find a broader authority for indemnification is to actually
amend its bylaws. So that is what some companies do to make sure they
can indemnify directors and officers to the maximum extent provided by
law. In that regard, for companies that take that approach, it affords a
higher level of protection for directors, officers, and CCOs.
With that said, there is still a regulatory overlay to all of this. In
particular, there is one regulation we are going to talk about today and that
is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) rule on golden
parachute and indemnification payments. 5 That came about when the
Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”)
was enacted in 1989, which was designed to address some of the problems
that arose in the late 1980s when a lot of savings and loan associations
(“SNL”) failed. Part of the problem that occurred during that era was many
SNLs were failing, the officers of these SNLs were offered very lucrative
golden parachute payments. So as their institutions were failing, they
severed their employment with the SNL. FIRREA addressed this by
requiring the FDIC to promulgate a rule making that regulated the golden
parachute payments as well as indemnification payments to directors and
officers. That legislation and the FDIC’s indemnification rule, which is
found in 12 C.F.R. Part 359, basically prohibits any sort of indemnification
payment to an institution affiliated party (“IAP”) in certain circumstances.6
An IAP is defined as a director, officer, employee, or controlling
stockholder. The thrust of that rule is that a bank is prohibited from paying
or reimbursing any person in a civil money penalty or a judgment that
5. See FDIC, Financial Institution Letter on Guidance on Golden Parachute
Applications (Oct. 14, 2010).
6. See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 359 (2016).
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results from a civil or administrative action. 7 Basically, a bank is
prohibited from paying a civil money penalty on behalf of a director or
officer or employee. The way that that has been interpreted is that banks
are permitted to pay legal fees for directors and officers up until a point
where he or she is formally charged. So at that point, then the prohibition
would kick in. So let us say a CCO was charged with a violation—he or
she would be required to pay that money penalty him or herself, as well as
legal defense fees.
M1: Now what if they are exonerated, but they have not been
indemnified, would they have to pay their own fees?
P3: Yes, that is an exception. So in that case, if they prevailed on the
merits, the bank would be allowed to reimburse them. It is notable, I think,
that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) also seems to
disfavor payment of penalty to IAPs. In a lot of the CFPB consent orders
that we have seen, it often states that “the respondent shall not seek or
accept directly or indirectly any reimbursement or indemnification from
any source with regard to any civil money penalty that the respondent is
ordered to be paid under this order.” That seems to be the CFPB’s general
approach—that civil money penalties should not be reimbursable in any
event.
M1: What about if the CFPB is trying to claw back the legal fees being
paid for each person? Let us say you have not paid your legal bill and you
signed the agreement, you are covered by the director and officer
indemnification policy.
A1: So let us say a director or CCO settles in either a civil or criminal
matter.
P3: No, that would not be considered prevailing on the merits. That
would be a situation where the CCO and director could not be reimbursed
for their legal fees. There have actually been some enforcement actions to
that effect and some case law.
A1: So is there compulsion to settle then because you are going to have
to settle or pay for it all out of pocket?
M1: No, but it sounds like they not allow settling a matter that results in
an order or something like that.
P3: They do not allow that. Right.
M1: So actually it is an incentive to keep fighting.
P3: Yes, an incentive to keep fighting and contesting it.
M1: Well, this is the CFPB context. So if you are charged in CFPB
context, they do not have the FDIC’s golden parachute rule.

7. 12 C.F.R. § 359.1(h)(1) (2016).
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P3: Right. I do not believe they could avail themselves of that, but the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act would specify how that applies or does not
apply to the CFPB. But we have not seen that play out yet, where they
would try to claw back the legal fees. So with that, I am going to turn it
over to P2 to talk about a couple of recent enforcement actions where it has
been difficult for the director or officer to get his legal fees back.
P2: Thank you, P3. The matters I believe have already been touched
upon. One was the Ted Urban matter. He did eventually get his
reimbursement, but it took a long time and he had to incur that risk that he
would not.
M1: Knowing that he might have hired different counsel, albeit a more
expensive counsel.
P2: He did hire [Redacted] I believe. And that is why he probably
ultimately prevailed—he had a good defense.
M1: Ted Olson?
P2: It was not Ted. Imagine the case where you are CCO, not one of the
indemnified officers. You leave the employment with your company and
shortly thereafter, you receive a subpoena and you have to rely on either
the company on its own to agree to reimburse the expenses to comply with
that subpoena, or you have to ultimately pay out of pocket. In the Ted
Urban case, he was still at the company for a large part of his defense
where he was mounting his challenge. The bottom line is if CCOs do not
have a good defense fund, they are more likely to settle cases in the cheaper
expedient way, rather than to risk bankrupting their family and not
mounting that type of a fight. As we have heard throughout the day, their
careers are on the line here. If you do ultimately have to settle a matter
with the SEC, you are likely unemployable as a CCO because the risk
tolerance or parameters of your corporation would not allow for a
government–sanctioned individual to serve in such a role. That is true also
for auditors or CFOs. Auditor firms will not accept CFOs that have settled
SEC actions, so once you find yourself on the other side of a government
action it is very hard to be employed anymore in this area. So it is very
important to be able to mount a defense and have competent counsel.
Which brings me to the concept of, is there insurance? Is there an
insurance policy out there or one that can be developed for CCOs? While
M1 and M2 were coming up with the idea to have this conference, we
started talking about the idea of insurance and if there is insurance. In
some instances, we started talking about whether there are some insurance
policies for in–house counsel that are offered from insurance companies.
But other than that, there are not really any analogues to what we kind of
thought might be a good idea. P4, I do not know if you remember this, but
there was a professional liability insurance company when we were at the

268

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6:2

SEC, that got sent around and said if you are a manager at the SEC you can
on your own contact this company and get professional insurance. If
somebody says that you did something wrong outside the scope of your
employment, maybe harassment or something, you would be able to have a
lawyer through this policy that would defend you. So, even if the agency’s
own lawyer would not defend you or you wanted your own lawyer because
you thought that was a better option, you can have that through this policy.
We started talking about what would a policy look like for a CCO. M1 got
some insurance brokers and some underwriters, and we have had a number
of conversations with some London underwriters, some United States
brokers. It is interesting because I have learned a lot about insurance
brokers and director and officer insurance (“D&O”) and other types of
insurance than I ever thought I would. Clearly there are tensions with
putting the CCO in the typical tower that indemnified officers and other
officers have under the bylaws and the various types of insurance that
comes with that tower. There are various policies that attach to that tower.
A2: Why is it and why doesn’t it fit well within that realm of insurance?
P2: Why doesn’t it? I think that a lot of the companies spread the limits
of the policy.
M1: Sometimes the rank and justification does not go down far enough
to get to the CCO. It is officers, but only up to a certain point so you would
have to amend the bylaws to extend it further. It might go down to the vice
president and the general counsel, but not to the CCO.
P4: I was going to say, all the more reason why you want to be in the
executive suite if you are a CCO.
P2: Typically, companies cover all employees for matters within the
scope of employment. If you are acting within the scope and you get some
process from a government agency, typically the company is going to use
its resources to help you through that process. But if you find yourself in
situation let us say—there were a couple of instances we had with the
hand–off issue. If you as a CCO find a compliance issue and you do hand
it off to the right person in the organization to take it from there and let us
say they do not take it from there. If the government starts an inquiry and
fingers start getting pointed, you as a CCO, if there was a policy, might
want some type of comfort that you could employ a great lawyer like
[Redacted] to represent you if it is a life and death case. Again, your career
could be on the line. That brings us to the point—what are the underwriters
saying? What are the brokers saying?
M1: The other thing is, and this was mentioned during the discussion we
had last night, it may be that the CCO is in the executive suite and is
covered; however, the employee who is handling BSA/AML—a very
important compliance job—is not in the suite and is in the cross hairs. But
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the insurance brokers say that this tower only extends down so far and
sometimes it catches the CCO because of the policy of corporate decisions
and sometimes it does not. Certainly, it does not cover, in large
organizations, all of the compliance officers. We had a conversation
through an American broker with London underwriters and brokers and
they understand that this is a rapidly growing area of employment in the
U.S. But they research and do not find any policies that cover compliance
officers.
A2: In actual everyday practice, in terms of the CCO investigations, I
assume that the companies are paying for legal fees and things like that.
P2: I am happy to share this example and P4 can share an example, I
represent a former CCO who did not come under the mandatory
indemnification, was not entitled under the bylaws, it was not clear, and
was not necessarily entitled to having legal fees paid in a manner similar to
the stories we have touched upon. In that case, I called the company up
and they said we are not required to do this, but in this case we will.
A2: It is in the interest of the company.
P2: In that case, it was in the interest of the company. I think it is in the
interest of the company. But, if there is a real clash—let us say you leave
your company because you have a crisis of conscious and you say you left
because they were not handling it the right way and a year later you get a
subpoena to explain your side of the story. How are you going to pay for
that? Maybe you do want to go to the company and say you guys need to
pay for my lawyer. This is from when I was working there. But maybe
you do not want to do that. Maybe you want your own lawyer.
P4: I think as a practical matter, it is good business to advance legal fees
for employees under an investigation unless they are the root cause of the
investigation. But if it is a situation where they have done some
wrongdoing, it is good business to advance their fees and I think a lot of
sophisticated companies do. I think there is some space there where maybe
you are not in the cross hairs, or maybe your company makes a bad
decision. I mean let us face it, sometimes management makes bad
decisions.
P2: So what is the answer M1?
M1: I think we have a lot more to do, and this has been a useful
discussion in that is there a market for this? I would be interested in
hearing any other CCO describe this. In conversations with CCOs before
we organized this symposium, there was an expression of interest in this
type of product. They thought it would be of interest.
P2: And does it empower? Would having that comfort empower the
compliance officer to feel more bullet proof if they felt that if something
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went wrong they would absolutely have a lawyer and someone of their
choosing?
A2: I think that helps, but it certainly does not solve the liability issue. I
mean once you are in that position, your career prospects and things like
that are certainly affected greater than any indemnification provisions can
[inaudible].
A3: Question: [inaudible]
M1: Well that is an interesting question, whether you would be able to
negotiate an extra or add–on to your regular compensation so that you
could buy it. The CCO candidate says: I am willing to take the job, but I
would have to have some comfort and I would have to make another
$10,000 per year, or whatever it is, $5,000 after taxes, that I am going to
use to buy my own policy.
P3: Some companies also provide executive allowances so it could be
covered in that way, too. You could just take your executive allowance and
use it to cover your insurance premium.
M1: A2, what do you think? Do you think insurance—you are obviously
at a pretty prestigious company so it is not really an issue for you.
A2: I mean well I think that if it is cost effective, it makes sense.
P2: And what about the folks—the level right beneath you, including the
anti-money laundering person, they would probably like something like
that too?
A2: Yeah, I mean it is interesting. I wonder if maybe companies would
sign up, especially financial services type companies you know who are in
the cross hairs all the time as an added benefit.
M1: A little more comfort. I do not expect my house to burn down, but I
would have to be paid over the course of my life well over $100,000 and
maybe have $250,000 worth of insurance. I have never had to file a claim
thank goodness, but I think I feel better and I know I need insurance even if
I do not have a mortgage and a requirement to have insurance to protect my
creditors.
P1: It could actually be a recruiting tool to bring on talent.
M1: We started out with role and responsibility. We spent some time on
that. Then we talked about risks. Then what steps could we take to make it
safer. We have talked about more assurances in the law, indemnification,
insurance. We are trying to find ways to make this a safe place for strong
talent that is needed in these jobs.
P4: On the insurance front, a lot of the insurers have policies that cover
regulatory investigations. American International Group (“AIG”) has Edge
policy. Nationwide has a policy. I have been dealing with both.
M1: For individuals?
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P4: It will go down pretty low. You can negotiate riders and everything
else on those policies. The question oftentimes becomes though costs on
the premiums. First of all, if your company has ever had some enforcement
problems, the cost on the premium is going to be relatively high. Second
of all, if you are in a high risk, high regulatory environment like many of
you are doing, premiums are going to be high. So sometimes companies
opt against the insurance and they make a business judgment and say it is
not worth the cost of the premiums alone, but there are policies out there.
One point I wanted to highlight, is so often if you are a CCO, in financial
services or any regulated industry, you really cannot afford, and I am not
talking about dollars and cents, I am talking about your livelihood, to settle
a compliance matter if you are in the cross hairs. Sometimes you are
forced to really battle it out with the SEC. A recent example I had, and I
will change the names and roles to protect the innocent, but the SEC
wanted our client to agree to some lesser offense and it would have put the
person out of business. The individual would have never worked in the
industry in her life again. Fortunately, they had insurance by the way, and
her fees were also advanced by her employer. So, when the SEC asked for
our offer, we said zero, we are going to go to trial. Our offer is you drop
the charges, say sorry, and we walk away. And [Redacted] was there for
the meeting and it was sort of like a scene from the Godfather, we were
meeting with the Senator. Senator you do not have to wait for my offer,
my offer is nothing. So we are waiting any moment to hear that they filed
the lawsuit and they filed a lawsuit against her employer and against the
principal at her employer. We were waiting any day to get the call and
they reluctantly called up and said that they were closing the matter against
our person. But it was one of those things where she had to fight because
her recourse was—whatever fine she wrote or check she wrote, she would
have been out of the industry and that is what she did her whole livelihood.
I mean think about it, if you are in your career, you know no other. And
the sad part about it, and this sort of goes full circle to this whole broken
windows concept and everything else and how aggressive the SEC has
been. They are going after this little stuff, but little stuff is not that little to
the people in the cross hairs because it is career ending no matter how little
it is.
M1: And to the earlier point, the chilling effect on others who might not
have been the one who broke the window, they are afraid that when they
turn around over their shoulder, something will hit the window.
P4: That is right.
M1: I wish we had more CCOs and compliance officers here.
P4: Uh oh, A4 has a tough question. He is getting me back by the way
because A4 was at the SEC in a senior position in the NY office. A4 was a
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terrific member of the NY staff and I worked for the Commissioner at the
time, so I got to ask A4 tough questions and give my boss tough questions
so this is payback.
A4: I honestly wish I could pay you back. Earlier today we were talking
about the regulatory environment. Obviously it seems like we could be in
for a lot of change on the CCO aspect of things assuming there is either
commissioners or chairmen supportive of Gallagher’s views. Do you see
there being more of, whether on the regulatory front or policy making, that
being a possibility as it relates CCOs?
P4: I think that, I have given a lot of thought since the climate changes
last Tuesday, a week ago, and you know I think that, and these are of
course my views and do not reflect anyone else’s views. First of all, I do
not think that the next Administration will somehow be weak on anything
or weak on violations. There is going to be tough enforcement when
people break the law. Candidly, I think it is going to be smarter
enforcement. By that I mean really going after the individual wrongdoers
and intentional misconduct hard and full force. I think that one thing that
was eye opening to me when I worked in government is, there are limited
resources in government believe it or not. You know you always think I
have unlimited resources and with the SEC’s budget of $2 billion. You
think gosh they could do anything, but they cannot. You have limited
resources; you are constrained by the number of people and hours in the
day. I think there is going to be a rethinking about focusing and perhaps
refocusing away from what I call the unintentional negligent paperwork
type violations that sometimes can snare CCOs and more focused on
intentional wrongdoing. The other area where I think you are going to
hopefully see some changes is—the SEC has been real hardcore focused on
staff. Everything has been about the number of cases they have, the
number of penalties, and every year the number gets higher and higher.
This year the SEC announces a record. I am tired of hearing record every
single year. I live in Arlington, and a couple of years ago the Arlington
police department issued an announcement that said they were at a twenty–
three record year low on the arrest for violent crimes and it was the same
year the SEC had hit another record. I sort of scratch my head saying
imagine if the Arlington police department said we are at a record high for
number of arrests, this is great.
P4: If there are record penalties and a record number of enforcement
actions, it probably means that the system is not working. I will tell you,
that I deal a lot with funds, hedge funds and financial services firms on
questions about insider trading. You want to talk about deterrence that is
happened in the last six years, such as the Preet Bharara case and other
prosecuting issues of insider trade violations. When I walk in for training
or to meet with people about insider trading or compliance issues, I mean
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people are literally afraid, and very much focused. Bharara had a very
strong effect on deterring—I think—insider trading. I question whether the
SEC has had very much of a deterrence effect on what it’s been doing and
its focus for some time and for some time I think its focus has been a little
out of whack. Going back to it, I think that I would anticipate that the new
SEC faced with limited resources and also with an understanding and focus
on deterrence, I think there is going to be more incentive, hopefully, for
companies and funds, and financial services firms, land public companies,
you name it, to actually self-report. To do internal investigations, to find
wrongdoers, and to say here is the problem we fixed it. The SEC
nominally says we credit self–policing, self–reporting, and remediation, but
as a practical matter, they use more of the stick than the carrot to say well
you did not self–report so the penalty is going to be even higher. There is
really a question about what are the incentives for self–reporting and doing
that. I would hope that that conversation gets into play in the next
Administration where people say do we really want to incentivize and do
more to incentivize CCOs, public companies, and funds to come forward
and self–report. Where we give them real credit and where they say look
we have a bad apple here, a wrongdoer, this is the person. Right now, you
go in and say hey SEC, we have a wrong–doer, this is the bad person.
Sometimes the SEC, it reminds me of the scene from the Airplane—the
guy walks through the metal detector with a bazooka and a bomb and then
the little old lady walks through and her hair pin sets off the metal detector
and they throw her against the wall. Sometimes it is a bit of that. Throw
everyone else against the wall and you come in and you are just like no that
is the bad guy that we have self–reported here. I think there needs to be
some real focusing and prioritization. The last point on this, and not to
knock the current Enforcement Officer, but I have heard a speech from him
not long ago and he gave a list of priorities the SEC was doing. It was a
very good speech, a terrific speech. He listed a bunch of priorities and I
sort of said to him if all of those are a priority, what is not a priority then?
It was a tough question; I did not get an answer. But if everything is a
priority, then nothing really is a priority. I mean you have to pick and
choose what is really a priority and I think you have to prioritize some
things. There is always going to be some debate over what is a priority, but
if everything is a priority, then there really is no priority. Sorry that was a
longwinded answer.
M1: Does anyone else have a question they would like to ask?
A5: Yeah, I would like to hear generally from the CCOs what were some
of the big takeaways from this discussion or from some of the other
discussions you have had?
M1: We have one on the panel. I do not know if she wants to answer.
And of course we have our gallery over here.
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P1: I think the liability question here is a really interesting and certainly I
am going to go back to my company and look at our D&O and errors and
omissions (“E&O”) policies. That is another area to look at, E&O policies
might have coverage, and also indemnification by agreement or state law.
A3: I enjoyed the discussion in terms of what standards need to be set to
get us out of this vague area of compliance officer liability.
P4: In all seriousness, all of the CCOs in the room, you guys are the
good guys, and do not forget that. Whether regulators sometimes,
whatever the policies are and focus on CCOs—at the end of the day, you
guys are the good guys and that is what is important to keep in mind.
M1: P4 do you think that in the earlier discussions we have said maybe
we can develop some learning around CCOs that would establish a
standard both in terms of the definition of the role and ways of cabining the
risks and presenting some of this that needs regulatory approval to
regulators? In fact there was something said by [Redacted] because
perhaps that is the area he has experience in. The SEC and other agencies
that have securities jurisdiction and I think that you would have to find one
commissioner, one person in a position of authority who was willing to
take this cause up to work on it to make it happen. I mean I have always
thought that you need somebody who is the champion. If everyone is the
champion, as you have said with priorities, no one is the champion. You
need someone who says I believe in this and I am willing to take it on.
Would that be your take or what would you think? You have worked for a
couple of commissioners.
P4: Yes I think, but I think these issues are going to be debated and
contemplated by the next chairmen and his or her fellow commissioners.
There are only going to be, after January 20th, two existing commissioners
staying on, so three of the five commissioners will be brand new from
January so you do not know what the future holds with respect to their
views and what they are going to do. One thing I will just say for all of you
in the audience is that would I never want anyone to walk away thinking I
have a negative impression of the SEC. It is an agency I love, it is the best
job I have ever had and the SEC has a CCO summit that is put on here in
Washington. It is a terrific summit where there is really a discussion
between peers and SEC staff and the like. I think it is hosted by the Office
of Compliance and Examinations (“OC”), which I think is terrific. It is
what you want from a regulator, which is an interaction with regulator and
discussions like this. I can tell you those CCO summits have these debates
going on about what we can do to assure us. The other thing I will say too
is, one question maybe you did not raise today and maybe it was raised is,
what are the mechanics of going through and being a really good CCO?
Do you memorialize everything? Do you put a lot of things in writing? Do
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you not put a lot of things in writing? I mean, there are different views on
this, which is why I think it is an interesting question. Personally, I am the
type that saves all of my e–mails and I put as much as possible in writing. I
have always had the mentality that if you are doing the right thing then
memorializing it is going to help you later on. You may not realize it at the
time, but there are other lawyers I have encountered that say do not put
anything in writing or do not memorialize anything. But that is a question.
I think what are the mechanics in this environment? What do you want to
be doing to protect yourself as a CCO—memos to file, notes to file, that
sort of thing. I hate to say it—the colloquial is “CYA,” but what type of
“CYA” do you need to do this job.
A3: That is an interesting topic for discussion and I think there is not a
one size fits all answer. I will give a good example of that. When you
bring in a consultant firm to provide you with ideas, and I have done this,
when you are starting in a new role, in a new place, you want to sort of get
some perspective. The worst thing I believe you can do is to have in your
engagement letter that you shall provide me with a detailed report with all
of your recommendations because invariably what you will get is the good
idea boss and the sound will be “boom” running over you. You are going
to have to implement every one of those recommendations because as soon
as you get that report from a consultant, the regulators are going to get that
report and they are going to use it and beat you with it until you complete
every one of them. So that is an instance where the documentation can kill
you. My recommendation and advice to people is that if you are going to
be hiring a consultant from another organization to find out what you need
to do, do not ask for documentation. Ask them to evaluate your firm and to
have a meeting with you, and then you document in the meeting, the things
you are going to do as a takeaway from their observations. That way you
remain in control. In the situation when you are in somewhat of a stickier
ethical dilemma, then I think the documents probably help you more than it
can hurt you. I think that is my perspective.
P2: Quick question for P4. Can I ask him a question?
M1: Please.
P2: P4, as you know when we were at the SEC we saw the
prosecutorialization of the agency we love so much and the financial crisis
of fraud. Today there is a prosecutor that is the chair of the agency, I am
not sure we have seen that before. Is the pendulum going to swing back
into this becoming a regulatory agency with an enforcement staff that has a
history at the agency that as you said brings more impactful cases that have
a deterrence effect? Do you think that is something we can count on?
P4: I do not know. I would say that there is going to be smarter
enforcement. I think it is going to be tough enforcement. There are a lot of
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bad actors in the financial market. There are a lot of great actors out there.
But wherever you go, there are bad actors. I think the quote was great.
Every town has a jail. There are bad actors out there. You need a vigorous
SEC. One of my heroes by the way was the longstanding Enforcement
Director, [Redacted]. And [Redacted] talked about the importance of being
sort of the cop. You want to ensure that there is a level playing field out
there for investors. That people cannot commit fraud or cheat or steal. I
think that is a bipartisan view. I do not think that is going to change
whatsoever, but it is probably going to be a bit smarter and more focused to
look to see where you can deter the wrongdoers, and empower the
gatekeepers too. [Redacted] was very famous for focusing on gatekeepers.
In the Lincoln’s Savings case [Redacted] said where are the accountants?
But CCOs are also gatekeepers, and you want to make sure you are also
empowering gatekeepers. You want to make sure you are empowering
auditors, including lawyers. In the last few years, there have been a
number of cases against lawyers. There have been cases against
independent directors that the SEC brought where they have failed in their
duties. You want to enforce that and make sure that the gatekeepers are not
only doing their job, but also that they are empowered to do their job,
which I think is a good segway back to the topic of the panel.
M1: I think we have had a pretty robust discussion. We are going to
have a publication by the American University Business Law Review,
which includes a chart that will bring together a summary of the laws that
relate to CCO liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the United States government
prioritized the deterrence of corporate misconduct.1 Consequently, over
* Staff Member, American University Business Law Review, Volume 6; J.D.
Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, 2018.
1. See generally Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling,
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the years, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) addressed corporate
misconduct in a variety of DOJ memoranda. 2 These memoranda sought to
ensure justice, fairness, and accountability for high-level corporate
officials. 3
However, each new administration brings a unique perspective. Thus,
under the Trump Administration, there will likely be a shift in how the DOJ
determines and prosecutes corporate misconduct. Because the Trump
Administration appears unpredictable to much of the American public, it is
as-yet unclear what stance the DOJ will take with respect to ongoing and
future corporate misconduct.
This Comment attempts to predict what can be expected by the Trump
Administration in relation to prosecutorial efforts to punish corporate
misconduct. Section Two provides a detailed description of each DOJ
memorandum, the context in which each memorandum was written, and
the cases that arose as a result of each memorandum. Furthermore, Section
Two will demonstrate how other administrative agencies, such as the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), have followed the DOJ’s
lead, holding individuals accountable for corporate misconduct. Section
Three compares and contrasts the development of DOJ memorandas,
discusses the memorandas’ impact on case law, and explains how cases are
brought against Chief Compliance Officers (“CCOs”). Section Four makes
suggestions about what should be included in a new DOJ memorandum and
explains why deregulating the financial services industry would harm the
economy.
Specifically, this Comment suggests that the Trump
Administration should continue to focus on individual accountability for
corporate misconduct. In particular, the Trump Administration should
provide for consequences to high-ranking corporate officials and Board
members that play a role in corporate misconduct. Finally, this Comment

INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/ (last
visited Jan. 28, 2017); see also The origins of the financial crisis: Crash course,
ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financialcrisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
2. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo] (on file with author); Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry D.
Thompson to Heads of Dep’t Components United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo] (on file with author); Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep’t Components United States Attorneys
(Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo] (on file with author); Memorandum from
Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark Filip to Heads of Dep’t Components United States
Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo] (on file with author);
Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all United States
Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo] (on file with author).
3. Yates Memo, supra note 2.
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concludes with an explanation of why these proposed changes will benefit
corporate CCOs, the business sector, and the economy as a whole.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DOJ Memoranda
In an effort to demonstrate a tough stance against corporations and the
individuals who engage in misconduct, the DOJ has, throughout the years,
issued memoranda guiding federal prosecutors on when to bring criminal
charges against corporations, corporate officials, or both. 4 The DOJ
memoranda are meant to serve two purposes: (1) to combat corporate fraud
and misbehavior 5 and (2) to hold both corporations and individuals who
engage in misconduct accountable.6 These memoranda possess substantial
weight (although they are not binding within the legal community), because
they set the tone for the DOJ’s prosecutorial priorities, methods, and
strategies. 7 The following sections describe in more detail each DOJ
memorandum and provide the social context in which each was adopted.
1. The Holder Memorandum
The Holder Memorandum (“Holder Memo”) was the first memorandum
of its kind. 8 The Holder Memo’s objective was to deter corporate fraud
and ensure accountability from corporations and culpable individuals. 9 The
Holder Memo predominantly focused on the federal prosecution of
corporations as a means of deterring corporate misconduct.10 Pursuant to
the Holder Memo, corporations should be held responsible for their
employees’ behavior because employees act on behalf of the corporation.11
In bringing charges against corporations, prosecutors were encouraged to
consider the following factors:
1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the impact on the
public; 2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
4.
5.
6.
7.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Frederick T. Davis, The DOJ “Yates Memorandum” – What is it, and Why
does it Matter?, ETHIC INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 2015), http://www.ethicintelligence.com/experts/9759-doj-yates-memorandum-matter/ (“[legal memoranda
are] not legally binding and create no enforceable rights . . . [but DOJ memos are
taken] seriously and counsel often make very explicit reference to them in discussions
and negotiations with prosecutors.”).
8. See Holder Memo, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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including any wrongdoing committed by corporate management; 3) the
corporation’s prior history of misconduct; 4) the corporation’s timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to cooperate in
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the
corporate attorney-client and work product privileges; 5) whether the
corporation has a compliance program and whether that program is
effective; 6) the corporation’s remedial actions to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant
government agencies; 7) collateral consequences, including
disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not proven
personally culpable; and 8) the adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such
12
as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.

While the primary goal of the Holder Memo was to pursue corporations,
it also took the first steps to initiate the DOJ’s commitment to “prosecute
culpable individuals.” 13
An example of the Holder Memo’s use by federal prosecutors is seen in
the 2001 indictment of TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. (“TAP
Pharmaceutical”) and the indictments of seven TAP Pharmaceutical
officers. 14 TAP Pharmaceutical was indicted for fraudulent drug pricing
and marketing conduct. Additionally, seven TAP officers were charged
with “conspiring to pay kickbacks to doctors and other customers.” 15 As a
result of these indictments, TAP Pharmaceutical and its officers elected to
settle the case. 16 The officers were able to evade civil penalties; however,
TAP Pharmaceuticals was ordered to pay a $290 million criminal fine to
the DOJ’s Crime Victim Fund. 17
Cases such as TAP Pharmaceutical demonstrate the impact that the
DOJ’s Holder Memo created on corporate conduct. The Holder Memo
increased corporate awareness that the government would monitor
corporate conduct. The Holder Memo guided DOJ prosecutors for two
years on when to engage in prosecutions of corporate misconduct until
2003 when the Thompson Memorandum (“Thompson Memo”) was issued.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc., and Seven

Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to
Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2001/October/51
3civ.htm [hereinafter TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc., and Seven Others Charged
with Health Care Crimes].
15. Id.
16. See id. (noting a large reimbursement payment to the victims of the
misconduct).
17. See id. (observing that some of the money went to the victims).
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2. The Thompson, McNulty, and Filip Memoranda
In 2001, the Enron scandal further emphasized the need to address
corporate misconduct. 18 Enron was one of America’s largest and most
powerful corporations.19 Enron focused on energy trading and supplying
as well as the creation of Enron Online, a commodities trading website.20
At Enron’s apex, its shares were worth ninety dollars. 21 Enron engaged in
fraudulent mark-to-market practices, which hid its losses and made it
appear to be far more profitable than it actually was. 22 The mark-to-market
practice allowed Enron to build assets and claim profits from those assets
even though no profit was actually made. 23 As a result of Enron’s fraud, its
stock spiraled into a free fall, which shook Wall Street. 24 Enron collapsed,
and the resulting fallout pushed the Bush administration to address
corporate misconduct, leading directly to the Thompson Memo. 25
The Thompson Memo’s stated purpose was to revise the principles for
federal prosecution of business organizations. However, the Memo also
emphasized the need to hold corporations accountable for their employees’
actions. 26 Under the Thompson Memo, prosecutors were directed to weigh
the thoroughness of a corporation’s disclosure of wrongdoing. 27
Specifically, when determining whether to bring charges, prosecutors were
encouraged to consider the willingness of a corporation to waive attorney-

18. See generally Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling, supra note 1
(“At Enron’s peak, its shares were worth $90.75, but after the company declared
bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, they plummeted to $0.67 by January 2002. To this
day, many wonder how such a powerful business disintegrated almost overnight and
how it managed to fool the regulators with fake, off-the-books corporations for so
long.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.; Mark To Market – MTM, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investoped
ia.com/terms/m/marktomarket.asp?lgl=rira-baseline-vertical (last visited July 24, 2017)
(“Mark to market (MTM) is a measure of the fair value of accounts that can change
over time, such as assets and liabilities. Mark to market aims to provide a realistic
appraisal of an institution’s or company’s current financial situation.”).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in
a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1095, 1097 (2006).
26. See Thompson Memo, supra note 2 (referencing the same guidelines as put
forth in the Holder Memo).
27. Id.
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client privilege and the work product doctrine. 28 Waivers allowed the
government to obtain otherwise protected documents. 29
Additional factors that the Thompson Memo recommended to
prosecutors were: 1) whether the corporation guarded its culpable
employees and provided support through the payment of legal fees; and 2)
whether the corporation acted in a manner that hindered the government’s
investigation.30 Similar to the Holder Memo, the Thompson Memo briefly
acknowledged that “prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals.” 31 The Thompson Memo
emphasized that holding corporations accountable would deter future
corporate misconduct. 32
The Thompson Memo was criticized in the legal community, which
claimed that it eroded the attorney-client and work-product privileges. 33
As a result, the Bush administration issued the McNulty Memorandum
(“McNulty Memo”) to revise the Thompson Memo’s shortcomings. 34 The
McNulty Memo continued to advise prosecutors to follow the guidelines in
the Holder Memo and the Thompson Memo, but the McNulty Memo
clarified waiver of attorney-client and work product doctrine privileges.35
The McNulty Memo stated that prosecutors were to request waiver of
attorney-client and work product privileges only if there was a “legitimate
need” for the information. 36 Like the Holder and Thompson Memos, the
McNulty Memo briefly addressed individual accountability, stating that
individual directors, officers, employers, and shareholders would also be
charged if they were criminally culpable for the corporation’s
misconduct.37
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7, 8.
Id. at 1.
Id.
See generally Letter from Former Attorneys Gen., Deputy Attorneys Gen., and
Solicitor Gen.’s to Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzalez (Sept. 5, 2006), http://federalev
idence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/Former_DOJ_Lttr_9_5_06.pdf (purporting that the
Thompson memorandum was eroding attorney-client and work product privileges); see
also McNulty Memo, supra note 2 (expressing that the corporate legal community was
concerned over the practices implemented by the DOJ, which impacted the
communications between the corporate legal counsel and the corporate employees).
34. See generally Letter from Former Attorneys Gen., Deputy Attorneys Gen., and
Solicitor Gen.’s to Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzalez, (Sept. 5, 2006), http://federalev
idence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/Former_DOJ_Lttr_9_5_06.pdf; see also McNulty Memo,
supra note 2.
35. McNulty Memo, supra note 2.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 2.
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The final memorandum issued under the Bush administration was the
Filip Memorandum (“Filip Memo”), which continued the trend of revising
the previous memoranda on corporate prosecutions.38 While the Filip
Memo noted that corporate individuals should face criminal accountability
for their misconduct, it primarily revised the principles on cooperation
credit, payment of attorney’s fees, and corporate participation in a joint
defense agreement. 39
Ultimately, the Bush administration memoranda encouraged
corporations to be held responsible for their actions while individual
liability would be resolved through the corporation’s option to waive
privileges and hand over incriminating information. 40
3. The Yates Memorandum
The Yates Memorandum (“Yates Memo”) was created in response to
complaints that after the 2008 recession, senior banking officials were not
held accountable for their part in the housing market crash.41 The 2008
recession was in large part a result of the real estate market collapse, which
was driven by financial institutions offering subprime and other risky
mortgages to homebuyers. 42 Financial institutions then securitized these
risky mortgages and sold them via mortgage-backed securities, spreading
the toxic assets across the country. 43 Although prosecutors collected
billions in civil monetary penalties from the largest financial institutions
stemming from lending practices, none of their top executives were
sentenced to prison. 44 The DOJ then began focusing on individual
accountability, prompting the issuance of the Yates Memo.. 45
The Yates Memo’s purpose was to encourage the prosecution of highlevel corporate officials for corporate wrongdoing. 46 The Yates Memo has
been implemented in both civil and criminal provisions of the United States
38.
39.
40.
41.

See Filip Memo, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
See also Benjamin B. Coulter, The Yates Memo: Its Impact on the Prosecution
of Corporations and Individual Defendants, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/03/11/the-yates-memo-its-impact-on-theprosecution-of-co?slreturn=1502047746.
42. R. Christopher Small, The Role of Accounting in the Financial Crisis, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGS (Mar. 2, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harv
ard.edu/2012/03/02/the-role-of-accounting-in-the-financial-crisis/.
43. Id.
44. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/poli
tics/new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html.
45. See id.
46. See Yates Memo, supra note 2.
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Attorney’s Manual, for example, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (“PFPBO”). 47
The Yates Memo lays out “six key steps” that prosecutors should follow
when investigating corporate wrongdoing.
The first is the most
controversial amongst corporate legal practitioners and compliance
officers. 48 It states, “to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations
must provide all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct.” 49 Under this guideline, the corporation must identify all
culpable individuals who engaged in misconduct, regardless of their
position in the company. 50 Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
emphasized that this first step is an “all or nothing” provision, and that
corporations are no longer able to cherry-pick which facts will be
disclosed. 51 Essentially, if a corporation wants cooperation credit, it must
hand over all relevant facts relating to the misconduct and identify all of the
individuals who participated. 52
Individuals felt the impact of individual accountability, as reflected in
the 2015 indictment against W. Carl Reichel.53 Carl Reichel was the
president of healthcare provider Warner Chilcott; he was arrested and
charged with conspiring to pay kickbacks to physicians to incentivize them
to purchase the healthcare services offered by the company. 54 “Prosecutors
had said Reichel oversaw stunning levels of bribery at Warner Chilcott:
200,000 dinner tabs, $25 million in speaking fees for health care providers,
and sailing trips in Rhode Island, all in service, they said, of the company’s
bottom line.” 55 Warner Chilcott was ordered to pay a criminal fine of
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
See id. at 2-6.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at
N.Y.U. Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate
Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school.
52. See id. (“[I]f a company wants any consideration for its cooperation, it must
give up the individuals no matter where they sit within the company.”).
53. See Indictment, United States v. Reichel, Case No. 1:15-cr-10324-DPW at 1, 46 (Mass. Dist. Ct.), available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/file/789116/
download; see also Jonathan Sack, Recent Trials Highlight DOJ’s Challenges in
Prosecuting Individuals for Corporate Misconduct, FORBES, http://www.forbes
.com/sites/insider/2016/07/11/recent-trials-highlight-dojs-challenges-in-prosecutingindividuals-for-corporate-misconduct/2/#c966dbe61048 (last updated July 11, 2016).
54. See Indictment, United States v. Reichel, supra note 53.
55. See Brian Amaral, Ex-Warner Chilcott Exec Acquitted In Doctor Bribery
Scheme, LAW 360 (June 17, 2016, 11:37 AM), https://www.law360.com/lifesci
ences/articles/807944?nl_pk=a5670392-c6d7-4422-30113c1697b2378&utm_source=
newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=lifesciences.
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$22.4 million and a civil settlement of $102.06 million. 56 However, Carl
Reichel was ultimately acquitted of anti-kickback charges. 57
Another case involved the prosecution of Deborah Duffy, the CCO of
WG Trading Company, LG. 58 Duffy maintained the books for the trading
company and knew of the fraudulent scheme conducted by WG Trading
principals, Stephen Walsh and Paul Greenwood. 59 Duffy was sentenced to
prison for securities fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering. 60 In
addition, she was ordered to pay $1,272,841 in restitution. 61
The DOJ’s move towards individual accountability was also prominent
in the cases of United States v. Cioff & Tannii 62, United States v. Meyer 63,
and United States v. Madoff. 64 In United States v. Cioffi , Ralph Cioffi and
Matthew Tannin were both portfolio managers of hedge funds for Bear
Stearns. 65 Both were also charged as individuals with “conspiracy,
securities fraud, and wire fraud.” 66 Cioffi was also charged with insider
trading. 67 A jury acquitted both men of all charges. 68 Furthermore, in
United States v. Meyer, James Meyer, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of
Preferred Merchants LLC, was charged and sentenced to fifteen months in
prison for obstruction of justice. 69 Meyer purposefully misinformed the
56. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner Chilcott Agrees to Plead Guilty to
Felony Health Care Fraud Scheme and Pay $125 Million to Resolve Criminal Liability
and False Claims Act Allegations (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Warner Chilcott Agrees
to Plead Guilty] (on file with author).
57. See Gary F. Giampetruzzi & Terra L. Reynolds, Not Guilty, Again: Individual
Corporate Liability After Reichel, LAW360 (June 20, 2016, 10:38 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/808278/not-guilty-again-individual-corporate-liabili
ty-after-reichel.
58. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chief Compliance Officer of WG Trading
Company, LP, Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court for Several Hundred MillionDollar Fraud Scheme (Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter WG Trading Press Release] (on file
with author).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Indictment, United States v. Cioffi, Case No. 08-CR-415 (FB) (E.D.N.Y.)
[hereinafter Indictment, United States v. Cioffi].
63. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Financial Services
Company Executive Sentenced to 15 Months for Obstruction of Justice (Aug. 23,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/financial-services-company-executive-sentenc
ed-15-months-obstruction-justice [hereinafter Press Release Office of Pub. Affairs].
64. See Indictment, United States v. Madoff, Criminal No. S7 10 Cr. 228 (LTS)
(S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter Indictment, United States v. Madoff].
65. Indictment, United States v. Cioffi, supra note 62, at 1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Sack, supra note 53.
69. Press Release Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 63.
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SEC of his company’s asset holdings in Rex Ventures Group LLC, which
was engaged in a Ponzi scheme. 70 In United States v. Madoff, Peter
Madoff was the Chief Compliance Officer and director of Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities. 71 Madoff was charged with securities fraud,
falsifying records of an investment advisor, falsifying records of a brokerdealer, and making false statements to the SEC.72 Ultimately, Madoff was
sentenced to 150 years in prison. 73
B. Administrative Agencies Following DOJ’s Lead
Since the release of the Yates Memo, many administrative agencies have
followed the DOJ’s lead in prosecuting individuals. Although DOJ
memoranda are not binding on administrative agencies, they are persuasive
authority. 74 This section discusses several administrative agencies’
methods of pursuing corporate misconduct, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
1. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
The mission of the SEC is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly,
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”75 The SEC
accomplishes its mission by overseeing the United States securities markets
and ensuring that securities brokers, publicly traded corporations,
investment advisors, and mutual funds properly disclose material
information. 76 The SEC also protects investors from fraud. 77 The SEC’s
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Indictment, United States v. Madoff, supra note 64.
Id.
See id.; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Bernard Madoff Sentenced to
150 Years in Prison (June 29 2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/pressreleases/2009/nyfo062909.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Peter
Madoff, Former Chief Compliance Officer and Senior Managing Director At Bernard
L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, Pleads Guilty To Securities Fraud And Tax
Fraud Conspiracy In Manhattan Federal Court (June 29, 2012), https://archives.
fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/peter-madoff-former-chief-complianceofficer-and-senior-managing-director-at-bernard-l.-madoff-investment-securities-llcpleads-guilty-to-securities-fraud-and-tax-fraud-conspiracy-in-manhattan-federal-court
[hereinafter Peter Madoff Press Release].
74. See DOJ Issues New Guidance on Pursuing Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing 3, COVINGTON (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2015/09/doj_memo_individual_corporate_wrongdo
ing.pdf (noting that DOJ memorandum is not binding on DOJ attorneys and law
enforcement agents).
75. See What We Do, S.E.C., https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
updated June 10, 2013).
76. Id.
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Division of Enforcement brings civil actions against individuals and
corporations that engage in securities fraud.78 Often, the SEC works in
tandem with the DOJ, which pursues criminal actions against individuals
who participate in securities fraud.79
Following in the footsteps of the DOJ, the SEC has committed to
maintain corporate individual accountability. 80 The SEC brings most of its
cases against CCOs under § 15(b)(4)(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (“SEA”) and Rule 206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940. 81
Under § 15(b)(4)(e) of SEA, CCOs may be held personally liable for
failure to supervise, and under Rule 206(4)-7, they may be held personally
responsible for failed compliance policies and procedures. 82 The SEC’s
move toward individual accountability is highlighted in the cases In re SFX
Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc. and Eugene Mason 83
and BlackRock Advisors, LLC. 84 In In re SFX Financial Advisory
Management Enterprises, Inc. (“SFX”), Mason, the CCO for SFX, was
charged with: (1) failing to implement SFX’s compliance policies, (2)
failing to conduct annual reviews, and (3) making a material misstatement
on a filing. 85 The SEC filed its complaint against Mason after SFX’s
president, Brian Ourand and another individual misappropriated funds. 86
The SEC filed its complaint even though Mason timely conducted an
internal investigation after discovering Ourand was misappropriating
funds. 87 It was not enough that SFX terminated Ourand and reported his
actions to the DOJ. 88 Rather, the SEC found that SFX’s compliance
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Press Release, Comm’r Luis A. Aguilar, S.E.C., The Role of Chief Compliance
Officers Must be Supported (June 29, 2015) [hereinafter The Role of Chief Compliance
Officers] (on file with author).
81. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., S.E.C. Div. of Enf’t, Keynote Address at the 2015
National Society of Compliance Professional, National Conference (Nov. 4, 2015).
82. Id. (stating that Rule 206(4)-7 emphasizes that the CCO should have a position
of seniority and authority, which would allow CCOs to have an influential voice within
a corporation).
83. SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4116 (June 15, 2015).
84. BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,
Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).
85. SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4116 (June 15, 2015).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
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policies and procedures were not reasonably designed to detect the
misappropriation.89 As a result, the SEC ordered Mason to pay a civil
penalty of $25,000. 90
Additionally, in an administrative proceeding against Blackrock
Advisors, LLC and its then-CCO, Bartholomew A. Battista, the SEC
charged the CCO with fostering compliance failures. Specifically, Battista
was charged with failing to adopt and implement written compliance
policies and procedures for outside activities of employees.91 This case
arose after a senior portfolio manager engaged in misconduct with his own
personal investment vehicles, which violated Blackrock’s private
investment policy and created conflicts of interest. 92 Because the CCO
failed to oversee Rice’s outside business activities and the attendant
conflicts of interests with Blackrock, the SEC ordered the CCO to pay
$60,000. 93 These cases reflect the SEC’s vision of CCOs as gatekeepers,
who are supposed to actively monitor and control corporate compliance.94
2. Financial Crimes Enforcement and Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) have each followed
the lead of the DOJ in pursuing corporate individual liability. The mission
of FinCEN is to protect the financial system by preventing money
laundering and “[promoting] national security through the collection,
analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of
financial authorities.” 95
FinCEN’s approach to pursuing corporate
individual liability is displayed in Department of Treasury v. Haider.
Thomas Haider was the CCO for MoneyGram International Inc., in charge
of ensuring that MoneyGram complied with the Bank Secrecy Act. 96
Haider was also responsible for implementing an anti-money laundering
program and filing suspicious activity reports (“SARs”) to FinCEN.97
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,

Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket 1 (Apr. 20, 2015).

92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, S.E.C., Keynote Address at Compliance Week 2014

(May 19, 2014).
95. See Mission, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/about/mission (last visited Aug.
1, 2017).
96. United States Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (DSD/HB), 2016
WL 107940, at *1, *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016).
97. Id. at *1-4.
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Haider’s alleged failure to implement an anti-money laundering program
and file SARS resulted in a civil penalty of $1 million.98
Additionally, FINRA may hold CCOs culpable for failing to implement
a “culture that consistently places ethical considerations and client interests
at the center of business decisions.” 99 Similar to the SEC’s mission and
purpose, FINRA also regulates the securities market to protect investors
against fraud. 100 FINRA has the ability to enforce its rules and regulations
against all of its registered members, including firms and individual
brokers. 101
FINRA defines “firm culture” as “the set of explicit and implicit norms,
practices, and expected behaviors that influence how employees make and
carry out decisions in the course of conducting the firm’s business.” 102 If a
firm fails to implement a positive firm culture, the firm could face steep
penalties and CCOs can suffer consequences such as civil penalties. 103
FINRA’s imposition of harsh consequences to CCOs who fail to ensure
that their corporations have a positive firm culture is reflected in
Department of Enforcement v. Meyers Assoc.’s, Inc., where Bruce Meyers,
was the CEO of Meyers Associates, L.P. 104 Meyers was charged with
failing to supervise, sending misleading advertising materials, and failing to
maintain accurate books and records. 105 Meyers was fined $75,000 and the
firm was fined $700,000. 106 Although the consequences were issued to the
CEO, FINRA does not discriminate when holding higher-level officials
accountable, meaning that consequences can equally be distributed to

98. Id. at *3.
99. See Establishing, Communicating and Implementing Cultural Values, FINRA

(Feb. 2016), http://www.finra.org/industry/establishing-communicating-and-implemen
ting-cultural-values [hereinafter Implementing Cultural Values].
100. See What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do (last visited
Aug. 16, 2017).
101. Id.
102. See Implementing Cultural Values, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. Dep’t of Enf’t v. Meyers Assoc.’s, Inc., Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2010020954501 (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.bdlawcorner.com/wp-content/ uploads/
sites/523/2016/05/Meyers-Associates.pdf; see also Press Release, FINRA, FINRA
Fines Brown Brothers Harriman A Record $8 Million for Substantial Anti-Money
Laundering Compliance Failures (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/
2014/finra-fines-brown-brothers-harriman-record-8-million-substantial-anti-moneylaundering (explaining FINRA v. Crawford).
105. Alan Wolper, According To FINRA, “Culture Of Compliance” Is Not Only
Definable, It’s Enforceable, BROKER-DEALER (May 18, 2016), http://www.bdlaw
corner.com/2016/05/according-to-finra-culture-of-compliance-is-not-only-definableits-enforceable/.
106. Id.
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CCOs. 107 This case is looked at as a leading example of FINRA’s nononsense attitude on building and maintaining a positive firm culture, and
its willingness to pursue individual actors such as CCOs. 108
C. The Trump Administration
The Trump Administration has already begun to shift DOJ policies
implemented under the Obama Administration. Recently, President Trump
announced plans to “cut a lot out of” the Dodd-Frank Act. 109 Dodd-Frank
was passed in 2010 as a result of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Dodd-Frank
created the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which identifies risks and
threats to financial stability. 111 Dodd-Frank “has had a profound effect on
the financial industry, forcing banks to submit to yearly ‘stress tests’ to
prove they could withstand economic turbulence and draw up ‘living wills’
that lay out how the banks could be dismantled without harming the rest of
the financial system.” 112 President Trump’s recent SEC Chair appointment
suggests that the Trump Administration may be laxer than the Obama
Administration on corporate regulations.113 Trump’s pick for SEC
Commissioner, Jay Clayton, is known for being a “Wall Street lawyer,”
and he has represented Goldman Sachs for decades.114 It is believed that
107. See Hardy Callcott & Emily Culbertson, FINRA Is Concerned About Firm
Culture: What Does It Mean? 1, 2, LAW360 (Feb. 29, 2016, 12:03 PM),
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/law360_finra-is-concerned-about-firmculture_what-does-it-mean.pdf.
108. Id.; see also See FINRA Fines Brown Brothers Harriman a Record $8 Million
for Substantial Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Failures, FINRA (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-fines-brown-brothers-harriman-record-8million-substantial-anti-money-laundering (noting FINRA v. Crawford, where the CCO
notified his superiors of corporate misconduct, but he was still held personally
accountable for failing to take action).
109. Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era
Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/20
17/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financial-regulations.html?_r=0.
110. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulato
ry-reform-bill.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).
111. Id.
112. See Renae Merle & Steven Mufson, Trump Signs Order to Begin Rolling Back
Wall Street Regulations, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/trump-signs-order-to-begin-rolling-back-wall-street-regula
tions/2017/02/03/650668d8-ea30-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=
.2e84edfa6080.
113. Leslie Picker, Donald Trump Nominates Wall Street Lawyer to Head S.E.C.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/business/dealbook/d
onald-trump-sec-jay-clayton.html?mcubz=1.
114. Chris Arnold, Can an SEC Nominee with Ties to Goldman Regulate Wall Street
Impartially?, NPR (Jan. 5, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/05/5084084
55/can-an-sec-nominee-with-ties-to-goldman-regulate-wall-street-impartially (noting
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Clayton’s representation of Goldman Sachs is an indicator that he may be
lenient towards Wall Street firms; however, presently there is no
information on Clayton’s view towards business regulations. 115
D. Chief Compliance Officers
Since the release of the Yates Memo, CCOs have been in the crosshairs
of regulatory and DOJ prosecution. CCOs are targeted because agencies
view CCOs as corporate compliance gatekeepers and a means to keep the
corporation and its officers in check. 116 Further, CCOs are seen as
instrumental in implementing the “tone at the top.” 117
CCOs generally ensure that a corporation meets regulatory standards.118
A CCO has the responsibility of creating and implementing corporate
compliance programs to (1) prevent and detect corporate misconduct and
(2) promote ethical conduct and compliance with the law.119 Further, a
CCO must ensure that a compliance program is effective, efficient, wellknown, and respected within the corporation.120 If misconduct occurs,
CCOs have a duty to report it to the CEO and Board of Directors.121
Challenges of the CCO profession include: undefined roles within the
corporation; lack of authority and independence; lack of resources to carry
out CCO functions; and ostracization from major decisions which could
potentially impact compliance.122
III. THE IMPACT OF DOJ MEMORANDA
A. Development of DOJ Memoranda
The common thread between the Holder Memo and the Bush era
memoranda is their primary focus on prosecuting corporate misconduct.123
that Mary Jo White, Obama’s pick for SEC commissioner was also previously a “Wall
Street Lawyer”).
115. See Picker, supra note 113.
116. See Stein, supra note 94.
117. Id.
118. The Role of Chief Compliance Officers Must be Supported, supra note 80.
119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
120. Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), MEMBER OF THE IARCP, http://www.chiefcompliance-officer.org (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
121. José A. Tabuena, The Chief Compliance Officer vs the General Counsel:
Friend or foe?, SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (Dec. 2006), http://www.corp
oratecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/past_handouts/CEI/2008/601-3.pdf.
122. See Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 120.
123. See generally Holder Memo, supra note 2; Thompson Memo, supra note 2;
McNulty Memo, supra note 2; Filip Memo, supra note 2.
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The guidelines for the memoranda are focused on a corporation’s
prosecution; 124 they are only dedicated to individual accountability in a
minimal way. 125
These memoranda lack emphasis on individual
accountability to deter corporate misconduct. 126
As a result of certain conduct that contributed to the 2008 recession, the
issue of individual accountability came under the spotlight. 127 The Yates
Memo is the only memorandum issued by the DOJ that explicitly
emphasizes individual accountability for corporate directors, officers,
shareholders, and employees. 128 Contrary to the Clinton and Bush
memoranda, the Yates Memo’s charging factors focus on individual
accountability for corporate wrongdoing. 129 The first guideline of the
Yates Memo states, “to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations
must provide all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct.” 130 Under this guideline, the corporation must identify all
culpable individuals who engaged in misconduct, regardless of their
position. 131
B. Good Intentions, Difficult to Implement
While the Yates Memo emphasizes individual accountability for
corporate officers, in practice the DOJ has been unsuccessful in criminal
prosecutions against individuals. 132 Most corporate criminal cases are
settled before trial, or at trial, the officers are often acquitted. 133 For
example, in TAP Pharmaceuticals, the DOJ brought anti-kickback violation
charges against eight officers, directors, and employees. 134 The jury

124. See generally Holder Memo, supra note 2; Thompson Memo, supra note 2;
McNulty Memo, supra note 2; Filip Memo, supra note 2.
125. See generally Holder Memo, supra note 2; Thompson Memo, supra note 2;
McNulty Memo, supra note 2; Filip Memo, supra note 2.
126. See generally Holder Memo, supra note 2; Thompson Memo, supra note 2;
McNulty Memo, supra note 2; Filip Memo, supra note 2.
127. See Yates Memo, supra note 2; see also The Financial Crisis Response in
Charts, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/data-chart-center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf.
128. See Yates Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 3.
131. See id.
132. See Sack, supra note 53, at 1.
133. TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc., and Seven Others Charged with Health
Care Crimes, supra note 14; see also Indictment, United States v. Reichel, supra note
53; Warner Chilcott Agrees to Plead Guilty, supra note 56.
134. TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc., and Seven Others Charged with Health
Care Crimes, supra note 14.
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acquitted all eight individuals.135 Also, as noted above, although healthcare
provider Warner Chilcott plead guilty to multiple counts of fraud and
agreed to pay $125 million, it’s CEO Carl Reichel was ultimately acquitted
of all charges. 136 Reichel’s case happened after the issuance of the Yates
Memo, and Reichel’s acquittal dealt a blow to the Yates Memo’s
objective. 137 Reichel’s case demonstrated the government’s difficulty in
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a corporate individual engaged in
misconduct.138
Similarly, the DOJ was successful in bringing a civil action against TAP
Pharmaceuticals for $875 million to redress the criminal actions done by its
employees. 139 Despite the monetary penalty against the company, Tap
Pharmaceuticals’ officials were acquitted, demonstrating another failure by
the DOJ to hold individuals responsible.
Additionally, in United States v. Cioffi, Raplh Cioffi and Matthew
Tannin were acquitted of securities fraud, leaving two more high-ranking
corporate officials unscathed by government action. 140
The cases above highlight the government’s difficulty in pursuing
individual prosecutions. 141 In part, the difficulty stems from the challenge
of demonstrating that corporate executives, employees, or officers
“knowingly and intentionally” committed misconduct. 142 The burden of
proving that an individual knowingly and intentionally committed
misconduct is high, due to the wide-ranging authority for decision-making
in a corporate setting. 143 There are two types of corporate decision making,

135. Shelley Murphy & Alice Dembner, All Acquitted in Drug Kickbacks Case Jury
Deals a Blow to US Prosecutors, BOSTON GLOBE (July 15, 2004), http://archive.bos
ton.com/news/local/articles/2004/07/15/all_acquitted_in_drug_kickbacks_case/.
136. See Giampetruzzi et al., supra note 57.
137. Thomas Sullivan, Carl Reichel Warner Chilcott Executive Acquittal Deals
Blow to Yates Memo, POL’Y AND MED. (June 20, 2016, 5:12 AM), http://www.policy
med.com/2016/06/carl-reichel-warner-chilcott-executive-acquittal-deals-blow-to-yatesmemo.html.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Sack, supra note 53, at 1.
141. See Gary Giampetruzzi, Terra Reynolds & Jahmila Williams, Not Guilty,
Again: Individual Corporate Liability in the Wake of the Reichel Acquittal, PAUL
HASTINGS (June 22, 2016), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/de
tails/?id=6cc9e969-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Michael S. Schmidt & Edward Wyatt, Corporate Fraud Cases
Often Spare Individuals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/20
12/08/08/business/more-fraud-settlements-for-companies-but-rarely-individuals.html
(stating that “senior executives are often insulated from the day-to-day duties of the
corporation,” which makes prosecuting on the basis of intent difficult).
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top down or bottom up, but both result in dispersed decision-making. 144
The top down approach consists of high-level officers and directors making
decisions which are passed down for implementation. 145 The bottom up
approach gives authority to middle level officers to make decisions, which
are then dispersed to the rest of the corporation’s employees, up or
down. 146 Most corporations implement the top down approach, which
leaves officers at the top of the company more open to liability under the
Yates Memo. 147
Another problem with the government’s pursuit of criminal actions
against corporate individuals is that under many anti-fraud statutes, is that
the term “willfully” has different meanings. 148 The various definitions of
willfully includes: 1) “proof that the individual intentionally violated a
known legal duty; 2) proof that the individual knowingly committed the
criminal act, regardless of whether she also knew that her actions were
illegal; and 3) requires that the individual acted with the intent to violate
the law.” 149 Depending on the particular statute, the culpability the
government must prove may hinder prosecution. 150 Further, in defense,
defendants often claim they acted in good faith, which excuses mistakes.151
Facing claims good faith, it is difficult for prosecutors to prove that an
individual knowingly and intentionally engaged in misconduct. 152 For
example, the defense of good faith was used in United States v. Cioffi, 153
and is part of the reason the DOJ was unsuccessful in criminally
prosecuting the defendants. 154 Based on these indictments by the DOJ,
pursuing individual accountability has posed a challenge for the DOJ.

144. See The Process of Corporate Decision Making, MGMT STUDY GUIDE,
http://www.managementstudyguide.com/corporate-decision-making.htm (last visited
Aug. 16, 2017).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Carol A. Poindexter, Norton Rose Fulbright & Timothy M. Moore, Trends in
Federal White Collar Prosecutions, PRACTICAL L. 1, 8 (2016), http://www.nortonrose
fulbright.com/files/20160101-trends-in-federal-white-collar-prosecutions-135964.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Ciof & Tannin, 08-cr-0415 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008)
(indictment given on June 18, 2008).
154. See Poindexter et al., supra note 148, at 9 (explaining that the defendant used
the defense of good faith to claim that the defendant made an “honest misunderstanding
of her legal duties”).

2017

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

295

C. Successful Civil Actions Brought by Administrative Agencies
While successfully pursuing criminal actions has been difficult for the
DOJ, administrative agencies have been more successful against corporate
individuals, especially CCOs.
For the SEC, the concern with § 15(b)(4)(E) of SEA is that the
regulation fails to acknowledge that CCOs often do not hold supervisory
positions within a company. 155 CCOs are subordinate to the board of
directors and the CEO, but nevertheless, under § 15(b)(4)(E), CCOs may
be held accountable for misconduct regardless of whether they hold a
sufficiently supervisory position.156
Rule 206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisors Act is as controversial as §
15(b)(4)(E) of SEA. On its face, Rule 206(4)-7 implies that the SEC
should charge the firm’s Registered Investment Adviser (“RIA”), who is
tasked with enforcing compliance policies and procedures, and not charge
the CCO. 157 This implication is further advanced by the statutory
background released by the SEC, which states that investment advisors
adopt compliance policies and procedures and review the adequacy of the
procedures annually. 158 Under Rule 206(4)-7, CCOs are responsible for
administering the procedures. 159 The SEC ignores the plain reading of the
Rule and continuously holds CCOs personally liable for any misconduct
that occurs. 160 This is demonstrated in the case Blackrock Advisors, in
which the SEC charged the CCO, Batista, for failure to implement adequate
policies and procedures that would have prevented the securities
violations. 161
Further, FinCEN pursues civil actions against CCOs for “any violations
of reporting, recordkeeping, or other requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act.” 162 As for FINRA, civil penalties are imposed against CCOs if
155. See Dawn Causey, Who Should Have Personal Liability for Compliance
Failures?, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://bankingjournal.aba.com/20
15/08/who-should-have-personal-liability-for-compliance-failures/ (noting that CCOs
are not at the top of the corporate organizational chart); see also Susan Lorde Martin,
Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173, 189 (2015).
156. See Martin, supra note 155, at 189.
157. See Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, S.E.C. (Nov. 23,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/advoverview.htm.
158. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270, 275 (2004).
159. Id.
160. See Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, supra note 157
(purporting that Chair White holds the CCOs responsible for ensuring that the RIA firm
has adopted sufficient procedures and policies that would not violate Rule 206(4)-(7)).
161. See id.
162. Enforcement Actions, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/news-room/enforce
ment-actions (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
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compliance mechanisms fail, the corporation lacks good firm culture, the
CCO aids and abets recordkeeping violations, or the CCO holds a lack of
proper qualifications. 163
The success of imposing civil penalties against corporate individuals is
reflected in the cases brought by the SEC, FinCEN, and FINRA. 164 Both of
the SEC cases, SFX and BlackRock, resulted in CCOs paying civil
monetary penalties of $25,000 and $60,000, respectively. 165 Additionally,
both FinCEN and FINRA’s cases, Haider and Meyers resulted in CCOs
paying a civil penalty. 166 In Haider, defendant Haider paid a $1 million
civil penalty. 167 In Meyers, FINRA simply fined Meyers $75,000. 168
However, none of the individuals were sentenced to time in jail.
There are several reasons why civil penalties have been a more
successful way to punish corporate misconduct than criminal actions with
the potential for jail time. First, there is a lower burden of proof for civil
charges than criminal charges, in which prosecutors must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual engaged in a crime. 169 Civil cases
require prosecutors to prove guilt based on a preponderance of evidence.170
Second, there is a greater opportunity to secure a large sum for damages.171
In civil cases, the burden lies with the prosecution to prove that an
individual knowingly and intentionally violated the law.172 Furthermore, it
is easier and more cost effective for agencies to bring civil actions instead
163. See Callcott et al., supra note 107, at 2; see also Brian L. Rubin & Katherine L.
Kelly, While You Were Complying: SEC and FINRA Disciplinary Actions Taken
Against Chief Compliance Officers 39, REG. REFORM TASKFORCE (Sept.-Oct. 2010),
http://www.regulatoryreformtaskforce.com/portalresource/While%20You%20
Were%20Complying-%20SEC%20and%20FINRA.pdf.
164. See generally BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4065, Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).;
United States Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (DSD/HB), 2016 WL
107940, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016); Dep’t of Enf’t v. Meyers Assoc.’s, Inc.,
Disciplinary
Proceeding
No.
2010020954501
(Apr.
27,
2016),
http://www.bdlawcorner.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/523/2016/05/MeyersAssociates.
pdf.
165. See BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,
Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).
166. See Haider, 2016 WL 107940 at *1; see also Dep’t of Enf’t v. Meyers Assoc.’s,
Inc., supra note 164.
167. Haider, 2016 WL 107940 at *1.
168. Dep’t of Enf’t v. Meyers Assoc.’s, Inc., supra note 164.
169. The Differences between a Criminal Case and a Civil Case, FINDLAW,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/the-differences-between-a-criminalcase-and-a-civil-case.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
170. Id.
171. See Schmidt et al., supra note 143.
172. Id.
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of DOJ bringing a criminal suit. 173 For every “one dollar spent on a
criminal case, the government receives fifteen dollars for a civil case.” 174
D. Individual Accountability a Concern for CCOs
In 2016, a survey conducted by the law firm DLA Piper found that “8
out of 10 Chief Compliance Officers said they were at least somewhat
concerned about the change in tone and tactics from Washington.” 175
The DOJ encourages increased prosecutorial attention on high-level
corporate officers to deter corporate wrongdoing. 176 DOJ prosecutors seek
criminal actions alongside civil suits against CCOs.
The DOJ’s
predominant focus is to ensure that CCOs engaged in or aware of
misconduct is punished, to deter corporations from injuring the American
people. 177 WR Trading Company’s Deborah Duffy maintained the books
of the company while knowing of the fraudulent scheme conducted by its
principals. 178 She was sentenced to prison for securities fraud, conspiracy,
and money laundering and ordered to pay $1,272,841 in restitution. 179
While the DOJ’s prosecutions of CCOs are infrequent, like other
corporate executives, they could be held liable for corporate misconduct.
Similar to Carl Reichel, then president of Warner Chilcott, a CCO could be
held liable for personally engaging in kickbacks or being aware of the
kickbacks, but failing to stop them. 180 Like other officers, CCOs face the
possibility of being held accountable. 181 CCOs can also be held
accountable for obstructing justice, which was the case in the DOJ
prosecution of Jaymes Meyer, CEO of Preferred Merchants LLC, a
financial services company. 182 Meyers concealed millions of dollars from

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. DLA PIPER’S 2016 COMPLIANCE & RISK REPORT: CCOS UNDER SCRUTINY

(2016).
176. Id.
177. See USAM 9-28.210, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-928000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.210 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2017); see also Giampetruzzi et al., supra note 57.
178. See Warner Chilcott Agrees to Plead Guilty, supra note 56.
179. Id.
180. Indictment, United States v. Reichel, supra note 53.
181. See What is the Difference Between a President and a Chief Executive Officer?
Can There Be More than One of Each?, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/062504.asp (explaining that Chief
Executive Officers’ role within a corporation consists of “integrating policy into the
daily operations of the corporation, and the responsibility of the president is to
implement the day-to-day operations of the corporation”).
182. See Press Release Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 69.
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the government. 183 Under a CCO scenario, the CCO would be held
accountable along with other executives, for not only being aware and
taking part in the misappropriation of funds, but also for failure to
supervise and implement proper compliance mechanisms. 184 This was the
case in the sentencing of Peter Madoff, who was a CCO for Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS). 185 Peter Madoff was aware
of, and enabled Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, and he was sentenced to
prison. 186
The DOJ and administrative agencies attempts at reeling in corporate
misconduct have had a chilling effect on the compliance community. 187
Sixty-five percent of CCOs said that “increased scrutiny would cause them
to reconsider their positions as CCOs due to the mounting fear of being
personally liable for corporate misconduct.”188 Increased enforcement
actions have led to CCOs paying large fines as seen in SFX, forced
resignations, and the tying of compensation to successful compliance
programs. 189 Further, CCOs now suffer reputational damage because of the
recent spotlight. 190 The overall concern is that CCOs are being targeted
and held accountable for individual misconduct of others. 191
IV. THE NEW TRUMP MEMORANDUM
Although the Yates Memo is a commendable initial effort to deter
corporate misconduct, improvements can be made. The discussion above
highlights the challenges that developed under the Yates Memo such as the
DOJ’s inability to prove that corporate individuals’ possess the requisite
mens rea. The DOJ is partially unsuccessful with criminal prosecutions
because corporations disperse their work among officers, making it
difficult for the DOJ to prove intent. 192 Further, it is hard for the DOJ to
prove intent because the DOJ cannot prove it beyond a reasonable doubt,
the standard for criminal prosecutions. Thus, the next memorandum issued
under the Trump Administration should be to focus on corporate individual
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Peter Madoff Press Release, supra note 73.
Id.
See DLA PIPER, supra note 175.
Id.
Id.
See Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, supra note 157.
Scott Killingsworth, CCO Liability: Winds of Change at the SEC?,
COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (June 19, 2015), http://complianceandethics.org/cco-liabilitywinds-of-change-at-the-sec/.
192. See Schmidt et al., supra note 143.
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accountability, but the consequences should be distributed to the Board of
Directors as well as the individual who engaged in misconduct. The Board
of Directors (“the Board”) should be held accountable because it approves
CCO and higher level executive actions.193
The basic corporate structure consists of shareholders at the top.194
Shareholders elect Directors. 195 The duty of the Board is to oversee the
managers of the company and support the shareholders. 196 Every
subsequent level of managers, which includes the CCO, report to the
Board. 197 The CCO has to report to the Board and assure that all
compliance mechanisms are effective and efficient.198 Prior to reporting to
the Board, the CCO has to initially report to the Chief Executive Officer
regarding material regulatory issues.199
Because the CCO essentially has two reporting channels, consequences
should flow to the Board of Directors and the CEO. Additionally, an issue
that many CCOs face pertains to upper level officials disregarding CCOs
advice and ignoring suspect activity that CCOs bring to their attention.200
Although targeting CCOs may cause corporations to increase attention to
compliance efforts, the most effective means to curb corporate misconduct
is to focus on the Board and CEOs. Government agencies should abandon
the approach of simply targeting CCOs and focus on the Board and CEO.

193. See The Basics of Corporate Structure, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2015, 9:22
PM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/022803.asp.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), supra note 120.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Martin, supra note 155, at 182.
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Figure 1 201

A. Using the Past as an Example of What Not to do in the Future
Recently, President Trump signed an executive order to review the
current regulations imposed on Wall Street in an effort to jump-start
revising the Dodd-Frank Act. 202 Dodd-Frank created the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which oversees the financial services sector.203
Dodd-Frank also assures that the financial services sector is stable in case
of “economic turbulence.” 204 President Trump has stated he wants to
upend Dodd-Frank regulations to increase the flow of credit.205
History proves that relaxed regulation can harm the economy. The
rolling back of regulation partially led to both Enron’s collapse and the
2008 financial crisis. 206 For Enron, the Federal Regulatory Energy
Commission (“FERC”) “[failed] to address the . . . inadequacies in the
regulatory structure that [permitted] Enron’s most questionable business
201. Governance Structure, AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., https://www.afdb.org/en/
about-us/organisational-structure/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
202. See Merle et al., supra note 112.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id.

2017

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

301

practices to go without scrutiny.” 207 As a result, “FERC . . . [allowed
Enron to engage in] market abuse, . . . [which was] uncorrected and
unchallenged for many months.” 208
Specifically, for the 2008 financial crisis, there was widespread
minimum oversight over the financial industry. 209 In part, relaxed
oversight resulted from the financial sector’s influence on Congress. 210 For
example, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae lobbied Congressional members for
decreased capital reserve requirements for mortgage lenders.211 If the DOJ
issues a new memorandum, it should factor in the societal as well as
business sector effects of lax corporate regulation. Examining historical
events would provide insight regarding the impact of lax regulations for
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The proposed recommendations would be best for CCOs, business, and
the economy. The Yates Memo had a chilling effect on the compliance
community. Most CCOs said that increased scrutiny would cause them to
reconsider their positions due to a mounting fear of personal liability for
corporate misconduct. To perform most efficiently, CCOs should not have
a target on their backs. Consequences for corporate misconduct should be
distributed equally to all higher level corporate officials to create fairness
for CCOs.
The second recommendation would benefit because investors are willing
to invest when there is transparency and accountability. Investment fuels
the growth of the economy. Regulation, and its counterpart – enforcement
– in tandem, benefit the economy.

207. Asleep at the Switch: FERC’S Oversight of Enron Corporation—Vol. I:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 3 (2002)
(statement of Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs).
208. Id.
209. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis, FORBES (Jan.
27, 2009, 2:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisisbusiness-corruption09_0127corruption.html.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
The role of Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) is relatively new in the
evolution of Corporate Governance. 1 Concepts about the role, including —
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

The subject matter scope of the program for which the CCO is
responsible;
The compliance program elements and functions that CCO’s
manage within corporations;
The appropriate stature of the CCO and reporting line within
corporate governance structures; and

* Mr. Krenitsky is the Chief Compliance Officer of Discover Financial Services,
Riverwoods, IL. To the extent that this article expresses any views or opinions,
however, they are entirely Mr. Krenitsky’s own views and do not reflect the position of
Discover Financial Services.
1. See Caroline Nolan, Defining the Evolving Role of Chief Compliance Officer is
Essential According to PwC’s State of Compliance 2014 Survey, PWC 1, 2 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/mx/es/riesgos/archivo/2015-03-challenges.pdf (stating that:
Today’s Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs) are in a position similar to
that of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 15 years ago, and they face a
comparable opportunity and challenge: how to become a more strategic
partner in the organization; a vital member of the C–suite. Survey findings
show the role of the CCO has gained more prominence over the last
decade and is evolving rapidly.).
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The extent to which the CCO can, or should, be individually
liable when corporations fail to comply —

have evolved over time within the different industries and governmental
organizations that oversee them. 2
As this evolution unfolded, a
convergence of views and common understanding of the CCO’s role
gradually emerged. 3
This Article explores the convergence of these views and synthesizes the
current perspective of the role by exploring authoritative primary source
materials––i.e., official expressions of such organizations as the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and U.S. financial industry regulators. It also
explores the current perspective on the role from the industry by exploring
influential secondary source materials––i.e., respected industry associations
such as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”) and the American Bankers Association (“ABA”). The
examples and details in this article focus on the CCO’s role within financial
services firms (e.g., Banks); but the principles enunciated would apply to a
CCO of any corporation in any industry. This Article should not be read as
a blueprint or prescription for the role, but rather as a synthesized
description of the current state of the role’s evolution.
II. SUBJECT MATTER SCOPE
Determining the subject matter scope of the CCO’s role requires
contemplation of the questions, “with what requirements must corporations
comply” and “who are the ranking officers in the company responsible for
These questions must be
compliance with those requirements?” 4
considered from a governmental perspective as well as an industry
perspective.

2. See generally Nilisha Patel, A Chief Compliance Officer’s Role in Risk
Management, ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT. INITIATIVE (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://erm.ncsu.edu/library/article/chief-compliance-officer-risk-management
(explaining the evolving role of CCOs).
3. See Matt Podowitz, Fulfilling the New Compliance Mandate –– The
Compliance Convergence Journey, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS 4 (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/fulfilling-the-new-compliance-mandatethrough-compliance-convergence/ (describing the new critical roles of the CCO, such
as: change agent, lead architect, quality inspector, that are necessary to lead a company
to fulfill the new compliance mandate).
4. The Chief Compliance Officer: The Fourth Ingredient in a World–Class Ethics
and Compliance Program, DELOITTE 1, 2, 4 (2015) [hereinafter The Chief Compliance
Officer], https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aersdownload-the-full-report-the-chief-compliance-officer-05012015.pdf.
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A. Governmental Perspective
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 5 suggest actions for courts to take upon
finding organizations guilty of violating laws. 6 Courts may be more lenient
if an organization can prove that it has an effective compliance program. 7
In describing what would be considered an effective compliance program,
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state:
[A]n organization shall —
(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct;
and
(2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages
ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.
Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably designed,
implemented, and enforced so that the program is generally effective in
8
preventing and detecting criminal conduct.

This language implies that the subject matter scope of an effective
compliance program overseen by a CCO is very broad. 9 While the first
element is focused on detecting and preventing criminal law violations, the
second element is not so limited. 10 It simply references “the law.” 11 The
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are not limited to statutory law, so the second
element was presumably intended to capture regulatory requirements and
expectations as well as common law. 12 By referencing “ethical conduct,”
the scope expands further to cover accepted standards of conduct for an
industry in which a corporation operates. 13 The non–criminal statutes,
regulations and regulatory expectations, common law, and standards of
ethical conduct (collectively “Compliance Requirements”) applicable to
5. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1–B2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct, and Effective
Compliance and Ethics Programs, effective Nov. 1, 1991 & 2004).
6. See id. (“First a court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to
remedy any harm caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy the harm
should not be viewed as punishment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for
the harm caused.”).
7. See Corporate Compliance Programs Under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, in WHITE COLLAR DESKBOOK § 7:4 (“The 2004 Amendments require that
organizations seeking fine leniency based on a compliance program must meet two
overarching standards.”).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id.

306

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6:2

any particular corporation will differ based on the industry in which it
operates. 14 Image 1 below demonstrates the expansive scope of an
effective compliance program necessary under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.
Image 1

For several years, the Federal Reserve has emphasized the need for a
“firm–wide” approach to compliance risk management. 15 The Federal
Reserve defined “firm–wide compliance risk management” as, “the
processes established to manage compliance risk across an entire
organization, both within and across business lines, support units, legal
entities, and jurisdictions of operation.” 16

14. Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39
J. CORP. L. 769, 770–71 (2014) (explaining how different corporations will end up with
different ethics codes).
15. FED. RESERVE SYS., BD. OF GOVERNORS, SR 08–8/CA 08–11, COMPLIANCE
RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
WITH COMPLEX COMPLIANCE PROFILES (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE RISK
MANAGEMENT].
16. Id.
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In highly regulated industries, such as banking or healthcare, the number
of applicable Compliance Requirements is exceptionally large. 17 Many of
the Compliance Requirements are very complex and require highly
specialized knowledge and experience to understand and manage the
risks. 18 In fact, the federal government has itself created the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to focus only on consumer financial
protection laws and regulations.19 However, consumer financial protection
regulations are only one type of category requirements with which
corporations that provide banking services must comply. 20
A more manageable categorization of Compliance Requirements
emerges when one considers all laws, including regulations and regulatory
expectations, common law, and ethical conduct. As an example, Image 2,
below, provides a means of categorizing Compliance Requirements for a
corporation engaged in banking:
Image 2

17. Top Sectors for Regulatory Change, IBISWORLD (Sept. 17, 2013),
https://www.ibisworld.com/media/2013/09/17/10-increasingly-regulated-industries/.
18. See In Focus: 2015 Compliance Trends Survey, DELOITTE 1, 3 (2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-regcrs-2015-compliance-trends-survey-051515.pdf.
19. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Strategic Plan FY 2013 –– FY 2017,
CFPB 4 (Aug. 2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategicplan.pdf (“To create a single point of accountability in the federal government for
consumer financial protection, the Dodd–Frank Act consolidated many of the consumer
financial protection authorities previously shared by seven federal agencies into the
CFPB . . . .”).
20. J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by
Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25, 28 (1998).

308

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6:2

not all programs that oversee and ensure compliance with laws within these
categories are managed by CCOs in Banks—particularly the Labor &
Employment Laws and Regulations and the Safety & Soundness laws and
regulations. 21 Moreover, bank regulatory agencies do not routinely
examine all of these categories that supervise the banking industry. 22 For
example, bank regulatory agencies generally do not conduct examinations
that encompass banking corporations’ compliance with Ethics, Anti–
Bribery, Insider Trading requirements, or Labor and Employment Laws
and Regulations. 23 Nor do bank regulatory agencies routinely examine
whether banks are complying with the requirements of highly important
state laws, such as the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) or other state
laws relating to securing collateral (even though compliance with the UCC
and these other state laws is very important to the safety and soundness of a
bank). 24 So does the supervisory scope of bank regulatory agencies define
the scope of a bank corporation’s compliance program? That cannot be the
case because, as any corporation, banks are required to meet the minimum
expectations set forth by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 25 The
inexorable conclusion is that to meet expectations articulated by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, a Compliance and Ethics program must be
designed to broadly cover all Compliance Requirements. 26
So what does that mean for the role of the CCO? It is hard to
comprehend that one individual can possibly know, much less oversee or
manage programs that ensure compliance with all Compliance
Requirements. 27 Many of the Compliance Requirement categories noted
above are not typically managed directly by CCOs in financial
21. But see COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 15.
22. Edward V. Murphy, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES

WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 7 (2015).
23. FDIC, Compliance Examination Manual II–1.1 (Dec. 2015), https://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/compliance/manual/2/II-1.1.pdf; COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT,
supra note 15.
24. Supervising and Regulating Financial Institutions and Activities, FED.
RESERVE, 74, 87, 89, https://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf (last visited Jan.
18, 2017) (demonstrating the process the Federal Reserve takes when examining
compliance, with no reference to state law or the uniform commercial code).
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
26. See id. (suggesting requirements for an effective compliance and ethics
program).
27. See, e.g., Jeremiah Buckley, The Compliance Officer Bill of Rights, AM.
BANKER (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-complianceofficer-bill-of-rights?tag=00000156-32ee-d79b-a377-3efe1d240000 (“A compliance
officer cannot rationally be responsible for assuring that thousands of employees follow
compliance requirements.”).
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institutions. 28 So is the role of a CCO a hopelessly over–broad, impossible
task that places CCOs in the untenable position of being held accountable
whenever instances of non–compliance occur? This should not be the case.
Corporations need to clearly define the scope of their corporate compliance
program, the CCO’s responsibilities in overseeing that program, and the
roles and responsibilities of other critical corporate officers who play
significant roles within the organization’s compliance program. 29
B. The Industry Perspective
Industry publications have not largely focused on the subject matter
scope of compliance, but instead focus on the functions that compliance
departments are asked to perform. 30 For this reason, industry literature is
not particularly instructive on defining the subject matter scope of a
compliance program and the best manner to address the U.S. Sentencing
Guideline mandate to cover all Compliance Requirements.
C. Managing a Compliance Program with Broad Scope
How can corporations approach the hard mission of managing a
compliance program that covers broadly defined Compliance
Requirements? It is noteworthy that many Compliance Requirements
overlap with other risk management disciplines that have their own experts
who oversee them. 31 Take, for example, a Chief Financial Officer
(“CFO”). In the absence of finance–related laws, regulations, and
accounting standards, there would be a need to accurately measure, from a
financial perspective, how well (or how poorly) a business enterprise was
performing. 32 The absence of a financial performance measurement
28. Luis A. Aguilar, The Role of Chief Compliance Officers Must Be Supported,
SEC 18 (June 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/supporting-role-of-chiefcompliance-officers.html).
29. Id. at 1.
30. CAROLE BASRI ET AL., 1–5 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRACTICE GUIDE § 5.02
(2015).
31. See J. Secrist, The Link Between Risk Management and Compliance,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0f4cec83ffdf-41c2-92ac-7567bd09401f (“Risk management and compliance are interrelated and
must also be considered together. While risk management and compliance are often
appropriately handled by two separate groups within an organization, the pitfall is that
this separation can lead to a fragmented approach whereby compliance risk is isolated
from other enterprise risks.”).
32. See Financial Leadership in Challenging Times: Challenges and Opportunities
for Today’s CFO, PWC 1, 2 (Nov. 2009), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasingfinance-function-effectiveness/assets/financial-leadership-in-challenging-times.pdf
(“Financial executives must play a leading role in accelerating strategic growth across
the enterprise. CFOs are uniquely qualified to provide meaningful input to their
organizations’ current and future investments, participate in the broader corporate
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function would result in an increased risk that financial distress would not
be timely identified or reported, thus increasing the risk of financial
failure. 33 A CFO provides this necessary risk management function for a
business enterprise. 34
Over time, the layering of Compliance
Requirements 35 on top of the risk management function has resulted in the
development of a highly skilled, financial and accounting profession (with
sub–specializations). In addition to performing basic financial performance
measurement and risk management, a CFO also manages a firm’s day–to–
day compliance with tax law and financial reporting rules. Compliance
risk is created by (i) the existence of, and changes to, laws or regulations
over financial reporting, as well as (ii) changes within the business that
impact the sources of financial data, financial controls and how they are
measured. 36 The CFO routinely manages these compliance risks on a day–
to–day basis. 37
Depending on the industry, other similar overlaps may exist with, for
example: (i) the head of human resources (who manages day–to–day
compliance with labor and employment laws, regulation and regulatory
expectations); (ii) the head of liquidity management (typically a corporate
Treasurer who ensures that the Corporation has the means to continue to
pay debts as they become due); (iii) the head of capital adequacy
management (who manages certain of the safety and soundness regulations
relating to minimum capital requirements); 38 (iv) the head of credit and
vision, and advocate and produce strategic transformation.”).
33. See Compliance Risks: What You Don’t Contain Can Hurt You, DELOITTE 1, 1
(2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tr/Documents/finance-transfor
mation/Global%20Yayınlar/cfo-insights-compliance-risks.pdf (“[C]ompliance risk is
the threat posed to a company’s financial, organizational, or reputational standing
resulting from violations of laws, regulations, codes of conduct, or standards of
practice.”).
34. Id. (explaining how CFOs work with Chief Risk Officers or CCOs to own and
manage the enterprise risk function).
35. For example: compliance requirements relating to the filing of tax returns,
public financial disclosures, and/or regulatory financial reporting.
36. Julia Black et al., Legal and Compliance Risk in Financial Institutions, 2 LAW
& FIN. MKT. REV. 481, 481 (Nov. 2008).
37. See generally Robert Barba, Swamped by Compliance, CFOs Would Rather
Focus on Future, BLOOMBERG BLOG (May 12, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/
enterprise/blog/swamped-by-compliance-cfos-would-rather-focus-on-future/
(discussing how after the 2008 financial crisis, the daily tasks of CFOs are being taken
over by compliance matters).
38. In banking this is the Comprehensive Capital Adequacy Review (“CCAR”) or
Dodd–Frank Act Stress Test (“DFAST”). See Dodd–Frank Act Stress Test (Company–
Run), OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas. gov/toolsforms/forms/bank-operations/stress-test-reporting.html (last visited Jan. 2017)
(explaining the Dodd–Frank Act Stress Test and the reasoning behind its
implementation).
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counter–party risk management (also managing certain safety & soundness
requirements); (v) the head of operational risk management, etc. 39 In the
absence of laws, regulations, and regulatory guidance, these other areas
require skilled management to perform the functions that address the
underlying risks. 40 Over time, the layering of legal and regulatory
requirements over managerial control functions results in these officers
having to manage compliance risks on a day–to–day basis, which they
know better than anyone else in the organization. 41
Because of the existence of these other professionals, who manage day–
to–day compliance risks, corporations could define their compliance
programs in a way that CCOs could rely on these other professionals as an
integral part of overseeing the compliance program. 42 In identifying these
other professionals, their characteristics need to be: (i) that they have
sufficient rank to exercise control (e.g., officers on the Executive
Management Committee), (ii) that they oversee day–to–day compliance
over the respective subject area, and (iii) that they perform this oversight
within an independent, risk management control function (i.e., not tainted
by responsibility for revenue generation or specific financial goals for the
firm). 43 If each criterion is satisfied, day–to–day compliance responsibility
could reasonably be assigned to such officers and they could accept the
responsibility and accountability for these Compliance Requirements. 44
These officers could then provide the CCO with periodic assurance that
they are managing the risks that they oversee in accordance with applicable
Compliance Requirements. Such assurance could possibly be evidenced in
a form similar to the common practice of corporations today under
39. See CCAR/DFAST: Incorporating Stress Testing Into Everyday Banking
Operations and Strategic Planning Processes, GRANT THORNTON LLP 1 (2016),
https://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-files/financial-services/pdfs/20
16/GARP/CCAR-DFAST-Article-Incorporating-stress-testing-into-everyday-bankingoperations.ashx (discussing how regulatory stress–testing requires inputs from most
bank functions, officers, and directors).
40. See, e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., HOW WE DO BUSINESS –– THE REPORT 6, 18,
27 (Dec. 19, 2014) (discussing the importance of investing in high–quality independent
control staff to manage risk at the front line of the business).
41. See Building World–Class Ethics and Compliance Programs: Making a Good
Program Great; Five Ingredients for Your Program, DELOITTE 8–10 (2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-g2g-com
pendium.pdf (explaining various risks CCOs encounter and how to mitigate them).
42. See LOUIS M. BROWN ET. AL., THE LEGAL AUDIT: CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION § 7:3 (2016).
43. See COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 15.
44. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. & Am. Health
Lawyers Ass’n, Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Compliance: A Resource for
Health Care Boards of Directors, 1, 5–6 , https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/compliance
guidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
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Sarbanes–Oxley, which requires corporations to gather “sub–certifications”
from owners of key financial controls. 45 By defining the scope of
compliance programs and clearly ascribing responsibilities in this way,
corporations could empower CCOs to effectively oversee holistic
compliance programs while realistically dividing responsibility and
accountability to the different components of the program. 46
Corporations could, by approval of the scope of the compliance program,
ascribe to certain high–ranking officers (other than the CCO) the
responsibility for “functional compliance management” 47 of certain
categories of specified Compliance Requirements (hereinafter referred to as
“Independent Control Function Officers” or “ICFOs”). The CCO would
thus be responsible for:
(i) Aggregation and Reporting. The duty to (a) aggregate information
from the ICFOs and (b) report to the Board broadly on all Compliance
Requirements and how they are being managed throughout the firm
(similar to the way a CFO aggregates data on key financial controls and
reports to the Board under Sarbanes– Oxley) and
(ii) Direct Functional Compliance Management. The duty to directly
manage those programs that oversee and ensure compliance with certain
other categories of laws and regulations, such as Consumer Protection,
Ethics, possibly also Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) and Bank
Secrecy Act (“BSA”), Anti–Money Laundering (“AML”), and U.S.
Sanctions requirements administered by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (“OFAC”). These are categories of Compliance Requirements
most often directly managed by CCOs in the banking and financial
services industry today.

By not taking this approach, corporations—particularly those in highly
regulated industries—risk having regulatory agencies develop for them a

45. Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of
Sarbanes–Oxley, 955, 994–995 (2008), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewconte
nt.cgi?article=1315&context=jbl.
46. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. & Am. Health
Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 44, at 1, 4–5.
47. See infra Section III. This Article uses the term “functional compliance
management” to refer to the programmatic elements and functions that are expected for
a sound compliance management program — e.g., (i) ownership over the drafting of
policies and procedures, (ii) design and implementation of an effective system of
internal controls integrated within business processes, (iii) a means of monitoring and
testing to ensure that internal controls are functioning as designed on an ongoing or
periodic basis, (iv) training employees to respect and follow procedures and not
circumvent the system of internal controls, (v) updating all of the foregoing if, as and
when laws or regulations or processes change, and (vi) analyzing feedback (whether in
the form of customer complaints, employee “whistleblowing” hotline calls, employee
exit interviews, etc. See Compliance Management System, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2006/2cep_compliance.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).

2017

DEFINING THE CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER ROLE

313

“one–size fits all” approach that defines the CCO role. 48 By taking an
active approach in defining roles and responsibilities relating to a
compliance program and specifying roles of ICFOs and the CCO,
corporations may retain greater control over their futures and avoid the
need for regulatory agencies to fill the void. 49
III. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONS
Government and industry literature is replete with explications of
program elements and functions for an effective compliance program. 50
The program elements and functions are synthesized from the government
and industry sources into Table 1 below. Table 1 also summarizes how a
compliance program approved by a Board could choose to allocate
responsibilities between ICFOs and CCOs. In this regard, the obligations
on the CCO would be dual:
(i)

(ii)

Oversight to ensure that the ICFOs are
incorporating expected program elements
management of their compliance risks and
performing the compliance functions as ascribed
by the Board; and
Direct functional compliance management for
assigned by the Board to the CCO.

appropriately
into their
are properly
to the ICFOs
subject areas

In some cases, it may be sensible to centralize certain functional
compliance management under the CCO rather than have it distributed
among the ICFOs.

48. See Joe Murphy, One Size Fits All: A Flawed Approach to Company
Compliance Programs, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter Murphy,
One Size] (discussing the difficulties of the “one size fits all” compliance regulation).
49. See Suzanne Folsom, One Size Does Not Fit All When It Comes to Compliance
Strategies, INSIDE COUNCIL (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/01/01/
one-size-does-not-fit-all-when-it-comes-to-complia (explaining that companies are
tailoring their compliance programs to their own risk cultures and their beneficial
effects).
50. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF COMPLIANCE, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, NSA (June 24, 2016), https://www.nsa.gov/about/civilliberties/resources/assets/files/essential-elements-of-a-compliance-program.pdf.
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Description of Expectation

Compliance programs need to (i) educate board
members and Senior Executive Management on
the legal / regulatory expectations and compliance
risks of the company and (ii) provide effective
reporting so the Board can oversee and Senior
Executive Management can manage risk–taking
and allocations of resources according to a risk
51
appetite. The Board of Directors should
approve a risk appetite for compliance risk and an
52
enterprise–wide compliance policy. Through
the risk appetite, Compliance Policy, and other
actions and communications, the Board and
Senior Executive Management should provide a
clear tone from the top in support of a culture of
53
compliance.
Compliance programs need to be led by
Executive
executive–level leadership (i.e., a CCO) with
Leadership,
sufficient authority (to influence other Executive
Authority,
Resources,
Officers) and resources (both human and
Independence otherwise) in an organization structure with
& Integration clearly defined roles and delegation of day–to–
day operational responsibilities. The organization
(PE)
structure has to be independent from the business
(with respect to supervision, hiring, and
compensation), but yet highly integrated, with the
business (with respect to design, implementation,
54
monitoring, and testing of controls). The
Board
Oversight,
Risk Appetite
& Tone from
the Top (PE)

Vol. 6:2
ICFOs CCO

N/A

Yes

N/A

Yes

51. See generally COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 15.
52. Id.; see also Gov. Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at Fed. Reserve Bank of NY Conf:

Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014); see generally Gov. Mark W.
Olson, Speech at Am. Bankers Ass’n Regulatory Compliance Conf.: What Are
Examiners Looking for When they Examine Banks for Compliance? (Jun. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter Speech by Gov. Olson].
53. See generally COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 15; see also
Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Sarbanes–Oxley and
the Idea of “Good” Governance, (Sept. 27, 2002); Speech by Gov. Olson, supra note
52 (describing the role that directors play in the compliance culture within a company).
54. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Compliance and the Compliance
Function in Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (2005) [hereinafter Compliance and
the Compliance Function], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf (explaining the scope
and breadth of activities of the compliances function should be subject to independent
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Description of Expectation

program should be organized such that the CCO’s
chain of supervision supports the independent
nature of the function [e.g., to the Chair of the
Audit Committee, to a Chief Executive Officer
55
(“CEO”), or to a Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”)].
Additionally the program should be aligned (i)
vertically to integrate within business structures to
support and ensure adherence with requirements
that apply within business processes and (ii)
horizontally where requirements apply across
businesses, legal entities or jurisdictional
56
boundaries.
Compliance programs need to provide for
assessment of risk arising from law, regulation
and regulatory guidance on an inherent (prior to
consideration of control) and residual (after
57
consideration of control effectiveness) basis.
The risk assessment needs to account for
emerging risks and foster self–assessment within
58
business line management.
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ICFOs CCO

Yes

Yes

review); Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Guidelines: Corporate Governance
Principles for Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (July 2015) [hereinafter
Corporate Governance Principles], http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf (providing
guidelines for corporate governance principles for banks).
55. See generally Compliance and the Compliance Function, supra note 54
(describing the roles and responsibilities of the officers within the chain of
supervision).
56. Examples of such horizontal focus include: financial key controls and
reporting, Anti–money laundering, Sanctions and List Screening, Fair Lending,
Privacy, and Conflicts of Interest/Ethics.
57. On a highly coordinated basis to be a component that fits within an overall,
enterprise–wide compliance risk assessment. Corporate Governance Principles, supra
note 54; see also White Paper: The Evolving Role of Compliance, SEC. INDUS. & FIN.
MKTS. ASS’N (Mar. 2013), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589942363
[hereinafter White Paper Evolving Role].
58. See Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 54.
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Policies,
Compliance programs need to oversee
Procedures & corporation’s policies, procedures and internal
Controls (PE) controls as they relate to law, regulation and
regulatory expectation with the goal of
preventing, detecting, promptly escalating, and
59
self–reporting instances of non–compliance.
Compliance programs need to effectively
Awareness,
communicate and train to ensure that as
Education
and Training appropriate for each role in the company, legal
and regulatory requirements or expectations and
(PF)
policies, procedures, and internal controls are
61
understood. Such communication and training
should foster a culture of ethical behavior in
compliance with law, regulation and regulatory
62
guidance.
Compliance programs need to include effective
Monitoring
monitoring and testing to ensure compliance with
and Testing
laws, regulations, regulatory expectations, and
(PF)

Vol. 6:2
ICFOs CCO

Yes

60

Yes

Yes

63

Yes

Yes

66

Yes

59. Id.
60. While ICFOs and CCOs would own the drafting of their respective policies and

procedures, it may be useful, particularly for larger, complex firms, to have a policy
and procedure administration function (that could report to a CCO or CRO) to ensure
consistency in format, storage, accessibility to employees (e.g., via an internal intranet),
and appropriate governance over approvals and changes (e.g., in management or
board–level committees).
61. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference: Reforming Culture and
Behavior in the Financial Services Industry, Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance,
(Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020
a.htm; see also White Paper on the Role of Compliance, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS.
ASS’N (Oct. 2005), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2005Roleof
ComplianceWhitePaper.pdf.
62. See Tarullo, supra note 61; see generally White Paper on the Role of
Compliance, supra note 61.
63. An ICFO’s role in training may be limited to serving as a subject matter expert
for the content of, and determining the required audience for, training while the CCO or
a Human Resources Training and Development function may have broader
responsibilities for incorporating all required training into an overall, efficient,
effective, learner–centric, program (i.e., determining frequency of training, determining
the means of delivering training (e.g., in person/classroom or computer–based, etc.),
designing the training curriculum and individual courses, creating effective tracking of
successful completion by the required audience, etc.).
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company policies and procedures. Furthermore,
effective monitoring ensures internal controls
64
properly function. A “three lines of defense”
organization model should include oversight
mechanisms that set standards and report receipts
over First line quality control, continuous quality
assurance functions, and independent execution of
65
Second line’s periodic testing.
Enforcement Compliance programs need to incorporate
67
(PF)
incentives to prevent non–compliance.
Compliance programs need data analytics and
Data
Analytics and quantitative measurement of risks emanating from
Reporting for Compliance Requirements (e.g., key risk
Management indicators or KRIs) and program functioning (e.g.,
key performance indicators or KPIs) to create
and Board
effective management and board reporting.
(PF)
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N/A
N/A

68

Yes
Yes

66. ICFOs role in monitoring and testing may be limited to day–to–day monitoring.
It may make sense for Second line, periodic, independent testing over Compliance
Requirements to be centralized under a specialized Control Testing Team reporting to
the CCO.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 30, 170 (as amended in 2014); Uniform Interagency
Consumer Compliance Rating System, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,473, 79,476 (proposed Nov. 14,
2016); see also Aguilar, supra note 28 (noting that a CCO’s role is to comply with the
rules that apply to their operations and to work with corporate leadership to achieve the
company’s goals); Gov. Mark Olson, Speech to Financial Services Roundtable:
Compliance Risk Management in a Diversified Environment (May 16, 2006); WHITE
PAPER COMPLIANCE, supra note 61.
65. See Treas. Reg. § 30, 170; Michael Volkov, 5 Ways to Ensure Board Support
for Compliance, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Nov. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Volkov, 5
Ways], http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/5-ways-to-ensure-board-supportfor-compliance/ (“A CCO’s direct contact with the Board gives the CCO an important
tool that should be used in rare situations to ensure that senior management properly
attends to the ethics and compliance function.”).
67. See FDIC, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL II–2.1–2.2 (2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/ComplianceExaminationManual
(explaining how compliance programs may mitigate consumer harm); see also
Stephanie Gallagher, Who’s the Boss? The Importance of the Chief Compliance
Officer’s Independence, COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://comp
lianceandethics.org/whos-boss-importance-chief-compliance-officers-independence/
(criticizing the practice of having CCOs report to the GC or the CFO).
68. See Compliance and the Compliance Function, supra note 54, at 14–15 (“[T]he
compliance programme should be risk–based and subject to oversight by the head of
compliance to ensure appropriate coverage across businesses and co–ordination among
risk management functions.”) (emphasis added).

318
Prog ram
Ele ments
(“PE”) &
Functions
(“PF”)

Application
of
Compliance
Program to
Third Parties
(PF)
Change
Management
Controls
(PF)

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
Description of Expectation

Compliance programs need to be engaged in
third–party oversight to ensure that compliance
risks within processes performed by third parties
are appropriately managed and subjected to
compliance program management.

Compliance programs need to engage with the
business’ operations to anticipate and ensure the
organization is promptly addressing changes in
applicable laws, regulations, market conditions,
69
and products and services offered.
Additionally, compliance programs need to
engage with the business’s operating lines with
due diligence and in advance of product and
system changes to consider the entire life cycle of
a product or service in reviewing and
implementing changes after determining whether
70
actions achieved planned results.
Tracking of
Compliance programs need to track issues related
Issues and
to compliance risks to ensure proactive and
Corrective
prompt responses that address deficiencies and
Actions (PF) violations of laws or regulations including
71
remediation.
Complaint
Compliance programs need to have a means of
Analysis (PF) identifying complaints that may be indicative of
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ICFOs CCO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

69. See Gov. Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks at the Bond Market Association’s Legal
and Compliance Conference: Enterprise–wide Compliance Programs (Feb. 4, 2004); see
also Cynthia Dow & Jason Lim, A Function in Transition: How the Chief Compliance
Officer Role Is Transforming Across Financial Services, RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOC., 3–4
(Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.russellreynolds.com/en/Insights/thought-leadership/Documents/
R605016-rr0063-%20CCO%20in%20FS%20v16.pdf (suggesting that financial companies
are unsatisfied with their own compliance tools).
70. See Bies, supra note 69; see also Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers,

More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 169, 181 (2015) (explaining that CCOs are required to be involved in
compliance programs).
71. See Tod Reichert, The Roles of General Counsel and Chief Compliance
Officers, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/the-roles-of-general-counsel-and-chief-compliance-officers/; White Paper
Evolving Role, supra note 57.
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increasing compliance risk or weakness and/or
72
lack of policies, procedures, or internal controls.
(This should include both customer and consumer
complaints as well as matters arising from other
internal sources such as integrity hotlines, exit
interviews for separating employees, etc.)

IV. CCO STATURE AND REPORTING LINES
The literature and published speeches of financial service industry
officials clearly indicate that CCOs should be independent and have
sufficient stature and authority. 73 If independence is taken to its logical
extreme, one possibility would be for CCOs to report to an independent
member of the Board of Directors (such as the Chair of the Audit
Committee). 74 This type of structure is rather common for Heads of
Internal Audit who are charged with detecting control weaknesses within a
corporation’s control environment, but is less common for CCOs who are
charged with aiding in the design and implementation of controls aimed at
preventing (or very quickly detecting and self–correcting) instances of
non–adherence with Compliance Requirements.75 While having a CCO
report directly to an independent member of the Board of Directors (such
as the Chair of the Audit Committee) would certainly underscore
independence, a direct reporting line may not strike the right, delicate
balance between independence, on the one hand, and integration with
business practice and controls, on the other. 76 Accordingly, a dotted line
could be considered and may be appropriate for some institutions.
72. White Paper Evolving Role, supra note 57.
73. See Lori Richard, Dir. of Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,

SEC, Speech at the National Regulatory Service’s Twentieth Annual Spring
Compliance/Risk Management Conference (Apr. 20, 2005) (stating that the
Commission wishes CCOs be independent and have authority to enforce compliance).
74. Stephanie Tsacoumis, et al., The Sarbanes–Oxley Act: Rewriting Audit
Committee Governance, 3 BUS. L. INT’L 212, 215–17 (2003) (explaining the
requirements for establishing an independent member of the Audit Committee).
75. See CIPFA, THE ROLE OF THE HEAD OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT 1, 5–7 (2010)
[hereinafter THE ROLE OF THE HEAD], for a description of the role of the head of audit
in an organization.
76. See generally Gallagher, supra note 67 (explaining that the independence of the
CCO is key and the CCO should have no managerial responsibilities and should have a
direct line of communication to the CEO or board of directors).
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Industry practice widely varies and the concepts of sufficient
independence and sufficient authority have been interpreted differently at
different organizations. 77 In most financial institutions, CCOs are
responsible for providing regular reports to the Board of Directors or to key
Board–level committees. 78 As such, CCOs likely have frequent direct
contact with Board members including executive sessions. 79 In some large,
complex international banking organizations as well as domestic
institutions, the CCO is a member of the Executive Committee (e.g., BNP
Paribas, Ally Financial, Inc.) and may report directly to the CEO. In other
institutions, the CCO is not a member of an Executive Committee and may
report to the CRO or the General Counsel. 80
What is clear from the discussion of the subject matter scope and the
review of the elements and functions, is that CCOs need to have the stature
and support within the corporation to be capable of effectively overseeing
the entire program, including portions managed by ICFOs. 81 In the
financial industry, many corporations have not clearly defined ICFO and
CCO roles and responsibilities for compliance functional management. 82
Where corporations have done so, CCOs are responsible for oversight over
the entire compliance program. 83 As such, CCOs need the stature,
authority, and support to fulfill this responsibility. 84 If the CCO does not
have sufficient stature, authority, or support, the CCO is placed in the more
difficult position of relying on alternate leadership attributes (unique
knowledge and abilities, relationship building, etc.) to get the job done. 85
77. See generally THE ROLE OF THE HEAD, supra note 75, at 11 (noting that it is
important that the CCO is independent and that although it is important to be objective,
he must understand organizations differ, and must take a practical approach to reach
independence in his particular organization).
78. See generally Aguilar, supra note 28 (noting that the role of CCO’s is to
comply with the rules that apply to their operations, and CCO’s typically work with
corporate leadership to achieve this).
79. See Volkov, 5 Ways, supra note 65 (“A CCO’s direct contact with the Board
gives the CCO an important tool that should be used in rare situations to ensure that
senior management properly attends to the ethics and compliance function.”).
80. See Gallagher, supra note 76 (criticizing the practice of having CCOs report to
the GC or CFO).
81. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 54, at 14 (explaining that
“[t]he compliance program should be risk–based and subject to oversight by the head
of compliance to ensure appropriate coverage across businesses and coordination
among risk management functions.”).
82. See Dow et al., supra note 69, at 4 (suggesting that financial companies are
unsatisfied with their own compliance tools).
83. See Martin, supra note 70 (explaining that CCOs are required to be involved in
compliance programs).
84. See Reichert, supra note 71.
85. Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial But (Potentially) Precarious Position of the
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Regardless of the position to which the CCO reports, the CCO needs to
have a seat at the decision–making table to influence decisions and
outcomes. 86
V. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF CCOS
A number of recent events have created discussion over personal liability
of CCOs, such as:
"

"

"
"

The proposed rule in New York (ultimately not adopted in its
proposed form) to require CCOs to annually certify that their
anti–money laundering compliance programs are effective at
identifying and preventing illicit transactions which, if later
demonstrated false, would subject the CCO to criminal
87
liability;
Although not specifically focused on CCOs, the September 9,
2015 Memorandum of U.S. Department of Justice Deputy
Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates, extending DOJ’s policy
to hold individual wrongdoers accountable in the course of
corporate investigations, which places significant burdens on
CCOs because of the unique role they play in overseeing
compliance programs designed to satisfy U.S. Sentencing
88
Guidelines;
The SEC fine of Bartholomew Battista at Black Rock Advisors,
89
LLC on April 2015; and
The FinCEN fine of Thomas Haider of MoneyGram upheld by
the US District Court in Minnesota, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v.
90
Haider.

Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 56, 60–61 (2013)
(explaining the weakness of having a CCO without the authority to actually compel
compliance).
86. Donna Boehme, A Seat at the Table for the Compliance Officer, CORP.
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/
a-seat-at-the-table-for-the-compliance-officer/.
87. Franca Harris Gutierrez, NYDFS Proposes to Require Chief Compliance
Officers to Certify Effectiveness of AML and Sanctions Programs, WILMERHALE (Dec.
4, 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?News
PubId=17179880055.
88. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all United
States Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015).
89. Ed Beeson, SEC Sends Warning to Compliance Chiefs with Blackrock Fine,
LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.law360.com/assetmanagement/articles/646172/s
ec-sends-warning-to-compliance-chiefs-with-blackrock-fine.
90. No. 15–CV–01518, 2016 WL 107940 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2014); see also First–
Ever Case Against Chief Compliance Officer For Failure To Implement Anti–Money
Laundering Program at MoneyGram, GRAND JURY TARGET (Mar. 3, 2015),
https://grandjurytarget.com/2015/03/03/first-ever-case-against-chief-compliance-office
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Furthermore, several articles written on the topic of CCO personal liability
raise concerns about whether overly aggressive actions that hold CCOs
liable for corporate misconduct may result in the lack of qualified
individuals willing to assume the role. 91
There are certainly legitimate points to be made on both sides of the
argument and this article does not seek to resolve this developing issue. 92
Having roles of CCOs and ICFOs clearly defined in compliance program
documents approved by Boards of Directors, however, will certainly help
to direct the focus of those seeking to hold individuals within corporations
accountable. 93
Moreover, clarity around the difference between effective compliance
programs and individual points of failure to comply is needed. Compliance
programs need to be evaluated as a whole. 94 CCOs should expect to be
held accountable according to some appropriate standard (e.g., gross
negligence), if the programs over which they have responsibility are
determined, as a whole, to be ineffective. 95 CCOs should not be held
accountable when individuals fail to comply. Rather, every individual in
every company has a duty to comply with the law and should therefore be
held individually liable. 96
Clarity is also needed with respect to the standard that should be applied
r-for-failure-to-implement-anti-money-laundering-program-at-moneygram/.
91. See, e.g., Emily Glazer, The Most Thankless Job on Wall Street Gets a New
Worry, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/now-inregulators-cross-hairs-bank-compliance-officers-1454495400; Rachel Louise Ensign,
How Compliance Officers Can Limit Personal Liability, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2015,
1:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/01/30/how-compliance-off
icers-can-limit-personal-liability/; Buckley, supra note 27.
92. Ben Dipietro, SEC Actions Stir Concerns Over Compliance Officer Liability,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/06/24/secactions-stir-concerns-over-compliance-officer-liability/.
93. DeMott, supra note 85 (“Further maturation in the compliance professions
would also strengthen the quality of internal compliance systems and the individuals
responsible for their operation . . . .”).
94. Martin, supra note 70 (separating the duties a compliance officer has for the
company from the fear of individual supervisory liability is important for the
furtherance of the compliance goals of the company).
95. Id. (suggesting a values–based approach, rather than a compliance based
approach, is the best way to evaluate a compliance program because it generally yields
a better return for allocation of resources).
96. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 895 (La. 2013) (“[W]hen individual
member(s) of a juridical entity such as an LLC mismanage the entity or otherwise
thwart the public policies justifying treating the entity as a separate juridical person, the
individual member(s) have been subjected to personal liability for obligations for
which the LLC would otherwise be solely liable.”).
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when reaching through a corporate structure to hold a CCO criminally
liable. 97 For criminal liability to adhere, some measure of intent or, at a
minimum, willful disregard needs to be demonstrated.98 However, in order
to demonstrate that, it should be required that the CCO has authority over
corporate functions and resources. 99 Thus, in determining whether a CCO
should be liable, the defined roles and responsibilities and stature of the
CCO in the organization should be considered. 100 If a CCO does not have a
seat at the decision–making table within the corporation, the CCO should
not be personally liable. 101
CONCLUSION
The expectations on compliance programs are broad and require skilled
executive level management. 102 Compliance programs and the CCOs that
oversee them, if properly structured, can be very beneficial in corporate
governance by helping corporations compete fairly in the market within the
boundaries of the law. 103 Corporations have an opportunity to carefully
define the roles of CCOs and ICFOs in their organizations and should do so
before the regulatory agencies that oversee them do. 104 Doing so will fill
the current void that exists with regard to clarity regarding the scope of
compliance programs and the scope, responsibility and accountability of
CCOs and ICFOs. Filling this void may preempt the need for regulatory
agencies to act and would allow corporations the ability to more highly
customize their approaches to better suit their individual needs.

97. Martin, supra note 70 (noting that federal agencies have failed to establish a
“clear affirmative legal decision or rule protecting CCOs from secondary liability”).
98. H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 75–76 (2001)
(“Corporations are also subject to criminal conviction for willful violation of a statute
. . . [and for] an employee’s willful intent in violating the law . . . .”).
99. Heather Badami, et. al, ACC Panel Discussion at Fourth Annual Corporate
Counsel University: Structuring a Corporate Compliance Function (May 2006).
100. Jose Tabuena, Escalation Processes to Avoid Personal CCO Liability,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/josetabuena/escalation-processes-to-avoid-personal-cco-liability#.WIkN0bGZM_M.
101. Michael Volkov, Making Sure Business Ethics Has a Seat at the Table, CORP.
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Nov. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Volkov, Making Sure],
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/making-sure-business-ethics-seat-table/.
102. See Compliance Risks, supra note 34; see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
103. Maurice E. Stuck, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 777–778 (2014).
104. See, e.g., Folsom, supra note 49 and accompanying text.

*

*

*

TO INDEMNIFY OR NOT TO
INDEMNIFY? WHEN CCO INSURANCE
IS THE ANSWER
ALEXANDRA MCLEOD *
Introduction ...............................................................................................325
II. What is Indemnification? .....................................................................327
A. Delaware Indemnification Law.................................................327
B. The CCO and Indemnification ..................................................329
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Indemnification ..................331
III. CCO as a Scapegoat............................................................................332
A. Sources of Liability...................................................................334
B. Supervisory Liability.................................................................335
C. Leverage....................................................................................336
IV. Alternatives to Indemnification: General Insurance...........................337
A. Public Policy Concerns .............................................................338
B. Insurance Option that Would Work Best for CCOs..................338
Conclusion .................................................................................................339
INTRODUCTION
A recent survey by the American Association of Bank Directors found
that over the prior five years, 24.5% of banks had directors or prospective
directors resign, refuse to serve on committee, or refuse to become a
director for fear of personal liability. 1 This fear is something that Chief
* Editor–in–Chief, American University Business Law Review, Volume 6; J.D. 2017,
American University Washington College of Law, May 2017; B.A. magna cum laude,
Economics and Political Science, Sonoma State University, 2014. I would like to
thank the wonderful team at Buckley Sandler for their assistance in researching and
creating this piece. I would also like to thank my Executive Editor, Catriona Coppler,
for her tireless efforts editing this piece and the rest of the Symposium Edition.
Additionally, I would like to thank the American University Business Law Review for
all their hard work to make this Symposium a success. Finally, thank you to my family
who has always provided me with love, support, and encouragement.
1. Jon Eisenburg, Surviving an Age of Individual Accountability: How Much
Protection Do Indemnification and D&O Insurance Provide?, K&L GATES (May 21,
2014), http://www.klgates.com/surviving-in-an-age-of-individual-accountability-how-
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Compliance Officers (“CCOs”) live with on a daily basis; particularly due
to the government’s recently increased interest in holding individuals
accountable for corporate misconduct. 2 Most corporations indemnify highlevel officers and directors, which provides these individuals with legal and
financial security when investigations against the corporation arise. 3 While
it seems logical that a CCO would be a member of this high–level group,
that is simply not always the case. Instead, CCOs are often leveraged by
the corporation at the request of the government for a more lenient
punishment for the corporation or its other high–ranking officials. 4 Thus,
the CCO becomes an easy scapegoat for the corporation to offer to the
government when things go wrong. 5 So where does this leave CCOs when
they are left holding the bag for the corporation’s actions? How can CCOs
be expected to mount a successful defense when the corporation has
decided to abandon their cause?
This Article examines those instances in which corporations refused to
indemnify CCOs and explores the remaining options for CCOs facing
individual liability. There are three options for CCOs to consider when
negotiating with their employers to reduce their risk of individual liability.
First, the CCO can be added to the C–Suite due to the inherent risks and
responsibilities associated with the CCO’s role. Inclusion in the C–Suite
would then allow the CCO to make use of the corporation’s
indemnification policies to mount his or her defense. Second, if corporate
much-protection-do-indemnification-and-do-insurance-provide-05-21-2014/;
Yaron
Nili, How Much Protection Do Indemnification and D&O Insurance Provide?, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 28, 2014), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2014/05/28/how-much-protection-do-indemnification-and-do-insuranceprovide/.
2. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to Assistant
Attorney Gens.’ (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo].
3. See, e.g., Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002)
(explaining that Delaware legislation on indemnification is meant to provide a sense of
comfort for corporate officers and directors that they will be reasonably compensated
for expenses if suits arise in their positions); see also Alexander M. Szeto & David
Washburn, Indemnification of Directors and Officers: A Different Side to the Problem
of Corrupt Corruption, ANDREW KURTH (June 1, 2004), http://www.andrewskurth.
com/insights-IndemnificationofDirectorsandOfficersADif.html (noting that “[i]n order
to attract and retain highly qualified individuals to serve as directors and officers,
corporations must ensure that directors and officers can defend themselves if sued, and
if successful, can recover the costs of that defense”).
4. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(demonstrating KPMG’s willingness to not pay their indicted executives legal fees in
order to minimize the corporation’s liability).
5. See Julie Dimauro, The State of the Chief Compliance Officer in 2016, CORP.
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (May 25, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/s
tate-chief-compliance-officer-2016/ (explaining that a lack of corporate compliance
culture of a company can lead to the CCO being the scapegoat for corporate lapses and
violations of regulations).
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indemnification is not an option, the CCO should be able to negotiate his or
her employment agreement to include personal insurance that would cover
the costs associated with defending the CCO if suit arises. Finally,
insurance providers should create a package for CCOs to purchase that is
specifically tailored to the needs of CCOs for when the corporation refuses
or is unable to pay for the CCO’s legal defense. Ultimately, the CCO’s
role is becoming an essential part of a corporation’s operation; therefore,
these individuals should be treated with the respect and legal insurance that
they deserve.
II. WHAT IS INDEMNIFICATION?
Corporate indemnification is “the act of a corporation compensating one
or more of its directors, officers, employees, or agents for liability they
have personally incurred due to actions they took in their official capacities
with the corporation.” 6 Typically, employees must meet three conditions
before becoming indemnified. 7 First, the employee must be named as a
defendant in the lawsuit “by reason of” his or her employment title at the
corporation. 8 Second, the employee or officer must have been acting in
good faith when the action alleged in the lawsuit was performed. 9 Finally,
the corporation must reasonably believe that the employee or officer was
acting in the best interest of the corporation when the actions alleged in the
suit took place. 10 While most states permit corporations to indemnify their
directors and officers, a small number of states explicitly require that
certain officers be indemnified. 11 Therefore, the decision to indemnify an
officer or employee largely rests with the individual corporation and is
generally prescribed in each corporation’s governing documents. 12
A. Delaware Indemnification Law
Over a million businesses are incorporated in Delaware and this includes
more than fifty percent of all publicly traded companies in the United

6. NEAL T. BUETHE & MICHAEL C. WILHELM, CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION: A
STEP–BY–STEP GUIDE FOR HR PROFESSIONALS 132 (2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Margaret E. Barrett, Mandatory Indemnification of Corporate
Officers and Directors, 29 SW. L.J. 727, 727 (1975) (discussing New York being the
first state to enact indemnification legislation).
12. See Memorandum from Gibson Dunn to Clients (July 15, 2013) [hereinafter
Gibson Dunn Memo] (alerting clients that serve as directors and officers about what to
consider when looking at a public company’s insurance and indemnification policy).
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States and more than sixty percent of all fortune five hundred companies. 13
Therefore, when assessing indemnification protocol, it is best to look at the
Delaware Code for analysis because it is the leading home for American
corporations and most states follow the corporate laws that Delaware sets
forth. According to the Delaware Code:
[A] corporation shall have the power to indemnify any person who was
or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil criminal,
administrative or investigative by reason of fact that the person is or was
a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or was serving
14
at the request of the corporation . . . .

Once a corporate officer believes that he or she can be indemnified, the
officer must consider when he or she will receive payment from the
corporation to mount his or her defense. Under Delaware law, a
corporation is permitted, but not required, to advance legal fees to the
officer or director currently facing civil, criminal, administrative, or
investigative charges or proceedings. 15 However, if the corporation
chooses to advance these legal fees, Delaware law requires that the
corporation and the officer enter into an agreement in which “[the] director
or officer” agrees to pay back any money he or she received for legal fees if
it is “ultimately . . . determined that [the officer] is not entitled to
indemnif[ication].” 16
Additionally, Delaware law also permits the corporation to dictate
“terms and conditions” for the legal fees it provides.17 These “terms and
conditions” include: (1) collateral, (2) right to select counsel, (3)
reasonableness of the fees, and (4) the right to be informed of all
developments in the investigation. 18 Some argue that Delaware’s pro–
corporate laws are merely put in place to generate revenue for the state by
ensuring that companies continue to incorporate in Delaware. 19 However,
13. See Suzanne Raga, Why Are the Majority of U.S. Companies Incorporated in
Delaware?, MENTAL FLOSS (Mar. 11, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/76
951/why-are-so-many-us-companies-incorporated-delaware (noting three reasons why
companies choose to incorporate in Delaware: (1) Delaware Court of Chancery allows
companies to resolve disputes quickly with a judge rather than a jury; (2) Delaware’s
tax systems give businesses several ways to legally minimize their tax bills; and (3)
Delaware’s laws and policies make it easy for businesses to incorporate, avoid liability,
and retain privacy).
14. 8 Del. Code § 145(a) (2016).
15. Id. §145(e).
16. See id. (noting that the same rules apply to former directors and officers if suit
arises after the departure from the corporation).
17. Eisenburg, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. See David Kocieniewski, Delaware’s $1 Billion Incorporation Machine,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
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while this may be true, Delaware’s broad indemnification statutes also
allow individual corporate officers and directors to be held personally
accountable for their actions, which in turn can reduce the incentive to
misbehave. 20
A setback for directors and officers that work for companies
incorporated in Delaware is that Delaware’s broad indemnification
statutory language merely permits as opposed to requires corporations to
advance legal fees to their officers. 21 This broad language often times can
lead to directors and officers having to personally fund their own legal
defense without any help from their corporation. Thus, it is imperative for
officers and directors of large corporations to contract around these
corporate–biased laws. These contracts should include specific terms of
indemnification such as amount, time period, and immediacy to be
provided under Directors and Officers Insurance (“D&O Insurance”). 22
Additionally, when making an indemnification contract, directors, officers,
and other high–ranking officials, should take into consideration whether
their job currently falls under their corporation’s C–Suite indemnification
umbrella. 23 For CCOs this is where the heart of the issue lies; it is rare that
a CCO’s position is ever categorized as a C–Suite position. Thus, CCOs
are subject to all of the risk that a high–level position entails without any of
the protections that a C–Suite employee enjoys. 24
B. The CCO and Indemnification
The role of a CCO encompasses many different tasks to ensure that the
company stays informed and complies with current statutes and regulations
that monitor the industry. 25 The CCO is required to develop a compliance
2016-04-27/delaware-s-1-billion-opacity-industry-gives-u-s-onshore-haven (noting that
corporations’ registration fees provide more than $1 billion in annual state revenue).
20. Eisenburg, supra note 1.
21. 8 Del. Code § 145(a) (2016).
22. See Gibson Dunn Memo, supra note 12 (providing tips for directors and
officers when looking at their D&O Insurance policies in the wake of the 2007–2009
financial crisis).
23. See Boris Groysberg et al., The New Path To the C-Suite, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar. 2011 (explaining the typical positions within C–Suite, including: Chief
Information Officer, Chief Marketing and Sales Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
General Counsel, Chief Supply–Chain–Management Officer, Chief Human Resource
Officer, and Chief Executive Officer).
24. But see Edward T. Dartley, The Combined Role of the General Counsel and the
Chief Compliance Officer — Opportunities and Challenges, PRAC. COMPLIANCE &
RISK MGMT. FOR THE SEC. INDUSTRY, May–June 2014 (discussing the roles of a joint
General Counsel and CCO position).
25. 15 U.S.C § 80b–3(e)(6) (2017) (explaining the defenses a CCO can assert when
a suit is filed against them: (1) that the CCO adopted “procedures reasonably designed
to prevent and detect violations”; (2) the CCO had “a system in place for applying the
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program to which the corporation must adhere and to create an atmosphere
of corporate compliance and awareness throughout the company. 26 It is the
CCO’s job to distribute the compliance standards and administer
compliance trainings to confirm all employees, including high–level
officers, understand and follow the compliance rules. 27 When a CCO
implements compliance policies, he or she must continually assess and
monitor that these compliance standards are being met and are effective. 28
A way that CCOs assess the effectiveness of the corporation’s
compliance program is to perform random department or site checks to
make sure that compliance protocols are being followed at all times. 29 If
the CCO at any point feels that there is a red flag of suspicion about a
transaction the corporation performed, it is the CCO’s duty to investigate
and report his or her findings to his or her direct supervisor, which is often
the Board of Directors. 30 Upon the CCO reporting to his or her supervisor,
he or she must recommend penalties for misconduct via the corporation and
also consider whether the misconduct needs to be reported to the regulating
body of the industry. 31
As a result of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, senior executives, such as
the CCO, have become targets for public outrage. 32 The CCO, as the
officer that handles compliance, has the responsibility of creating and
administering the compliance plan for the entire corporation, but more
often than not, they are left off the list for C–Suite indemnification. This
leaves CCOs—especially in the banking industry—wide open to public
criticism and exposes them to personal liability without any line of defense
provided by the corporation. 33
procedures”; and (3) the CCO reasonably “discharged his supervisory responsibilities
in accordance with the procedures and had no reason to believe that the person was not
complying with the procedures).
26. See Barbara Barrett et al., CCO of Reliant Care Management Co. LLC,
Presentation at the 2015 ACC Annual Meeting in Boston, MA: Role and
Responsibility of the Chief Compliance Officer (Oct. 18–21, 2015) [hereinafter The
Role of a CCO Speech] (explaining the duties and challenges of the role of a CCO).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Panel III, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 241 (2017) (discussing the conflict that
arises when a CCO, who is also a lawyer, needs to report misconduct to law
enforcement).
32. See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (April 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/mag
azine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html (expressing the public’s discontent
with the lack of white collar prosecutions regarding the financial crisis).
33. See generally Groysberg et al., supra note 23.
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However, under Delaware law, corporations have two potential
solutions. 34 First, the corporation can choose to add the CCO position to
the C–Suite, which most likely will permit the CCO to become eligible for
protections that allow the individual to mount a defense funded or
reimbursed, to a certain extent, by the corporation. 35 Alternatively, the
corporation can make such determinations on a case–by–case basis. 36 The
corporation can make this decision when a suit or proceeding arises against
the officer through: (1) a majority vote of the directors who are not
themselves parties to the proceeding; (2) a committee of such directors
designated by majority vote; (3) by independent legal counsel directed to
make such a determination by the directors; or (4) by stockholder vote. 37
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Indemnification
The primary advantage of indemnification and D&O Insurance
agreements is that both provide security for the officers and directors at
issue, which in turn leads to corporate growth. 38 By allowing these kinds
of agreements to exist, the corporation can be led by vibrant, energetic, and
competent officers and directors that are not constantly looking over their
shoulder when they take a risk to benefit the company. 39 By having the
corporation indemnify senior executives, the executive still has a sense of
fiduciary duty to the corporation, but there is also a protection in place if
one day the executive’s name is included at the top of an indictment. 40
D&O Insurance or indemnification agreements allow for these high–level
officers in a time of crisis to avoid personal liability as long as the
individual was performing his or her corporate duties in good faith and
with the best interests of the corporation in mind. 41
However, there are some disadvantages to indemnification agreements
and D&O Insurance plans. These disadvantages generally crop up in the
“terms and conditions” that corporations attach to such indemnification
Specifically, corporations can impose “terms and
agreements. 42
conditions” that impede the officer from acquiring the type of legal
representation that he or she believes to be the best fit to defend against the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

8 Del. Code § 145(a) (2016).
Id. at § 145(c).
Id.
Id.
Szeto et al., supra note 3.
Eisenberg, supra note 1.
Id.
8 Del. Code § 145(c) (2016).
Id.
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charges at issue. 43 Some corporations have also implemented a cap on the
amount of money that they will pay towards their executive officers’
defenses. 44 Therefore, if the officer uses up the corporation’s allotted
money for their defense prior to the proceeding’s conclusion, the officer
must either personally pick up the rest of the bill or seek other
representation. 45
Another disadvantage of indemnification agreements or D&O Insurance
plans that has been brought up in more recent years is that these agreements
are a shield for corporate officers to not face individual accountability for
their actions. 46 The public looks at the events following the 2007 to 2009
financial crisis and wonders why more corporate officers of banks such as
JPMorgan, Citigroup, Bear Sterns, and Goldman Sachs were not punished
for their involvement in selling subprime mortgages that led to the collapse
of the real estate market and to some extent the United States economy as a
whole. 47 Many corporate officers from these banks used their D&O
Insurance plans to retain the best legal representation money could buy,
which in turn resulted in these officers facing mere monetary damages
rather than punitive measures. 48 The American public was outraged at the
lack of executive accountability, which prompted the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) to respond by taking a harsh stance on individual corporate
liability. 49 Under the Obama administration, Deputy Attorney General
Sally Yates took it upon herself to create and implement a memorandum
that would guide federal prosecutors to strictly hold corporate officers
liable for their misconduct within the corporation.50
III. CCO AS A SCAPEGOAT
Following the initiatives of the DOJ, former Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) Chairwoman Mary Jo White made targeting
individuals a “core principle” of the SEC’s enforcement program on the
theory that “when people fear for their own reputations, careers, or
pocketbooks, they tend to stay in line.” 51 Conversely, SEC Commissioner
43. See generally Stephen A. Allred, Key Issues in Evaluating and Negotiating
D&O Coverage, MCGUIREWOODS, https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources
/publications/Key-Issues-D-O-Insurance-Coverage.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id.
46. Eisenberg, supra note 1.
47. Eisinger, supra note 32.
48. Id.
49. Yates Memo, supra note 2.
50. Id.
51. Eisenberg, supra note 1.
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Daniel M. Gallagher opposed the SEC’s attempt to impose strict liability
against corporate officers by saying, “[a]s it stands the [SEC] seems to be
cutting off the noses of CCOs to spite [their] faces.” 52 Because of
statements such as these, at least eighty–one percent of CCOs are
concerned about their individual corporate liability. 53 This is especially
true for individuals who work in heavily regulated industries, such as in
financial services, healthcare, or pharmaceuticals. 54
These concerns also stem from a lack of resources to: (1) maintain an
effective compliance program with a constantly shifting regulatory
compliance landscape, and (2) resolve misconduct issues that arise within a
corporation. 55 Many CCOs work to create and implement effective
compliance programs for their corporations, but these officers are also
constantly worried that regardless of how hard they work, their corporation
is using their position to create plausible deniability if a link in the
compliance chain were to ever break. 56 This type of corporate thinking
leaves many CCOs as the corporation’s scapegoat when compliance
programs are found to be insufficient. 57 Furthermore, the government
recognizes the difficulty of a corporation civilly or criminally liable for its
actions; thus, it seems that federal prosecutors and administrative agencies
are targeting CCOs to appease the public’s demand for holding senior
executives accountable for their misconduct. 58

52. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, Statement on Recent SEC
Settlements Charging Chief Compliance Officers with Violations of Investment
Advisors Act Rule 206(4)–7 (June 18, 2015).
53. DLA PIPER’S 2016 COMPLIANCE & RISK REPORT: CCOS UNDER SCRUTINY
(2016).
54. Id.
55. See id. (detailing CCOs concerns about personal liability in a chart).
56. See Joanna Belby, 7 Nightmares Keeping Chief Compliance Officers Awake at
Night, FORBES (July 29, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joannabel
bey/2016/07/29/7-nightmares-keeping-chief-compliance-officers-awake-at-night/#f76
96d216be9.
57. Id.
58. See Daniel Rice, SEC Enforcement Director Defends Approach to Compliance
Officer Liability, WESTLAW CORP. GOV. DAILY BRIEFING (2015) (stating that the SEC
often makes compliance officers the scapegoat for violations made by their supervisors
or others in the firm); see also Selwyn Parker, Comply or else — Compliance Officers
Assume a Heavier Burden of Responsibility, INSIGHTS (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.wol
terskluwerfs.com/article/comply-or-else-compliance-officers-assume-a-heavier-burdenof-responsibility.aspx (“[T]he SEC has just taken enforcement actions against
compliance officers of investment advisors. Indeed some saw it as a witch–hunt in
which the compliance department became the scapegoat.”).
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A. Sources of Liability
The DOJ’s Yates Memorandum (“Yates Memo”), which was issued in
2015 by former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates was the trigger that
caused CCOs to become concerned about being individually prosecuted for
a corporation’s misconduct. 59 In the Yates Memo, Ms. Yates mentions that
prosecuting individual wrongdoers both “deters future illegal activity” and
“incentivizes changes in corporate misbehavior.” 60 The Yates Memo
encouraged the government to not only go after corporations for their
misconduct, but to also go after the corporation’s CCOs as well. However,
on January 30, 2017, President Trump asked for Ms. Yates’ resignation and
she ceased working as the Deputy Attorney General shortly thereafter. 61
Given Ms. Yates’ untimely departure, it is unclear whether the Yates
Memo will still be used in future DOJ prosecutions. 62 Although, it is
relatively safe to assume based upon the Trump administration’s pro–
business platform that there will not be a significant push to prosecute the
CCOs of large corporations anymore, unless there is an outcry from
President Trump’s voter base.
Another source of liability for CCOs is the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine (“RCO”). The RCO Doctrine is a “procedural contrivance
that regulators and prosecutors have rediscovered and now are . . .
[aggressively applying] against businessmen in administrative, civil, and
criminal actions.” 63 Rather than focusing on an individual’s intent or direct
involvement with the crime to sustain culpability, the RCO Doctrine
encompasses the “crime of doing nothing,” which means that senior
executives and CCOs can become culpable just because of their position
within the corporation. 64 The RCO Doctrine demonstrates how the
59. Yates Memo, supra note 2.
60. Id.; Alexis Ronickher, DOJ’s Pursuit of Individual Accountability is

Insufficient to Change Corporate Cultures that Promote Fraud, 21 WESTLAW J. 1, 2
(Oct. 2015).
61. Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied
Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics
/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html?_r=0.
62. Id.
63. Michael E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, J.
HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE, Jan–Feb. 2012, at 5, 5.
64. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding the company’s
president liable for the company’s misconduct because he shared “some measure of
blameworthiness . . . by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of . . . [but] he failed to do so”); see also United States v. Purdue Frederick
Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2007) (disbarring Purdue’s general counsel); see,
e.g., Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers
Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DUKE
L.J.145 (1992).
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government has wide–latitude to prosecute CCOs and other high–level
officers even if they have no involvement in the wrongdoing. 65
Conversely, this method of charging individual corporate liability is narrow
in scope because it can only be used under public welfare statutes. 66 Thus,
the RCO doctrine’s application is limited and CCOs do not have to be
consistently concerned about potential liability under this doctrine.
The combination of the Yates Memo, SEC guiding principles, and the
RCO Doctrine made it appear that most future DOJ prosecutions and SEC
enforcement actions will target senior executives who hold a “supervisory
role” even if these officers were not intimately involved in the misconduct
at issue. 67
B. Supervisory Liability
The most widely discussed enforcement action that was brought against
a CCO was that of Theodore Urban. 68 In that case, the SEC brought an
enforcement action against Mr. Urban for his failure to supervise an
employee. 69 Contrary, to the facts alleged indictment Mr. Urban attempted
several times to alert the company of the illegal trading activity. However,
the SEC still charged Mr. Urban because the SEC asserted he was head of
the Compliance Department and the duty to stop and prevent this type of
action fell under his “supervisory” role. 70 After the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, both the SEC and Mr. Urban appealed, but the
ALJ still did not define a “supervisory role” under the Securities and
Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”). 71 While the case eventually ended in a
stalemate dismissal, the case created substantial buzz because Mr. Urban—
in the process of defending himself over the course of five years—had
65. Clark, supra note 63.
66. Sarah Riley Howard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Finding

Executives Guilty of Crimes For What They Don’t Know, WARNER NORCROSS & JUDD
(Aug. 16, 2011), https://www.wnj.com/Publications/The-Responsible-CorporateOfficer-Doctrine-Findi.
67. Id.
68. Urban, SEC Rel. No. 402, 2010 WL 35009288, at *44 (ALJ Sept. 8. 2010)
[hereinafter Ted Urban Enforcement Action].
69. Bruce Carton, Former GC Urban to Compliance Officers: Make Sure You’re
Covered by Indemnity Agreement, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 6, 2012),
https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/enforcement-action/former-gc-urban-tocompliance-officers-make-sure-youre-covered-by-indemnity#.WAKVN5MrLR0.
70. 15 U.S.C § 80b–3(e)(6) (2017); see also Ted Urban Enforcement Action, supra
note 68, at 51–56 (holding that “(1) Mr. Urban was a supervisor, despite the fact that he
did not have ‘any day–to–day responsibility for the employee’ but that (2) Mr. Urban
had in fact adequately discharge his supervisory duties over this employee”).
71. Mr. Urban argued on appeal that he was not a supervisor of the rogue employee
and the SEC argued that Mr. Urban had actually failed to adequately discharge his
supervisory duties.
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incurred a seven–figure defense bill that the corporation initially refused to
pay. 72 It took many rounds of negotiation, but eventually the company
reimbursed Mr. Urban for his defense expenses to some degree. The vital
takeaway that Mr. Urban stated to the public after having gone through this
long and lengthy adjudication process was that an indemnification
agreement or some type of D&O Insurance is invaluable to a CCO or
General Counsel that handles compliance for the corporation. Thus, Mr.
Urban recommends that before taking any senior executive level position—
that works with compliance of regulation—an individual should negotiate
some type of indemnification agreement just in case a suit arises and the
person could be deemed individually liable for corporate misconduct or
violations of statutes and regulations.73
The concept of “supervisory liability” is still very unclear according to
the enforcement actions brought in the financial industry because most of
the time these actions result in a settlement. The settlements are a way for
the individual and the corporation’s they represent to keep their reputations
intact. 74 However, these actions do pose an interesting question about
whether an officer in a supervisory role can be held personally liable for
their employee’s actions. Additionally, these kinds of SEC enforcement
actions also raise the question of whether CCO or another executive in a
supervisory role has a duty to report an employee’s misconduct within a
particular time period in order to avoid charges? 75
C. Leverage
The DOJ filed its largest tax case against KPMG and its partners.76 The
DOJ alleged that the corporation created a tax shelter fraud from 1996 to
2003 by selling illicit deals and then misleading the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) about the transaction it orchestrated for wealthy
individuals. 77 However, in the course of the DOJ’s investigation, a young
and eager Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) attempted to use the
Thompson Memorandum78 to try to strong arm KPMG into refusing to pay
72. Carton, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No.

4065, Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket (Apr. 20, 2015).
75. In re John H. Gutfreund, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34–31554,
Admin. Pro. Release No. 3–7930, 1992 WL 362753 (Dec. 3, 1992).
76. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations in Relation to Largest–Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (August 29, 2005)
[hereinafter KPMG Press Release].
77. Id.
78. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson to Heads of
Dep’t Components United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) (encouraging corporations
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the legal fees of those indicted executive officers in exchange for
minimizing the corporation’s liability. The evidence demonstrated that
KPMG had a long–standing history of paying for their employees’ legal
fees to ensure a well–mounted defense for every employee. 79 This allowed
for the employee to hire the counsel of their choosing at the expense of the
company. 80 However, in this case, the AUSA met with KPMG’s attorneys
and made it explicitly clear that if KPMG decided to “circle the wagons”
and assist in paying the legal fees for those who were indicted, there would
also be consequences for the corporation as a result of their actions. 81
Ultimately, the Court had to dismiss the suits against the indicted
executives because of the prosecutors’ gross misconduct in the case. 82
This type of prosecutorial behavior is why many highly qualified
individuals feel uncomfortable when being offered the position of a CCO.
Often times individuals that are considering accepting a CCO position must
also take into account the extensive liability that goes along with the job in
recent years. 83 This is why Mr. Urban gives talks to senior executives and
CCOs negotiating and obtaining indemnification agreement or D&O
Insurance in a written formalized contract. So if that rainy day is ever to
come, the CCO’s contract can withstand a lengthy and intensive lawsuit
based on the CCO’s conduct on behalf of the corporation.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO INDEMNIFICATION: GENERAL INSURANCE
While it would be nice to believe that all corporations would be willing
to agree to an indemnification agreement or D&O Insurance plans for
CCOs, this is simply not the case. The idea that has been formulating by
some practitioners in the financial services industry is to provide the option
for CCOs to purchase individual liability insurance through a third party.
This insurance to some degree would be similar to a D&O insurance plan;
however, it would be paid for by the CCO.

to reveal information about their indicted executives in exchange for cooperation
credit).
79. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
80. See id. at 337 (noting that KPMG was now refusing to keep with their
longstanding tradition of paying their employees’ legal fees).
81. Id. at 364.
82. Id. at 382.
83. See, e.g., Yates Memo, supra note 2; Ted Urban Enforcement Action; supra
note 68; BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,
Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket 1721 (Apr. 20, 2015).
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A. Public Policy Concerns
The goals of the third party insurance would be to ease the CCO’s mind
when performing their job responsibilities. This insurance would allow
CCOs to conduct proper and thorough investigations knowing that if they
are ever indicted for individual liability on behalf of the corporation’s
misconduct—they would be able to mount a sufficient defense without
having to worry about the costs of litigation. 84 The purpose of this
insurance would not be to cover disgorgement—allowing the wrongdoer to
collect insurance proceeds to defend against his illegal act—but instead to
create a cushion that allows CCOs to perform their duties in the best
interest of the companies they represent while still having that soft pillow
to fall back on just in case the DOJ or SEC decides to bring an action
against a CCO for individual corporate liability. 85
B. Insurance Option that Would Work Best for CCOs
Upon discussions with members of the insurance community, it was
clear that the insurance provider would need to offer a Side A policy for
CCOs. 86 This is a similar policy that insurance providers offer corporations
under D&O Insurance plans. A Side A insurance policy protects officers
and directors from economic loss arising from claims for wrongful acts
made against the insured individual when the corporation refuses or is
unable to provide indemnification. 87 The only difference in the Side A
insurance policy for CCOs would be that the corporation would only pay
for a portion of the premium or the CCO would entirely cover the premium
costs of the insurance policy. While insurance providers may be intrigued
by this idea, a concern that may arise is that there may not be enough
demand for offering this type of CCO Liability Insurance to have such a
policy exist.

84. See, e.g., International Transport Intermediaries Club Ltd: Directors’ &
Officers’ Liability Insurance Endorsement Indication to the Current Terms and
Conditions of ITIC Certificate of Entry, INSURE (May 4, 2013), https://www.iticinsure.com/fileadmin/uploads/itic/Photos/Sample%20D%26O%20Terms.pdf (showing
a sample D&O insurance policy agreement).
85. See Eisenberg, supra note 1 (discussing the concerns that insurance for CCOs
would not allow for bad actors to obtain insurance payouts).
86. Id.; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Insurance Company (Oct. 26, 2016).
87. Jeanne Oronzio Wermuth, Why Purchase Side ‘A’ Directors & Officers
Liability Coverage? INS. J. (June 18, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com
/magazines/features/2012/06/18/251462.htm.
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CONCLUSION
The role of a CCO is a continuous debate within many regulated
industries. 88 Depending on the size of the corporation, compliance issues
may fall under the duties of the General Counsel, but ultimately, it is
important for regulated industries to decide where the CCO falls under the
corporate ladder. In a post 2007 to 2009 financial crisis world, compliance
has become essential to the day–to–day operation of the company.
Compliance is especially important in the financial services industry and as
a result, a compliance program should be at the top of the priority list for
the shareholders and the Board of Directors. It is important for
corporations to create a positive compliance culture that allows for CCOs
to effectively train employees to comply with industry regulations while
maintaining respect within the corporation. 89
As such, it seems reasonable to consider a CCO as a C–Suite member,
but if a corporation feels that this is unreasonable, there should be some
ability for a CCO to negotiate some type of insurance policy with the
corporation. This insurance policy should allow a CCO to be protected if
the corporation is under scrutiny for misconduct. CCOs should not be able
to be used as pawns in a corporation’s game to avoid liability. It is
important for regulated industries, such as the financial services industry, to
recognize the value that a CCO adds to their company and acknowledge
that they should be protected from individual liability for the corporation’s
misconduct. CCOs should be provided with some type of insurance or
indemnification for the vital roles they play in every regulated industry.

88. Dartley, supra note 24; see also Barrett et al., supra note 26.
89. Barrett et al., supra note 26.
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The American University Business Law Review (“BLR”) has compiled a
survey containing the statutes and regulations that a federal government
regulator or other agency could rely on to impose financial or other
penalties on Chief Compliance Officers (“CCOs”). This chart indicates:
(1) a citation to the provision, (2) which regulator or regulators are
responsible for the enforcement of the provision, (3) the statutory text
(edited for brevity where necessary), and (4) an explanation of the potential
impact on a CCO.
While we have attempted to include a variety of industries to which such
laws apply, this survey does not purport to be a complete examination of
every possible law, regulation, rule, guideline, or edict imposed through
enforcement applicable to all industries. In addition, this survey is not
intended to provide legal advice and should not be relied upon by any
recipient for that purpose.
CCOs may want to pay particular attention to the potential impact of the
regulators’ power to assess civil money penalties and to remove officers, as
well as the limitations imposed by the FDIC on payment of legal defense
costs.
BLR would like to thank Steve vonBerg and the late Bob Serino of
Buckley Sandler LLP for their contributions and assistance in compiling
this chart.
Additionally, special thanks to the BLR staff members who worked
tirelessly for their contributions on this chart: Hilary Rosenthal, Morgan
McKinlay, Brianna Schacter, Elizabeth Nwabueze, and Zac Johnston.
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12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a)

Banking

Citation

FDIC

Regulator

If, on the basis of the evidence presented at a
hearing before the Board of Directors (or any
person designated by the Board for such purpose),
in which all issues shall be determined on the
record pursuant to section 554 of Title 5 and the
written findings of the Board of Directors (or such
person) with respect to such evidence (which shall
be conclusive), the Board of Directors finds that
any unsafe or unsound practice or condition or any
violation specified in the notice to an insured
depository institution under paragraph (2)(B) or
subsection (w) of this section has been established,
the Board of Directors may issue an order
terminating the insured status of such depository
institution effective as of a date subsequent to such
finding.

Hearing

Potential Impact on CCOs

(iii) an insured depository institution or the
directors or trustees of the insured institution
have violated any applicable law, regulation,
order, condition imposed in writing by the
Corporation in connection with the approval of
any application or other request by the insured
depository institution, or written agreement
entered into between the insured depository
Appearance; consent to termination
institution and the Corporation,
Unless the depository institution shall appear at the
the Board of Directors shall notify the appropriate
hearing by a duly authorized representative, it shall
Federal banking agency with respect to such
be deemed to have consented to the termination of

(ii) an insured depository institution is in an
unsafe or unsound condition to continue
operations as an insured institution; or

(i) an insured depository institution or the
directors or trustees of an insured depository
institution have engaged or are engaging in
unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the
business of the depository institution;

(A) If the Board of Directors determines that—

STATUTES

Statutory Text
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Citation

Regulator

(i) serve written notice to the insured depository
institution of the Board's intention to terminate
the insured status of the institution;

If, after giving the notice required under subparagraph
(A) with respect to an insured depository institution,
the Board of Directors determines that any unsafe or
unsound practice or condition or any violation
specified in such notice requires the termination of the
insured status of the insured depository institution, the
Board shall—

(B) Notice of intention to terminate insurance

Statutory Text

institution (if other than the Corporation) or the State
banking supervisor of such institution (if the
Corporation is the appropriate Federal banking
agency) of the Board's determination and the facts and
circumstances on which such determination is based
for the purpose of securing the correction of such
practice, condition, or violation. Such notice shall be
given to the appropriate Federal banking agency not
less than 30 days before the notice required by
subparagraph (B), except that this period for notice to
the appropriate Federal banking agency may be
reduced or eliminated with the agreement of such
agency.
Any insured depository institution whose insured
status has been terminated by order of the Board of
Directors under this subsection shall have the right
of judicial review of such order only to the same
extent as provided for the review of orders under
subsection (h) of this section.

Judicial review

Potential Impact on CCOs

its status as an insured depository institution and
termination of such status thereupon may be
ordered.
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FDIC,
OCC,
Federal

12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b)

Reserve,
and NCUA

Regulator

Citation

Cease-and- desist order: If, in the opinion of the
appropriate Federal banking agency, any IAP is, has,
or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice
in conducting the business of such depository
institution, or is, has, or is about to violate, a law, rule,
or regulation, or any condition imposed in writing by
a Federal banking agency in connection with any
action on any application, notice, or other request by
the depository institution or institution-affiliated
party, or any written agreement entered into with the
agency, the appropriate Federal banking agency for
the depository institution may issue and serve upon
the depository institution or such party a notice of
charges in respect thereof. The notice shall contain a
statement of the facts constituting the alleged

(iii) notify the insured depository institution of
the date (not less than 30 days after notice under
this subparagraph) and place for a hearing before
the Board of Directors (or any person designated
by the Board) with respect to the termination of
the institution's insured status.

Statutory Text

(ii) provide the insured depository institution
with a statement of the charges on the basis of
which the determination to terminate such
institution's insured status was made (or a copy of
the notice under subparagraph (A)); and

2. Among the potential provisions in an order,
though rare, could be a requirement that monetary

1. The authority under § 1818(b) to issue a ceaseand- desist order also carries the authority to
require affirmative action to correct or remedy any
conditions resulting from any violation or practice
or limit activities and functions. §§ 1818(b)(6)-(7).
The cease and desist power has been used on
occasion to restrict the activities of bank officials.

Additional Comments:

Any violation of law, including a finding that a
CCO has or is engaged in an unsafe or unsound
practice in the opinion of a regulator, may result in
a cease-and-desist order.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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FDIC,
OCC,
Federal

12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)

Reserve,
and NCUA

Regulator

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

Removal: Whenever the appropriate Federal banking A CCO may be removed from office if a regulator
agency determines that:
determines that the CCO violated any law,
regulation, or condition imposed by a regulator, or
A. any IAP has, directly or indirectly…
any written agreement between the financial
i. violated——
institution and the regulator involving unsafe or
I. any law or regulation;
II. any cease-and-desist order which has unsound practices or breach of fiduciary duty IF all
of the following conditions are met:
become final;
III. any condition imposed in writing by a
First, the CCO violated: 1) any law or regulation;
2) any final cease-and-desist order; 3) any
Federal banking agency in connection
with any action on any application,
condition imposed by a Federal banking agency;

In the event the agency finds that any violation or
unsafe or unsound practice specified in the notice of
charges has been established, the agency may issue
and serve upon the depository institution or an IAP
from any such violation or practice. Such order may,
by provisions which may be mandatory or otherwise,
require the depository institution or its IAPs to cease
and desist from the same, and, further, to take
affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting
from any such violation or practice.

Statutory Text

violation or violations or the unsafe or unsound restitution be paid by a CCO to the financial
practice or practices, and shall fix a time and place at institution.
which a hearing will be held to determine whether an
order to cease and desist therefrom should issue
against the depository institution or the institutionaffiliated party.
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Citation

Regulator

B. By reason of the violation, practice, or breach
described in any clause of subparagraph (A)—
i. such insured depository institution or
business institution has suffered or will
probably suffer financial loss or other
damage; [or]
ii. the interests of the insured depository
institution's depositors have been or could
be prejudiced; or
iii. such party has received financial gain or
other benefit by reason of such violation,
practice, or breach;
and

and

Statutory Text

notice, or request by such depository
institution or institution-affiliated
party; or
IV. any written agreement between such
depository institution and such agency;
ii. engaged or participated in any unsafe or
unsound practice in connection with any
insured depository institution or business
institution; or
iii. committed or engaged in any act,
omission, or practice which constitutes a
breach of such party's fiduciary duty;

1. Knowing violation of a removal order subjects
the individual to criminal penalties composed of a
fine of up to $1,000,000, up to 5 years in prison, or
both. § 1818(j).

Additional Comments:

The CCO is entitled to an Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) hearing if no settlement
is reached between the parties.

Third, the violation 1) involves personal
dishonesty by the CCO; or 2) demonstrates
willful or continuing disregard by the CCO for
the safety and soundness of the depository
institution.

Second, either: 1) the violation or practice
caused the financial institution a financial loss or
other damage; 2) the interest of depositors was or
could have been prejudiced; or 3) the CCO
benefited from the violation.

Potential Impact on CCOs

or 4) any written agreement between the bank
and regulator involving unsafe or unsound
practices or involving an act or practice which
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.
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FDIC,
OCC,
Federal

12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(g)

Reserve,
and NCUA

Regulator

Citation

A CCO may be suspended for the time during
which he or she is the subject of a formal
investigation involving a felony crime of
dishonesty or breach of trust or a criminal violation
of the Bank Secrecy Act.

Potential Impact on CCOs

(i) a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust
which is punishable by imprisonment for a term Additional Comments:
exceeding one year under State or Federal law, or
1. A suspension or prohibition under § 1818(g)
(ii) a criminal violation of § 1956, 1957, or 1960 shall remain in effect until the information,
indictment, or complaint referred to in such
of Title 18 or § 5322 or 5324 of Title 31,
subparagraph is finally disposed of or until
the appropriate Federal banking agency may, if
terminated by the agency.
continued service or participation by such party

Suspension: Whenever any institution-affiliated
party is the subject of any information, indictment, or
complaint, involving the commission of or
participation in—

the appropriate Federal banking agency for the
depository institution may serve upon such party a
written notice of the agency's intention to remove
such party from office or to prohibit any further
participation by such party, in any manner, in the
conduct of the affairs of any insured depository
institution.

(ii) demonstrates willful or continuing
disregard by such party for the safety or
soundness of such insured depository
institution or business institution.

Statutory Text

C. Such violation, practice, or breach—
(i) involves personal dishonesty on the part
of such party; or

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
361

FDIC,
OCC,
Federal

12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)

Reserve,
and NCUA

Regulator

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

2. In 1976, a federal court held that due process
requires that the individual be given an immediate
post-suspension hearing. Feinberg v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1976).

1. In 1998, all of the Federal financial regulators
adopted a revised interagency statement of policy
regarding when they assess the civil money

(III) breaches any fiduciary duty;

(ii) which violation, practice, or breach—

Additional Comments:

insured depository institution; or

(i)(I) commits any violation described [in the first An Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)
tier];
hearing is required if no settlement is reached
(II) recklessly engages in an unsafe or unsound between the parties, regardless of which tier of
practice in conducting the affairs of such violation is implicated.

Civil Money Penalty: Applicable to any institution or A CCO may be subject to monetary penalties
any IAP. 3 tiers:
(which cannot be reimbursed by the financial
First Tier: Strict liability for violation of any law or institution) for violating any law, regulation, or
regulation, final or temporary order, or any written order related to a Federal banking agency. The
amount of potential penalty increases based upon
condition or agreement with a Federal banking
the CCO’s mental state or intention in bringing
agency. CMP is up to $7,500 per day during which
about or failing to prevent a violation. The first tier
such violation continues.
penalty is available for any violation, regardless of
Second Tier: any institution-affiliated party who
the CCO’s intent or lack thereof.

Statutory Text

posed, poses, or may pose a threat to the interests of
the depositors of, or threatened, threatens, or may
threaten to impair public confidence in, any relevant
depository institution, by written notice served upon
such party, suspend such party from office or prohibit
such party from further participation in any manner in
the conduct of the affairs of any depository
institution.
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Citation

Regulator

is liable for a CMP of up to $1,425,000 per day during
which such violation, practice, or breach continues.

(ii) knowingly or recklessly causes a substantial loss
to such depository institution or a substantial
pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party by
reason of such violation, practice, or breach…

(III) breaches any fiduciary duty; and

(II) engages in any unsafe or unsound practice
in conducting the affairs of such depository
institution; or

(I) commits any violation described in any
clause [in the first tier];

(i) knowingly—

Third Tier: any IAP who—

shall pay a CMP of up to $37,500 per day during
which such violation, practice, or breach continues.

a. Evidence that the violation or practice or
breach of fiduciary duty was intentional or
was committed with a disregard of the law
or with a disregard of the consequences to
the institution;
b. The duration and frequency of the
violations, practices, or breaches of
fiduciary duty;
c. The continuation of the violations, practices,
or breach of fiduciary duty after the
respondent was notified or, alternatively, its
immediate cessation and correction;
d. The failure to cooperate with the agency in
effecting early resolution of the problem;
e. Evidence of concealment of the violation,
practice, or breach of fiduciary duty or,
alternatively, voluntary disclosure of the
violation, practice or breach of fiduciary
duty;
f. Any threat of loss, actual loss, or other harm
to the institution, including harm to the

Potential Impact on CCOs

penalties. In determining whether to assess a
(II) causes or is likely to cause more than a penalty and, if so, the amount, the agencies are to
minimal loss to such depository institution; or evaluate statutory factors including: the size of the
financial resources, good faith, gravity of
(III) results in pecuniary gain or other benefit violation, history of violations and other matters
to such party,
that justice requires. Those 13 criteria are:

Statutory Text

(I) is part of a pattern of misconduct;
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Statutory Text
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public confidence in the institution, and the
degree of such harm;
g. Evidence that a participant or his or her
associates received financial gain or other
benefit as a result of the violation, practice,
or breach of fiduciary duty;
h. Evidence of any restitution paid by a
participant of losses resulting from the
violation, practice, or breach of fiduciary
duty;
i. History of prior violation, practice, or
breach of fiduciary duty, particularly where
they are similar to the actions under
consideration;
j. Previous criticism of the institution or
individual for similar actions;
k. Presence or absence of a compliance
program and its effectiveness;
l. Tendency to engage in violations of law,
unsafe or unsound banking practices, or
breaches of fiduciary duty; and
m. The existence of agreements, commitments
orders, or conditions imposed in writing
intended to prevent the violation, practice,
or breach of fiduciary duty.
2. New Matrices:

364
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Regulator

FDIC

Citation

12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(w)

The person against whom any penalty is assessed
shall be afforded the right to have the matter
litigated in an APA hearing before an independent
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ’s
recommendations are provided to the agency head
for a final decision. That decision can be appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

3. Hearing:

Potential Impact on CCOs

On Feb. 26, 2016 the OCC released new matrices
with new factors and weight, one for institutions
and the other for individuals. The release can be
accessed
at
http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/bulletins/2016/ bulletin-2016-5a.pdf.

After receipt of written notification from the Attorney In determining whether to terminate insurance the
General by the FDIC of a conviction of violations FDIC shall take into account the following factors:
related
to
money
laundering,
BSA/AML
1. The extent to which directors or senior
recordkeeping and reporting violations, or
executive officers of the depository
structuring, the FDIC shall issue to the insured
institution knew of, or were involved in, the
depository institution a notice of its intention to
commission of the money laundering
terminate the insured status of the insured depository
offense of which the institution was found
institution and schedule a hearing on the matter,
guilty.
which shall be conducted in all respects as a
2. The extent to which the offense occurred
termination hearing.
despite the existence of policies and
procedures within the depository institution

Statutory Text
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Federal

12 U.S.C.
§ 1829(a)

Reserve,
and NCUA

Regulator

Citation
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which were designed to prevent the
occurrence of any such offense.
3. The extent to which the depository
institution has fully cooperated with law
enforcement authorities with respect to the
investigation of the money laundering
offense of which the institution was found
guilty.
4. The extent to which the depository
institution has implemented additional
internal controls (since the commission of
the offense of which the depository
institution was found guilty) to prevent the
occurrence of any other money laundering
offense.
5. The extent to which the interest of the local
community in having adequate deposit and
credit services available would be
threatened by the termination of insurance.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(w)(2).

Prohibition: Except with the prior written consent of A CCO who is convicted of a criminal offense
the Corporation—
involving 1) dishonesty, 2) a breach of trust, or 3)
(A) any person who has been convicted of any money laundering will be summarily dismissed
criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of and prohibited from owning or participating in the
affairs of an insured financial institution.
trust or money laundering, or has agreed to enter into

Statutory Text
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Regulator

12 U.S.C. FDIC,
§ 1831o(f)( OCC,
2)(F)(ii)
Federal
Reserve

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

The appropriate Federal banking agency shall carry “Executive officer” means any person who
out this section by taking one or more of the following “participates or has authority to participate (other
actions:
than as a director) in major policymaking functions
of the company or bank.” 12 U.S.C. § 375b.
(F)(ii) Requiring the institution to dismiss from
office any director or senior executive officer who Thus, an undercapitalized institution may be
had held office for more than 180 days immediately required to dismiss the CCO.

Whoever knowingly violates the above shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 for each day such
prohibition is violated or imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both.

(B) any insured depository institution may not permit
any person referred to in subparagraph (A) to engage
in any conduct or continue any relationship prohibited
under such subparagraph.

(iii) otherwise participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository
institution; and

(ii) own or control, directly or indirectly, any
insured depository institution; or

Statutory Text

a pretrial diversion or similar program in connection This requires the prosecution of the CCO in a court
with a prosecution for such offense, may not—
but, once convicted, the agencies may impose the
prohibition without further hearings.
(i) become, or continue as, an institution-affiliated
party with respect to any insured depository
institution;
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FDIC,
OCC,
Federal
Reserve

Citation

12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be subject to monetary penalties
Whoever violates any provision of the 14 criminal (which cannot be reimbursed by the financial
statutes shall be subject to a civil penalty brought institution) far in excess of those noted above if
they are found to have violated 14 specific criminal
by the Attorney General in an amount assessed by
offenses.
the court in a civil action under this section.
The 14 predicate offenses are:
(b) Maximum amount of penalty
1. 18 U.S.C. § 215 (receipt of commissions
(1) Generally
or gifts for procuring loans);
The amount of the civil penalty shall not exceed
2. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (theft, embezzlement, or
$1,000,000.
misapplication by bank officer or
employee);
(2) Special rule for continuing violations
3. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (embezzling, abstracting,
In the case of a continuing violation, the
purloining, or willfully misapplying
amount of the civil penalty may exceed the
property of lending, credit, and insurance
amount described in paragraph (1) but may
institutions);
not exceed the lesser of $1,000,000 per day
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (false bank entries,
or $5,000,000.
reports, and transactions);
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (federal credit
(3) Special rule for violations creating gain or loss
institution
entries,
reports,
and
(A) If any person derives pecuniary gain
transactions);
from the violation, or if the violation results
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1007 (Federal Deposit
in pecuniary loss to a person other than the
Insurance Corporation transactions);

(a) In general

Statutory Text

before the institution became undercapitalized. No hearing is required for the dismissal of the CCO
Dismissal under this clause shall not be construed to to proceed; however it may be possible for the
be a removal under § 1818e.
institution to argue the determination of being
undercapitalized as arbitrary and capricious.
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Statutory Text

violator, the amount of the civil penalty may
exceed the amounts described in paragraphs
(1) and (2) but may not exceed the amount of
such gain or loss.

Potential Impact on CCOs

18 U.S.C. § 1014 (loan and credit
applications generally; renewals and
discounts; crop insurance),
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud);
18 U.S.C. § 287 (false claims) ;
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements),
18 U.S.C. § 1032 (concealment of assets
from conservator, receiver, or liquidating
agent);
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud);
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud);

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
1. For nine of the predicate offenses, which deal
specifically with banks or other financial

Additional Comments:

No further hearing is required as this is a civil
action in a U.S. district court.

However, because this is a civil action to recover
a civil penalty under those criminal offenses, the
Attorney General must only establish the right to
recovery by a preponderance of the evidence,
and need not prove guilt using the criminal
standard (beyond a reasonable doubt). 12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a(f).

15 U.S.C. § 645(a) (fraud in connection with Small
Business Administration transactions).

12.
13.

8.
9.
10.
11.

7.

2017
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Statutory Text

1. The good or bad faith of the defendant and
the degree of his/her scienter;
2. The injury to the public, and whether the
defendant's conduct created substantial loss
or the risk of substantial loss to other
persons;
3. The egregiousness of the violation;

2. In United States v. Menendez, No. 11 Civ. 06313
(C.D. Cal.), the court set forth the following eight
factors for determining the civil penalty amount
under FIRREA:

Potential Impact on CCOs

institutions in one way or another (such as bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344), the government does not
have to prove any additional element beyond
violation of the predicate offense itself. For the five
others, which are the more general offenses such
as false claims on the U.S. government (18 U.S.C.
§ 287), false statements within federal jurisdiction
(18 U.S.C. § 1001), fraud on federal receivers and
conservators (18 U.S.C. § 1032), and mail and wire
fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343), the government
must additionally prove that the violation of the
underlying criminal statute was one “affecting a
federally insured financial institution” (such as an
FDIC-insured bank).
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(b) In the event of the failure of any person to pay any
penalty assessed under this section, a civil action for
the recovery thereof may, in the discretion of the
Secretary, be brought in the name of the United
States.

Secretary of (a) For each willful or grossly negligent violation of
the Treasury any regulation under the general recordkeeping
requirement for US financial institutions, the
Secretary may assess upon any person to which the
regulation applies, or any person willfully causing a
violation of the regulation, and, if such person is a
partnership, corporation, or other entity, upon any
partner, director, officer, or employee thereof who
willfully or through gross negligence participates
in the violation, a civil penalty not exceeding
$10,000 per violation.

12 U.S.C.
§ 1955

Statutory Text

Regulator

Citation

A CCO may be subject to monetary penalties
(which cannot be reimbursed by the financial
institution) for any willful or grossly negligent
violation of any regulation under the general
recordkeeping requirement for US financial
institutions. The CMP may be up to $10,000 per
violation.

Potential Impact on CCOs

4. The isolated or repeated nature of the
violation;
5. The defendant's financial condition and
ability to pay;
6. The criminal fine that could be levied for
this conduct;
7. The amount the defendant sought to profit
through his fraud; and
8. The penalty range available under FIRREA.
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Comptroller
of Currency,
Board of
Governors
of the
Federal
Reserve
System, and
FDIC

Comptroller (a) Civil money penalty
of Currency,
(1) In general
Board of
Governors

12 U.S.C.
§ 3108(b)(
6)

12 U.S.C.
§ 3110(a)(

Any person who willfully fails or refuses to attend
and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or to
produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda,
contracts, agreements, or other records in accordance
with any subpoena under this subsection shall be
fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 1 year,
or both. Each day during which any such failure or
refusal continues shall be treated as a separate
offense.

Whoever willfully violates, or willfully causes a
violation of any regulation under the general
recordkeeping requirement for US financial
institutions, where the violation is committed in
furtherance of the commission of any violation of
Federal law punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

DOJ

12 U.S.C.
§ 1957

Statutory Text

Whoever willfully violates any regulation under the
general recordkeeping requirement for U.S. financial
institutions shall be fined not more than $1,000,
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

Regulator

DOJ

Citation

12 U.S.C.
§ 1956

Any bank, or person, who participates in the
violation of this statute may be fined up to $25,000
for each day during which such violation

Any person who willfully refuses or fails to answer
a lawful inquiry or subpoena shall be fined under
Title 18, imprisoned up to a year, or both. Each
day during the refusal or failure to answer shall be
treated as a separate offense.

Where the violation is committed in furtherance of
the commission of any Federal felony, the potential
fine increases to $10,000 and the potential time of
imprisonment increases to 5 years.

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be subject to criminal penalties for
any willful violation of any regulation under the
general recordkeeping requirement for US
financial institutions. The CCO may be fined up
to $1,000, imprisoned for up to a year, or both.

372
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6:2

Citation

1), (a)(5),
(c)

Regulator

of the
Federal
Reserve
System, and
FDIC

(i) fails to make, submit, or publish such reports or
information as may be required under this chapter or
under regulations prescribed by the Board or the
Comptroller of the Currency under this chapter,
within the period of time specified by the agency; or

(A) maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
any inadvertent error and, unintentionally and as a
result of such error—

Any foreign bank, or any office or subsidiary of a
foreign bank, that—

(1) First tier

(c) Penalty for failure to make reports

For purposes of this section, the term “violate”
includes taking any action (alone or with others) for
or toward causing, bringing about, participating in,
counseling, or aiding or abetting a violation.

(5) “Violate” defined

Statutory Text

Any foreign bank, and any office or subsidiary of a
foreign bank, that violates, and any individual who
participates in a violation of, any provision of this
chapter, or any regulation prescribed or order issued
under this chapter, shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty
of not more than $25,000 for each day during which
such violation continues.
The Statute provides three tiers of violations and
penalties for violations for any foreign bank found
in violation of the statute.

Potential Impact on CCOs

continues. Violation is defined very broadly to
include aiding or abetting a violation.
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Citation
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(B) submits or publishes any false or misleading
report or information, in a manner not described in
paragraph (1) shall be subject to a penalty of not more
than $20,000 for each day during which such failure
continues or such false or misleading information is
not corrected.

(A) fails to make, submit, or publish such reports or
information as may be required under this chapter or
under regulations prescribed by the Board or the
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to this chapter,
within the time period specified by such agency; or

Any foreign bank, or any office or subsidiary of a
foreign bank, that--

(2) Second tier

(B) inadvertently transmits or publishes any report
that is minimally late, shall be subject to a penalty of
not more than $2,000 for each day during which such
failure continues or such false or misleading
information is not corrected. The foreign bank, or the
office or subsidiary of a foreign bank, shall have the
burden of proving that an error was inadvertent and
that a report was inadvertently transmitted or
published late.

Statutory Text

(ii) submits or publishes any false or misleading
report or information; or

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Statutory Text
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Section 1818(h) of this title shall apply to any
proceeding under this subsection.

(5) Hearing procedure

Any penalty imposed under paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
shall be assessed and collected by the Board or the
Comptroller of the Currency in the manner provided
in subsection (a)(2) of this section (for penalties
imposed under such subsection) and any such
assessment (including the determination of the
amount of the penalty) shall be subject to the
provisions of such subsection.

(4) Assessment of penalties

Notwithstanding paragraph (2), if any company
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the accuracy
of any information or report described in paragraph
(2) submits or publishes any false or misleading
report or information, the Board or the Comptroller of
the Currency may, in the Board's or Comptroller's
discretion, assess a penalty of not more than
$1,000,000 or 1 percent of total assets of such foreign
bank, or such office or subsidiary of a foreign bank,
whichever is less, per day for each day during which
such failure continues or such false or misleading
information is not corrected.

(3) Third tier
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CFPB

CFPB

12 U.S.C.
§ 5536(a)(
3)

12 U.S.C.
§ 5565(c)
in

court

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or
recklessly provide assistance to anyone in violation
to section 5531 of this title.

Potential Impact on CCOs

Any person who knowingly violates any provision
in this chapter or any regulation issued by the
appropriate Federal banking agency shall be
imprisoned not more than 5 years or fined not more
than $1,000,000 for each day during which a
violation continues, or both.

and The statute provides civil penalty amounts in three
tiers for any person in violation, through any act or
omission, of any provision of Federal consumer
(1) In general
financial law.
Any person that violates, through any act or omission,
Further, the statute provides mitigating factors:
any provision of Federal consumer financial law shall

(c) Civil money penalty
administrative actions

(3) any person to knowingly or recklessly provide
substantial assistance to a covered person or service
provider in violation of the provisions of section 5531
of this title, or any rule or order issued thereunder, and
notwithstanding any provision of this title, the
provider of such substantial assistance shall be
deemed to be in violation of that section to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided.

It shall be unlawful for--

a) In general

Regulator

Statutory Text

Whoever, with the intent to deceive, to gain
financially, or to cause financial gain or loss to any
person, knowingly violates any provision of this
chapter or any regulation or order issued by the
appropriate Federal banking agency under this
chapter shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years or
fined not more than $1,000,000 for each day during
which a violation continues, or both.

Comptroller
of Currency,
Board of
Governors
of the
Federal
Reserve
System, and
FDIC

Citation

12 U.S.C.
§ 3111
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Citation

Regulator
(B) the gravity of the violation or failure to pay;

Potential Impact on CCOs

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

In determining the amount of any penalty assessed
under paragraph (2), the Bureau or the court shall take

(3) Mitigating factors

Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), for any
person that knowingly violates a Federal consumer
financial law, a civil penalty may not exceed
$1,000,000 for each day during which such violation
continues.

(C) Third tier

Notwithstanding paragraph (A), for any person that
recklessly engages in a violation of a Federal
consumer financial law, a civil penalty may not
exceed $25,000 for each day during which such
violation continues.

(B) Second tier

(A) First tier

(C) the severity of the risks to or losses of the
consumer, which may take into account the
For any violation of a law, rule, or final order or
number of products or services sold or provided;
condition imposed in writing by the Bureau, a civil
penalty may not exceed $5,000 for each day during (D) the history of previous violations; and
which such violation or failure to pay continues.
(E) such other matters as justice may require.

(2) Penalty amounts

Statutory Text

forfeit and pay a civil penalty pursuant to this (A) the size of financial resources and good faith
subsection.
of the person charged;
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Citation

Regulator

No civil penalty may be assessed under this
subsection with respect to a violation of any Federal
consumer financial law, unless--

(5) Notice and hearing

The Bureau may compromise, modify, or remit any
penalty which may be assessed or had already been
assessed under paragraph (2). The amount of such
penalty, when finally determined, shall be exclusive
of any sums owed by the person to the United States
in connection with the costs of the proceeding, and
may be deducted from any sums owing by the United
States to the person charged.

(4) Authority to modify or remit penalty

(E) such other matters as justice may require.

(D) the history of previous violations; and

(C) the severity of the risks to or losses of the
consumer, which may take into account the number
of products or services sold or provided;

(B) the gravity of the violation or failure to pay;

(A) the size of financial resources and good faith of
the person charged;

Statutory Text

into account the appropriateness of the penalty with
respect to--

Potential Impact on CCOs
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CFPB

12 U.S.C.
§ 5566

DOJ

DOJ

15 U.S.C.
§2

15 U.S.C.
§ 24

Commerce & Trade

Regulator

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be held personally liable if the
company he or she works for violates this statute.
See Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass’n v. Tillamook
County Creamery Ass’n, 358 F.2d 115, 118
(stating that “individuals whom a corporation acts
and who shape its intentions can be held liable on
a charge of attempted monopolization”).

Whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal If a corporation has violated any antitrust laws and
provisions of the antitrust laws, such violation shall the CCO has authorized, ordered, or done any acts

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if
any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.

If the Bureau obtains evidence that any person, The CFPB must give any evidence of a violation to
domestic or foreign, has engaged in conduct that may the Attorney General of the United States.
constitute a violation of Federal criminal law, the
Bureau shall transmit such evidence to the Attorney
General of the United States, who may institute
criminal proceedings under appropriate law. Nothing
in this section affects any other authority of the
Bureau to disclose information.

(B) the appropriate court has ordered such assessment
and entered judgment in favor of the Bureau.

Statutory Text

(A) the Bureau gives notice and an opportunity for a
hearing to the person accused of the violation; or

2017
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Regulator

FTC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 50

Any person who shall willfully make, or cause to be
made, any false entry or statement of fact in any report
required to be made under this subchapter, or who
shall willfully make, or cause to be made, any false
entry in any account, record, or memorandum kept by

Any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and
testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce
any documentary evidence, if in his power to do so,
in obedience to an order of a district court of the
United States directing compliance with the subpoena
or lawful requirement of the Commission, shall be
guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a
court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or
by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.

Statutory Text

be deemed to be also that of the individual
directors, officers, or agents of such corporation
who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of
the acts constituting in whole or in part such
violation, and such violation shall be deemed a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor of any
such director, officer, or agent he shall be punished
by a fine of not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment
for not exceeding one year, or by both, in the
discretion of the court.
A CCO may be held liable for (1) refusing to attend
and testify to any lawful inquiry or to produce any
documentary evidence in his or her power, (2)
wilfully making any false entry or statement of fact
in any account, record, or memorandum kept by
the corporation, and/or (3) making public any
information obtained by the FTC without its
authority.

Potential Impact on CCOs

that constitute part of that violation, the CCO will
be found guilty of a misdemeanor. See United
States v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 202 F.
Supp. 639, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“The accepted
rule is that officers, directors and agents of a
corporation may be held criminally liable for their
acts although performed in their official capacity
but where they have neither actively participated in
nor directed nor authorized a violation of law by
their corporation they are not liable.”).
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Citation

Regulator

If any persons, partnership, or corporation required by
this subchapter to file any annual or special report
shall fail so to do within the time fixed by the
Commission for filing the same, and such failure shall
continue for thirty days after notice of such default,
the corporation shall forfeit to the United States the

Statutory Text

any person, partnership, or corporation subject to this
subchapter, or who shall willfully neglect or fail to
make, or to cause to be made, full, true, and correct
entries in such accounts, records, or memoranda of all
facts and transactions appertaining to the business of
such person, partnership, or corporation, or who shall
willfully remove out of the jurisdiction of the United
States, or willfully mutilate, alter, or by any other
means falsify any documentary evidence of such
person, partnership, or corporation, or who shall
willfully refuse to submit to the Commission or to any
of its authorized agents, for the purpose of inspection
and taking copies, any documentary evidence of such
person, partnership, or corporation in his possession
or within his control, shall be deemed guilty of an
offense against the United States, and shall be subject,
upon conviction in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction, to a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for
a term of not more than three years, or to both such
fine and imprisonment.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

SEC, DOJ

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 77x

Potential Impact on CCOs

Any person who willfully violates any of the A CCO who willfully violates any securities law or
provisions of this subchapter, or the rules and regulation may be held criminally liable. See

Any officer or employee of the Commission who
shall make public any information obtained by the
Commission without its authority, unless directed by
a court, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.

Statutory Text

sum of $100 for each and every day of the
continuance of such failure, which forfeiture shall be
payable into the Treasury of the United States, and
shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the
United States brought in the case of a corporation or
partnership in the district where the corporation or
partnership has its principal office or in any district in
which it shall do business, and in the case of any
person in the district where such person resides or has
his principal place of business. It shall be the duty of
the various United States attorneys, under the
direction of the Attorney General of the United States,
to prosecute for the recovery of the forfeitures. The
costs and expenses of such prosecution shall be paid
out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts
of the United States.

382
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 77d-1(c)

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

(B) Liability

security in a transaction exempted by the provisions
of section 77d(6) of this title may bring an action
against an issuer described in paragraph (2), either at
law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if such person no longer
owns the security.

Potential Impact on CCOs

United States v. Szur, No. S5 97 CR 108 (JGK),
1998 WL 132942 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998)
(explaining that a compliance officer was charged
in a twenty-eight count indictment under 15 U.S.C
§ 77x and other securities laws for conspiring to
commit securities fraud).

(c) Liability for material misstatements and Any person who purchases a security may bring an
action against an issuer. The term issuer includes
omissions
any person who is a director and principal
(1) Actions authorized
executive officer or officer. Thus, a person could
(A) In general
potentially bring an action against a CCO because
Subject to paragraph (2), a person who purchases a of the CCO’s role as an officer.

Statutory Text

regulations promulgated by the Commission under
authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a
registration statement filed under this subchapter,
makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state any material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
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Citation

Regulator

(3) Definition

(B) does not sustain the burden of proof that such
issuer did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission.

(A) by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by any means of any
written or oral communication, in the offering or sale
of a security in a transaction exempted by the
provisions of section 77d(6) of this title, makes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact required to be stated or necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, provided that the purchaser did not know
of such untruth or omission; and

An issuer shall be liable in an action under paragraph
(1), if the issuer--

(2) Applicability

Statutory Text

An action brought under this paragraph shall be
subject to the provisions of section 77l (b) of this title
and section 77m of this title, as if the liability were
created under section 77l (a)(2) of this title.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 77h-1(a)

Potential Impact on CCOs

Authority of the Commission. If the Commission The SEC may enter a cease and desist order against
finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that a CCO if it finds that the CCO has violated or is
any person is violating, has violated, or is about to violating and securities rule or regulation.
violate any provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et
seq.], or any rule or regulation thereunder, the
Commission may publish its findings and enter an
order requiring such person, and any other person that
is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an
act or omission the person knew or should have
known would contribute to such violation, to cease
and desist from committing or causing such violation
and any future violation of the same provision, rule,
or regulation. Such order may, in addition to requiring
a person to cease and desist from committing or
causing a violation, require such person to comply, or
to take steps to effect compliance, with such
provision, rule, or regulation, upon such terms and

Statutory Text

As used in this subsection, the term “issuer” includes
any person who is a director or partner of the issuer,
and the principal executive officer or officers,
principal financial officer, and controller or principal
accounting officer of the issuer (and any person
occupying a similar status or performing a similar
function) that offers or sells a security in a transaction
exempted by the provisions of section 77d(6) of this
title and any person who offers or sells the security in
such offering.

2017
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a)

Potential Impact on CCOs

Every person who acquires a security burdened by
an untrue statement or omission of material fact
may sue every director and officer of the offeror.
This statute applies to misleading statements made
by one “whose profession gives authority to
statements made by him.” In re Am. Cont'l
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992). An attorney
who provides a legal opinion used in connection
with an SEC registration statement is an expert
within this statute and therefore can be held liable.
(1) every person who signed the registration
Id. Thus, a CCO may be held liable for any untrue
statement;
statements or any omissions of material facts in
(2) every person who was a director of (or person connection with a registration statement.
performing similar functions) or partner in, the
issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his
liability is asserted;

Persons possessing cause of action; persons liable. In
case any part of the registration statement, when such
part became effective, contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the
time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court
of competent jurisdiction, sue—

Statutory Text

conditions and within such time as the Commission
may specify in such order. Any such order may, as the
Commission deems appropriate, require future
compliance or steps to effect future compliance,
either permanently or for such period of time as the
Commission may specify, with such provision, rule,
or regulation with respect to any security, any issuer,
or any other person.
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Citation

Regulator

(5) every underwriter with respect to such
security. If such person acquired the security after
the issuer has made generally available to its
security holders an earning statement covering a
period of at least twelve months beginning after
the effective date of the registration statement,
then the right of recovery under this subsection
shall be conditioned on proof that such person
acquired the security relying upon such untrue
statement in the registration statement or relying
upon the registration statement and not knowing

(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or
any person whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has with his consent
been named as having prepared or certified any
part of the registration statement, or as having
prepared or certified any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registration
statement, with respect to the statement, in such
registration statement, report, or valuation, which
purports to have been prepared or certified by
him;

Statutory Text

(3) every person who, with his consent, is named
in the registration statement as being or about to
become a director, person performing similar
functions, or partner;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Action for injunction or criminal prosecution in The SEC may bring a case against a CCO if it finds
district court. Whenever it shall appear to the that the CCO is engaged in or about to engage in
Commission that any person is engaged or about to acts that violate securities laws or regulations.
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title
[15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.], or of any rule or regulation
prescribed under authority thereof, the Commission
may, in its discretion, bring an action in any district

SEC

15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b)

A CCO may be held liable if the CCO is a
“controlling person” in that he or she has “actual
power or influence” over a controlled person.
Durham v. Kelly, 810 F.2d 1500, 1503-04 (9th Cir.
1987); see also Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746
F. Supp. 1264, 1281-82 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding a
controlling person has “direct or indirect power
over management or policies of a person and is a
“culpable participant” in the fraud perpetrated by
the controlled person); Babst v. Morgan Keegan &
Co., 687 F. Supp. 255, 262 (E.D. La. 1988) (“[O]ne
who has the power to direct the management and
policies of a person held liable under the securities
laws may also be held liable as a controlling
person.”).

Controlling persons. Every person who, by or through
stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under section 11 or 12 [15
USCS § 77k or 77l], shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged
to exist.

SEC

Potential Impact on CCOs

15 U.S.C.
§ 77o(a)

Statutory Text

of such omission, but such reliance may be
established without proof of the reading of the
registration statement by such person.

Regulator

Citation
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 77x

Potential Impact on CCOs

Any person who wilfully violates any of the A CCO who wilfully violates any securities law or
provisions of this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.], or regulation may face criminal liability.
the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof, or any person
who wilfully, in a registration statement filed under
this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.], makes any untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, shall
upon conviction be fined not more than $ 10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Statutory Text

court of the United States, or United States court of
any Territory, to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond. The Commission may transmit such
evidence as may be available concerning such acts or
practices to the Attorney General who may, in his
discretion, institute the necessary criminal
proceedings under this title [15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.].
Any such criminal proceeding may be brought either
in the district wherein the transmittal of the
prospectus or security complained of begins, or in the
district wherein such prospectus or security is
received.

2017
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Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78c-3(j)

Regulator

SEC

(i) compliance office review;

(E) establish procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues identified by the
compliance officer through any—

(D) ensure compliance with this title [15 USCS
§§ 78a et seq.] (including regulations issued
under this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.])
relating to agreements, contracts, or
transactions, including each rule prescribed by
the Commission under this section;

(C) be responsible for administering each policy
and procedure that is required to be established
pursuant to this section;

(B) in consultation with its board, a body
performing a function similar thereto, or the
senior officer of the registered clearing agency,
resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise;

(A) report directly to the board or to the senior
officer of the clearing agency;

(2) Duties. The chief compliance officer shall—

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

Designation of chief compliance officer. (1) In A CCO may be held liable for failing to supervise.
general. Each registered clearing agency shall
designate an individual to serve as a chief compliance
officer.
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78j

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered,

(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to
security futures products.

Any person, including a CCO, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement , or omission, on which a purchaser
or seller of securities relies may be liable for
securities fraud as a primary violator. In re Charter
(a)(1) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any
Communications, Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir.
stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or
sale, of any security other than a government security, 2006); see also SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758
(charging a CCO under 10b-5).
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange—

(F) establish and follow appropriate procedures
for the handling, management response,
remediation, retesting, and closing of
noncompliance issues.

(v) validated complaint; and

(iv) self-reported error; or

(iii) internal or external audit finding;

Statutory Text

(ii) look-back;
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Citation

Regulator

Rules promulgated under subsection (b) of this
section that prohibit fraud, manipulation, or insider
trading (but not rules imposing or specifying
reporting or recordkeeping requirements, procedures,

(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) may be construed to
limit the authority of the appropriate Federal banking
agency (as defined in section 1813(q) of Title 12), the
National Credit Union Administration, or any other
Federal department or agency having a responsibility
under Federal law to prescribe rules or regulations
restricting transactions involving the loan or
borrowing of securities in order to protect the safety
and soundness of a financial institution or to protect
the financial system from systemic risk.

(c)(1) To effect, accept, or facilitate a transaction
involving the loan or borrowing of securities in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.

Statutory Text

or any securities-based swap agreement any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

15 U.S.C. SEC
§§ 78t(a)(c), and (e)

Citation

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any
person liable under any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable (including to the
Commission in any action brought under paragraph
(1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title), unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.

(a) Joint and several liability; good faith defense

Statutory Text

or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud,
manipulation, or insider trading), and judicial
precedents decided under subsection (b) of this
section and rules promulgated thereunder that
prohibit fraud, manipulation, or insider trading, shall
apply to security-based swap agreements to the same
extent as they apply to securities. Judicial precedents
decided under section 77q(a) of this title and sections
78i, 78o, 78p, 78t, and 78u-1of this title, and judicial
precedents decided under applicable rules
promulgated under such sections, shall apply to
security-based swap agreements to the same extent as
they apply to securities.
A CCO may be held liable as a controlling person
if any person under his or her control violates a
securities law or regulation. “Controlling” means
“possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person.” Poptech, L.P. v.
Stewardship Credit Arbitrage Fund, LLC, 792 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Conn. 2011). However, officers
are not liable under this statute absent an
underlying securities violation. In re Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation
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For purposes of any action brought by the
Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of section
78u(d) of this title, any person that knowingly or
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or
of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter,
shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision

(e) Prosecution of persons who aid and abet
violations

It shall be unlawful for any director or officer of, or
any owner of any securities issued by, any issuer
required to file any document, report, or information
under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder
without just cause to hinder, delay, or obstruct the
making or filing of any such document, report, or
information….

(c) Hindering, delaying, or obstructing the making
or filing of any document, report, or information

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be
unlawful for such person to do under the provisions
of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder
through or by means of any other person.

Statutory Text

(b) Unlawful activity through or by means of any
other person

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

15 U.S.C. SEC
§ 78u(d)(2)
-(3)

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person has violated any provision of this chapter, the

(2) Authority of court to prohibit persons from If the SEC finds that a CCO violates the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws, it can impose a
serving as officers and directors
fine on the CCO and/or enjoin, temporarily or
In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this
permanently, that CCO from serving as an officer
subsection, the court may prohibit, conditionally or
or director of any public company. See SEC v.
unconditionally, and permanently or for such period
Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995)
of time as it shall determine, any person who violated
(determining that a lifetime injunction enjoining a
section 78j(b) of this title or the rules or regulations
vice president of a pharmaceutical company from
thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any
serving as an officer or director of any public
issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant
company was not warranted after considering the
to section 78l of this title or that is required to file
following six factors: “(1) the ‘egregiousness' of
reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title if the
the underlying securities law violation; (2) the
person's conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an
defendant's ‘repeat offender’ status; (3) the
officer or director of any such issuer.
defendant's ‘role’ or position when he engaged in
the fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5)
(3) Money penalties in civil actions
the defendant's economic stake in the violation;
(A) Authority of Commission
and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur”).

The authority of the Commission under this section
with respect to security-based swap agreements shall
be subject to the restrictions and limitations of section
78c-1(b) of this title.

(f) Limitation on Commission authority

Statutory Text

to the same extent as the person to whom such
assistance is provided.
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Citation

Regulator

Notwithstanding clause (i), the amount of penalty for
each such violation shall not exceed the greater of (I)
$50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any other
person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to
such defendant as a result of the violation, if the
violation described in subparagraph (A) involved

(ii) Second tier

The amount of the penalty shall be determined by the
court in light of the facts and circumstances. For each
violation, the amount of the penalty shall not exceed
the greater of (I) $5,000 for a natural person or
$50,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount
of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the
violation.

(i) First tier

(B) Amount of penalty

Statutory Text

rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist
order entered by the Commission pursuant to section
78u-3 of this title, other than by committing a
violation subject to a penalty pursuant to section 78u1 of this title, the Commission may bring an action in
a United States district court to seek, and the court
shall have jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper
showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who
committed such violation.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§§ 78u1(a)(3)-(b)

The amount of the penalty which may be imposed on
any person who, at the time of the violation, directly
or indirectly controlled the person who committed
such violation, shall be determined by the court in
light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not
exceed the greater of $1,000,000, or three times the
amount of the profit gained or loss avoided as a result
of such controlled person's violation. If such
controlled person's violation was a violation by

(a)(3) Amount of penalty for controlling person

(bb) such violation directly or indirectly resulted in
substantial losses or created a significant risk of
substantial losses to other persons.

(aa) the violation described in subparagraph (A)
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; and

Notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), the amount of
penalty for each such violation shall not exceed the
greater of (I) $100,000 for a natural person or
$500,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross
amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result
of the violation, if—

(iii) Third tier

Statutory Text

fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless
disregard of a regulatory requirement.

A CCO may be liable for the actions of those he or
she controls if (1) the CCO recklessly disregarded
the fact that the controlled person was likely to
engage in the acts and failed to take appropriate
steps to prevent the act or (2) if the CCO
knowingly or recklessly failed to establish,
maintain, or enforce any policy or procedure
required under 78o(f). See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f)
(establishing that the SEC may require any
member of a national securities exchange or any

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-2

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Commission authority to assess money A CCO may be liable under this statute if he or she
wilfully aided, abetted, or counseled any other
penalties.
person in violating the securities laws.

(B) such controlling person knowingly or recklessly
failed to establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or
procedure required under section 78o(f) of this title or
section 80b-4a of this title and such failure
substantially contributed to or permitted the
occurrence of the act or acts constituting the violation.

(A) such controlling person knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that such controlled person was
likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the
violation and failed to take appropriate steps to
prevent such act or acts before they occurred; or

No controlling person shall be subject to a penalty
under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section unless the
Commission establishes that —

(1) Liability of controlling persons

(b) Limitations on liability

Statutory Text

communication, the profit gained or loss avoided as a person associated with any such member to
result of the violation shall, for purposes of this comply with the securities laws and regulations).
paragraph only, be deemed to be limited to the profit
gained or loss avoided by the person or persons to
whom the controlled person directed such
communication.
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Additionally, a CCO may be liable if he or she fails
to reasonably supervise another person who
violates any securities statute, rule, and regulation,
if that other person was subject to the CCO’s
supervision. A CCO will be found to have
reasonably supervised another person if:

(C) has willfully made or caused to be made in
any application for registration or report
required to be filed with the Commission or
with any other appropriate regulatory agency
under this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or in
any proceeding before the Commission with

(i) there have been established procedures, and a
system for applying such procedures, which would
reasonably be expected to prevent and detect,
(A) has willfully violated any provision of the
insofar as practicable, any such violation by such
Securities Act of 1933 [15 USCS §§ 77a et
other person, and
seq.], the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15
USCS §§ 80a-1 et seq.], the Investment
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the
Advisers Act of 1940 [15 USCS §§ 80b-1 et
duties and obligations incumbent upon him by
seq.], or this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or
reason of such procedures and system without
the rules or regulations thereunder, or the rules
reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board;
and system were not being complied with.
(B) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
commanded, induced, or procured such a
violation by any other person;

Statutory Text

(1) In general. In any proceeding instituted
pursuant to sections 15(b)(4), 15(b)(6), 15D,
15B, 15C, 15E, or 17A of this title [15 USCS
§ 78o(b)(4), (6), 78o-6, 78o-4, 78o-5, 78o-7, or
78q-1] against any person, the Commission or the
appropriate regulatory agency may impose a civil
penalty if it finds, on the record after notice and
opportunity for hearing, that such penalty is in the
public interest and that such person—
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Citation

Regulator

(A) is violating or has violated any provision of
this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or any rule
or regulation issued under this title [15 USCS
§§ 78a et seq.]; or

(2) Cease-and-desist proceedings. In any
proceeding instituted under section 21C [15
USCS § 78u-3] against any person, the
Commission may impose a civil penalty, if the
Commission finds, on the record after notice and
opportunity for hearing, that such person—

(D) has failed reasonably to supervise, within
the meaning of section 15(b)(4)(E) of this title
[15 USCS § 78o(b)(4)(E)], with a view to
preventing violations of the provisions of such
statutes, rules and regulations, another person
who commits such a violation, if such other
person is subject to his supervision;[.]

Statutory Text

respect to registration, any statement which
was, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false
or misleading with respect to any material fact,
or has omitted to state in any such application
or report any material fact which is required to
be stated therein; or

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(A) the act or omission described in subsection
(a) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or

(3) Third tier. Notwithstanding paragraphs (1)
and (2), the maximum amount of penalty for each
such act or omission shall be $ 100,000 for a
natural person or $ 500,000 for any other person
if—

(2) Second tier. Notwithstanding paragraph (1),
the maximum amount of penalty for each such act
or omission shall be $ 50,000 for a natural person
or $ 250,000 for any other person if the act or
omission described in subsection (a) involved
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.

(a) shall be $ 5,000 for a natural person or $
50,000 for any other person.

(1) First tier. The maximum amount of penalty
for each act or omission described in subsection

(b) Maximum amount of penalty.

Statutory Text

(B) is or was a cause of the violation of any
provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.],
or any rule or regulation issued under this title
[15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.].

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(4) whether such person previously has been
found by the Commission, another appropriate
regulatory agency, or a self-regulatory
organization to have violated the Federal

(3) the extent to which any person was unjustly
enriched, taking into account any restitution
made to persons injured by such behavior;

(2) the harm to other persons resulting either
directly or indirectly from such act or omission;

(1) whether the act or omission for which such
penalty is assessed involved fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard
of a regulatory requirement;

(c) Determination of public interest. In considering
under this section whether a penalty is in the public
interest, the Commission or the appropriate
regulatory agency may consider—

(B) such act or omission directly or indirectly
resulted in substantial losses or created a
significant risk of substantial losses to other
persons or resulted in substantial pecuniary
gain to the person who committed the act or
omission.

Statutory Text

deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(d) Evidence concerning ability to pay. In any
proceeding in which the Commission or the
appropriate regulatory agency may impose a penalty
under this section, a respondent may present evidence
of the respondent's ability to pay such penalty. The
Commission or the appropriate regulatory agency
may, in its discretion, consider such evidence in
determining whether such penalty is in the public
interest. Such evidence may relate to the extent of
such person's ability to continue in business and the
collectability of a penalty, taking into account any
other claims of the United States or third parties upon

(6) such other matters as justice may require.

(5) the need to deter such person and other
persons from committing such acts or omissions;
and

securities laws, State securities laws, or the rules
of a self-regulatory organization, has been
enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction
from violations of such laws or rules, or has been
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of
violations of such laws or of any felony or
misdemeanor described in section 15(b)(4)(B) of
this title [15 USCS § 78o(b)(4)(B)];

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs
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SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-3(a)

If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, that any person is violating, has violated,
or is about to violate any provision of this title [15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or any rule or regulation
thereunder, the Commission may publish its findings
and enter an order requiring such person, and any
other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the
violation, due to an act or omission the person knew
or should have known would contribute to such
violation, to cease and desist from committing or
causing such violation and any future violation of the
same provision, rule, or regulation. Such order may,
in addition to requiring a person to cease and desist

(e) Authority to enter an order requiring an
accounting and disgorgement. In any proceeding in
which the Commission or the appropriate regulatory
agency may impose a penalty under this section, the
Commission or the appropriate regulatory agency
may enter an order requiring accounting and
disgorgement, including reasonable interest. The
Commission is authorized to adopt rules, regulations,
and orders concerning payments to investors, rates of
interest, periods of accrual, and such other matters as
it deems appropriate to implement this subsection.

Statutory Text

such person's assets and the amount of such person's
assets.

If the SEC finds a CCO is violating, has violated,
or is about to violate any securities law, rule, or
regulation, it may enter an order requiring the CCO
to cease and desist from committing or causing
such violation and any future violation.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78u6(h)(1)(A)

Potential Impact on CCOs

(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of

(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;

If a CCO blows the whistle on corporate
misconduct, this statute provides protection for
(1) Prohibition against retaliation
that CCO. It reduces the consequences of reporting
(A) In general
to the SEC in that it prohibits employers from
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, or
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other discriminating in any way against any
manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the whistleblower.
terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the whistleblower—

(h) Protection of whistleblowers

Statutory Text

from committing or causing a violation, require such
person to comply, or to take steps to effect
compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation,
upon such terms and conditions and within such time
as the Commission may specify in such order. Any
such order may, as the Commission deems
appropriate, require future compliance or steps to
effect future compliance, either permanently or for
such period of time as the Commission may specify,
with such provision, rule, or regulation with respect
to any security, any issuer, or any other person.
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff

(a) Willful violations; false and misleading
statements. Any person who willfully violates any
provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.] (other
than section 30A [15 USCS § 78dd-1]), or any rule or
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
unlawful or the observance of which is required under
the terms of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or any
person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes
to be made, any statement in any application, report,
or document required to be filed under this title [15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.] or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a
registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of
section 15 of this title [15 USCS § 78o(d)], or by any
self-regulatory organization in connection with an
application for membership or participation therein or
to become associated with a member thereof, which
statement was false or misleading with respect to any

(iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15
U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section
78j-1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and
any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.

Statutory Text

the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or

A CCO may be held liable if he or she (1) willfully
violates any provision in the chapter or (2)
willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be
made, any false or misleading statement of
material fact in any document required to be filed.
The CCO may be subject to a maximum civil
penalty of $10,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(c) Violations by issuers, officers, directors,
stockholders, employees, or agents of issuers. (1) (A)
Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of
section 30A [15 USCS § 78dd-1] shall be fined not
more than $ 2,000,000. (B) Any issuer that violates

(b) Failure to file information, documents, or reports.
Any issuer which fails to file information, documents,
or reports required to be filed under subsection (d) of
section 15 of this title [15 USCS § 78o(d)] or any rule
or regulation thereunder shall forfeit to the United
States the sum of $ 100 for each and every day such
failure to file shall continue. Such forfeiture, which
shall be in lieu of any criminal penalty for such failure
to file which might be deemed to arise under
subsection (a) of this section, shall be payable to the
Treasury of the United States and shall be recoverable
in a civil suit in the name of the United States.

Statutory Text

material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $ 5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both, except that when such person is a
person other than a natural person, a fine not
exceeding $ 25,000,000 may be imposed; but no
person shall be subject to imprisonment under this
section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he
proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

15 U.S.C. SEC
§ 80a-35(a)

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Civil actions by Commission; jurisdiction; The SEC may bring an action against a CCO if the
CCO has engaged within five years of the
allegations; injunctive or other relief
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in commencement of the action or is about to engage
in any act or practice constituting a breach of
the proper district court of the United States, or in the
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in
United States court of any territory or other place
respect of any registered investment company.
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
alleging that a person who is, or at the time of the

(2) (A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an
issuer, or stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer,
who willfully violates subsection (a) or (g) of section
30A of this title [15 USCS § 78dd-1] shall be fined
not more than $ 100,000, or imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both. (B) Any officer, director, employee,
or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on behalf
of such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or (g) of
section 30A of this title [15 USCS § 78dd-1] shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $ 10,000
imposed in an action brought by the Commission. (3)
Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon
any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder
of an issuer, such fine may not be paid, directly or
indirectly, by such issuer.

Statutory Text

subsection (a) or (g) of section 30A [15 USCS
§ 78dd-1] shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
more than $ 10,000 imposed in an action brought by
the Commission.
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Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-47

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be held liable if he or she knowingly
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or or recklessly provides substantial assistance to
indirectly, to cause to be done any act or thing through

(a) Procurement

If such allegations are established, the court may
enjoin such persons from acting in any or all such
capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such
person as may be reasonable and appropriate in the
circumstances, having due regard to the protection of
investors and to the effectuation of the policies
declared in section 80a-1(b) of this title.

(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered
company is an open-end company, unit investment
trust, or face-amount certificate company.

(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory
board, investment adviser, or depositor; or

Statutory Text

alleged misconduct was, serving or acting in one or
more of the following capacities has engaged within
five years of the commencement of the action or is
about to engage in any act or practice constituting a
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct in respect of any registered investment
company for which such person so serves or acts, or
at the time of the alleged misconduct, so served or
acted—
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15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-48

Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this subchapter or of any rule, regulation, or order
hereunder, or any person who willfully in any
registration statement, application, report, account,

It shall be unlawful for any person without just cause
to hinder, delay, or obstruct the making, filing, or
keeping of any information, document, report, record,
or account required to be made, filed, or kept under
any provision of this subchapter or any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder.

(c) Obstructing compliance

For purposes of any action brought by the
Commission under subsection (d) or (e) of section
80a-41 of this title, any person that knowingly or
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this subchapter,
or of any rule or regulation issued under this
subchapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided.

(b) Substantially assisting a violation

Statutory Text

A CCO may be held liable if he or she wilfully
violates any securities law, rule, or regulation or
wilfully in any registration statement, application,
report, account record, or other document filed or

Potential Impact on CCOs

or by means of any other person which it would be another person in violation of the securities laws or
unlawful for such person to do under the provisions regulations.
of this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder.
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SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(f)

A CCO may be barred or suspended from
associating with an investment adviser, broker,
dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal
advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized
statistical rating organization if the CCO willfully
made a false or misleading statement in an
application for registration or report, or violated
any of the major securities acts or the rules or
regulations thereunder, or willfully assisted or
caused another person to do the same.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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To do this the SEC must find, on the record after
notice and opportunity for hearing, that such censure,

The SEC, by order, shall censure or place
limitations on the activities of any person
associated, seeking to become associated, or, at the
time of the alleged misconduct, associated or seeking
to become associated with an investment adviser, or
suspend for a period not exceeding 12 months or bar
any such person from being associated with an
investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal
securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or
nationally recognized statistical rating organization.

Bar or Suspension

Statutory Text

record, or other document filed or transmitted transmitted to the SEC makes an untrue statement
pursuant to this subchapter or the keeping of which is of a material fact or omits any material fact.
required pursuant to section 80a-30(a) of this title
makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to prevent
the statements made therein from being materially
misleading in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, shall upon conviction be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both; but no person shall be convicted
under this section for the violation of any rule,
regulation, or order if he proves that he had no actual
knowledge of such rule, regulation, or order.

2017
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Citation

Regulator

4.

3.

2.

1.

willfully made a false or misleading
statement in an application for registration or
report;
has willfully violated any provision of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the Commodity
Exchange Act, or the rules or regulations
under any such statutes or any rule of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board;
has willfully aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, or procured the
violation by any other person of any of the
above provisions or has failed reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of the provisions of such statutes,
rules, and regulations, another person who
commits such a violation;
been found by a foreign financial regulatory
authority to have committed any of the
violations list above or violated any foreign
statute or regulation regarding securities or
commodities transactions;

Statutory Text

placing of limitations, suspension, or bar is in the
public interest and that such person has committed or
omitted any of the following acts or omissions:

Potential Impact on CCOs
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4.

3.

2.

1.

involving the purchase or sale of a security,
taking a false oath, or making a false report,
bribery, perjury, burglary, or any
substantially similar activity;
arising out of the conduct of the business of
a broker, dealer, investment adviser, bank,
insurance company, or other financial
professional;
involving the larceny, theft, robbery,
extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent
concealment, embezzlement, fraudulent
conversion, or misappropriation of funds or
securities;
involving fraud, use of a fictitious name,
counterfeiting, forgery, or false statements.

Statutory Text

is subject to a final order of a State securities,
banking, or insurance regulator that bars
such person from association with a
regulated entity or is based on a violation of
any law or regulation prohibiting fraudulent,
manipulative or deceptive conduct.
Or, within ten years of the commencement of the
proceedings, has been convicted of any crime
punishable by 1 or more years in prison or any
crime:

5.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(i)

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be subject to monetary penalties
(which cannot be reimbursed by the financial
(A) First tier
institution) for willfully violating any provision of
The maximum amount of penalty for each act or the 33, 34 and Investment Company Acts or the
omission described to the left shall be $7,500 for a rules and regulations thereunder, or directing or
natural person or $80,000 for any other person.
helping another to violate those laws, or willfully
making a false statement in an application for
(B) Second tier
registration, or failing to reasonably supervise.
Notwithstanding [the first tier], the maximum amount
of penalty for each such act or omission shall be Additional Comments
$80,000 for a natural person or $400,000 for any other 1. The SEC does not have a mechanical formula
person if the act or omission described in paragraph for assessing CMPs aside from the statute. The
D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction to hear petitions to

Civil Monetary Penalty - Maximum amount

It is unlawful for any person as to whom such an order
suspending or barring him from being associated with
an investment adviser is in effect willfully to become,
or to be, associated with an investment adviser
without the consent of the SEC. Also, it is unlawful
for any investment adviser to permit such a person to
become, or remain, a person associated with him
without the consent of the SEC, if such investment
adviser knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, of such order.

Statutory Text

Or, is enjoined by order from acting as an investment
adviser, underwriter, broker, dealer, or other financial
professional.
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Statutory Text

3. In 2015, the SEC charged the CCO of
BlackRock Advisors LLC, an investment adviser,
with causing the firms compliance-related
violations for failing to implement compliance
policies and procedures reasonably designed to
prevent violations of the Advisers Act and its rules
concerning the outside activities of BlackRock’s

Potential Impact on CCOs

(1) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate review SEC disciplinary actions and in 2012
or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.
criticized the SEC for “not provid[ing] a consistent
interpretation of the Rule nor justified the apparent
(C) Third tier
inconsistency of its application.” Rapoport v.
Notwithstanding[the first or second tiers], the S.E.C., 682 F.3d 98, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
maximum amount of penalty for each such act or
omission shall be $160,000 for a natural person or 2. In 2010, as part of an SEC enforcement action
against the general counsel for a brokerage
$775,000 for any other person if—
and investment bank, an ALJ found that the
(i) the act or omission described to the left general counsel was a supervisor for purposes of
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or § 80b-3. The case against the general counsel was
deliberate or reckless disregard of a dismissed because the ALJ found that the general
regulatory requirement; and
counsel did not fail to exercise that supervision
(ii) such act or omission directly or reasonably. Arguably, this case opened the door
indirectly resulted in substantial losses or to compliance officers and general counsel
created a significant risk of substantial losses being labeled as "supervisors." See Admin.
to other persons or resulted in substantial Proc. File No. 3-13655, Initial Decision Rel.
pecuniary gain to the person who committed No. 402 (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/20
the act or omission.
10/id402bpm.pdf.
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Regulator

SEC

Citation

15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(k)

4. Also in 2015, the SEC charged the CCO of SFX
Financial Advisory Management Enterprises Inc.,
an investment adviser, with failing to implement
compliance policies and procedures that should
have detected an alleged misappropriation of client
assets by an executive at the firm and with
responsibility for material misstatements in certain
firm filings. The CCO agreed to pay a $25,000
penalty. See In re: SFX Financial Advisory
Management, et. al, SEC Rel. No IA-4166 (June
15, 2015) available at
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia4116.pdf.

Potential Impact on CCOs

employees, including how they should be assessed
and monitored for conflicts purposes, and when
conflicts of interest should be disclosed to
BlackRock fund’s boards and advisory clients. The
CCO agreed to pay a $60,000 penalty. See In re:
BlackRock Advisors LLC, et al., SEC Rel. No. IA4065 (Apr. 20, 2015) available at
https://ww
w.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf.

Any violation of the Investment Advisors Act (or
regulations thereunder), may result in a cease-andIf the SEC finds, after notice and opportunity for a
desist order.
hearing with the SEC, that any person is, has, or is
about to violate any provision of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, or any rule or regulation

Cease and Desist

Statutory Text
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18 U.S.C.
§2

Criminal

Citation

DOJ

Regulator

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United If a CCO aids, abets, counsels, commands,
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or induces, or procures the commission of an act is as
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. responsible for the act as if he committed it
directly. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which
if directly performed by him or another would be an 613, 618 (1949).This statute does not establish a
offense against the United States, is punishable as a separate crime, but rather merely permits one who
aids and abets the commission of a crime to be
principal.
punished as a principal. United States v. Walser, 3
F.3d 380, 388 (11th Cir. 1993). The standard test
for determining guilt by aiding and abetting is to

Such order may also require such person to comply,
or to take steps to effect compliance, with such
provision, rule, or regulation, upon the terms and
conditions as the SEC may specify. Any such order
may, as the SEC deems appropriate, require future
compliance or steps to effect future compliance,
either permanently or for such period of time as the
SEC may specify, with such provision, rule, or
regulation with respect to any security, any issuer, or
any other person

Statutory Text

thereunder, the SEC may publish its findings and
enter an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and
any future violation of the same provision, rule, or
regulation.
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A CCO may be charged as an accessory after the
fact if he or she knows that an offense has been
committed and “receives, relieves, comforts or
assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his
apprehension.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. Actual knowledge
Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of that the CCO knew that an offense occurred may
be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence.
Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be
United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1051
imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum
(9th Cir. 1983).
term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section
3571) fined not more than one-half the maximum fine
prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or
both; or if the principal is punishable by life
imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be
imprisoned not more than 15 years.

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each

DOJ

18 U.S.C.
§ 371

If a CCO is a part of a conspiracy to defraud the
United States or any U.S. agency, and any party of
the conspiracy does any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, the CCO may be liable. A
conspiracy exists where there is an agreement
between two or more people to violate a law, one

Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United
States has been committed, receives, relieves,
comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or
prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an
accessory after the fact.

DOJ

Potential Impact on CCOs

determine (1) whether a substantive offense was
committed, (2) whether the principal contributed to
and furthered the offense, and (3) whether the
principal intended to aid in the crime's
commission. United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d
1152, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).

18 U.S.C.
§3

Statutory Text

Regulator

Citation
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Regulator

DOJ

DOJ &
FDIC

Citation

18 U.S.C.
§ 551

18 U.S.C.
§ 657

Whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of or
connected in any capacity with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union
Administration, any Federal home loan bank, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Farm Credit
Administration, Department of Housing and Urban

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.

Statutory Text

This statute makes it illegal for officers of any
lending, credit, and insurance institution to
embezzle or wilfully misapply money or other
things of value from such an institution.

Potential Impact on CCOs

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more conspirator commits an overt act in furtherance of
than five years, or both.
the agreement, and the conspirators knew of the
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is conspiracy and voluntarily participated in it.
the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, $/#*%& '*.*%, (+ ".)0!/%-, 17 F.3d 745, 768
the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed (5th Cir. 1994). An “overt act” is defined
the maximum punishment provided for such as an “outward act done in pursuance of
crime and a
misdemeanor.
manifestation of an intent or
toward accomplishment of
design, looking
crime.” Chavez v. United States, 275 F.2d 813,
817 (9th Cir. 1960).
Whoever willfully conceals or destroys any invoice, This statute imposes liability for any willful
book, or paper relating to any merchandise imported concealment or destruction of any invoice, book,
into the United States, after an inspection thereof has or paper relating to merchandise imported into the
been demanded by the collector of any collection United States after an inspection has been
district; or
demanded by the collector of any collection
district.
Whoever conceals or destroys at any time any such
invoice, book, or paper for the purpose of suppressing
any evidence of fraud therein contained—
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Citation

Regulator

Statutory Text

Development, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,
the Secretary of Agriculture acting through the
Farmers Home Administration or successor agency,
the Rural Development Administration or successor
agency or the Farm Credit System Insurance
Corporation, a Farm Credit Bank, a bank for
cooperatives or any lending, mortgage, insurance,
credit or savings and loan corporation or association
authorized or acting under the laws of the United
States or any institution, other than an insured bank
(as defined in section 656), the accounts of which are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
or by the National Credit Union Administration
Board or any small business investment company, or
any community development financial institution
receiving financial assistance under the Riegle
Community
Development
and
Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, and whoever, being a
receiver of any such institution, or agent or employee
of the receiver, embezzles, abstracts, purloins or
willfully misapplies any moneys, funds, credits,
securities or other things of value belonging to such
institution, or pledged or otherwise intrusted to its
care, shall be fined not more than $ 1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both; but if the
amount or value embezzled, abstracted, purloined or
misapplied does not exceed $ 1,000, he shall be fined

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(c) An indictment or information for violation of this
section alleging that, in any proceedings before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made

(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct
occurred within or without the United States.

(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28,
United States Code) in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States knowingly makes any false material
declaration or makes or uses any other information,
including any book, paper, document, record,
recording, or other material, knowing the same to
contain any false material declaration, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.

DOJ

18 U.S.C.
§ 1623

A CCO may be held criminally liable if he or she
knowingly makes any false material declaration in
any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury while under oath.

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any A CCO who attempts or conspires to commit fraud
offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same shall be held criminally liable.
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy.

DOJ

Potential Impact on CCOs

18 U.S.C.
§ 1349

Statutory Text

under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.

Regulator

Citation
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Citation

Regulator

(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury
proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person
making the declaration admits such declaration to be
false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this
section if, at the time the admission is made, the
declaration has not substantially affected the

(2) each declaration was made within the period
of the statute of limitations for the offense
charged under this section. In any prosecution
under this section, the falsity of a declaration set
forth in the indictment or information shall be
established sufficient for conviction by proof that
the defendant while under oath made
irreconcilably contradictory declarations material
to the point in question in any proceeding before
or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be
a defense to an indictment or information made
pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection
that the defendant at the time he made each
declaration believed the declaration was true.

(1) each declaration was material to the point in
question, and

Statutory Text

two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to
the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need
not specify which declaration is false if—

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

DOJ

Citation

18 U.S.C.
§ 1956

(ii) with intent to engage in tax fraud; or

(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity; or

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole
or in part—

(A)

Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,
or who transports, transmits, or transfers –or attempts
to–a monetary instrument or funds —

(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this
section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be
necessary that such proof be made by any particular
number of witnesses or by documentary or other type
of evidence.

Statutory Text

proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such
falsity has been or will be exposed.

A CCO who knowingly engages in money
laundering may be fined up to $500,000 or twice
the value of the property involved in the
transaction, (whichever is greater), or imprisoned
for up to 20 years, or both.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

Money & Finance

Citation

shall be fined the greater of $10,000 or the value of
the property or funds involved, or imprisoned for not
more than 20 years, or both.

(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement
under State or Federal law,

(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of property
believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or

(A) to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity;

Additionally, anyone who conducts or attempts to
conduct a financial transaction involving property
represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity with the intent:

shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000
or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both.

Statutory Text

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement
under State or Federal law,

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(g)

Regulator

(ii) no current or former officer or employee of or
contractor for the Federal Government or of or for any
State, local, tribal, or territorial government within the
United States, who has any knowledge that such
report was made may disclose to any person involved

(i) neither the financial institution, director, officer,
employee, or agent of such institution (whether or not
any such person is still employed by the institution),
nor any other current or former director, officer, or
employee of, or contractor for, the financial
institution or other reporting person, may notify any
person involved in the transaction that the transaction
has been reported; and

(A) In general.—If a financial institution or any
director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial
institution, voluntarily or pursuant to this section or
any other authority, reports a suspicious transaction to
a government agency—

(2) Notification prohibited.—

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

Secretary of (g) Reporting of suspicious transactions.-This statute provides protection to CCOs who
Treasury
(1) In general.--The Secretary may require any report suspicious transactions relevant to a possible
violation of law or regulation.
financial institution, and any director, officer,
employee, or agent of any financial institution, to
report any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible violation of law or regulation.
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Citation

Regulator

in

certain

employment

except that such written reference or notice may not
disclose that such information was also included in
any such report, or that such report was made.

(II) in a written termination notice or employment
reference that is provided in accordance with the rules
of a self-regulatory organization registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission,

(I) in a written employment reference that is provided
in accordance with section 18(w) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act in response to a request from
another financial institution; or

(i) Rule of construction.—Notwithstanding the
application of subparagraph (A) in any other context,
subparagraph (A) shall not be construed as
prohibiting any financial institution, or any director,
officer, employee, or agent of such institution, from
including information that was included in a report to
which subparagraph (A) applies—

(B)
Disclosures
references.—

Statutory Text

in the transaction that the transaction has been
reported, other than as necessary to fulfill the official
duties of such officer or employee.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(B) Rule of construction.—Subparagraph (A) shall
not be construed as creating—

(A) In general.—Any financial institution that makes
a voluntary disclosure of any possible violation of law
or regulation to a government agency or makes a
disclosure pursuant to this subsection or any other
authority, and any director, officer, employee, or
agent of such institution who makes, or requires
another to make any such disclosure, shall not be
liable to any person under any law or regulation of the
United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of
any State or political subdivision of any State, or
under any contract or other legally enforceable
agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for
such disclosure or for any failure to provide notice of
such disclosure to the person who is the subject of
such disclosure or any other person identified in the
disclosure.

(3) Liability for disclosures.—

Statutory Text

(ii) Information not required.—Clause (i) shall not
be construed, by itself, to create any affirmative duty
to include any information described in clause (i) in
any employment reference or termination notice
referred to in clause (i).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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FinCEN and A domestic financial institution or nonfinancial trade
DOJ
or business, and a partner, director, officer, or
employee of a domestic financial institution or
nonfinancial trade or business, willfully violating:

31 U.S.C.
§ 5321

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO may be subject to monetary penalties
(which cannot be reimbursed by the financial
institution) for willfully violating the reporting and
recordkeeping
requirements
for
currency
transaction in the Bank Secrecy Act and Federal
a. the
reporting
and
recordkeeping
Deposit Insurance Act. The CMP may be up to
requirements for currency transaction in the
Bank Secrecy Act (except provisions related $25,000 per violation or per day the violation
continues or for the amount involved in the
to foreign transactions (see below));
transaction up to $100,000.
b. the retention of records provisions in the
Additional Comments:
Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
c. the recordkeeping procedures provision for 1. FinCEN used this provision to impose a $1
non-insured businesses in the Bank Secrecy million CMP against the CCO of MoneyGram in
Act.
2014. See In the Matter of Thomas E. Haider,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil
Number
2014-08
penalty of not more than the greater of the amount
(Dec. 18, 2014) available at https://www.fincen.g
(not to exceed $100,000) involved in the transaction
ov/news_room/ea/files/Haider_Assessment.pdf.
(if any) or $25,000 per violation or per day.

(ii) any immunity against, or otherwise affecting, any
civil or criminal action brought by any government or
agency of government to enforce any constitution,
law, or regulation of such government or agency.

Statutory Text

(i) any inference that the term “person”, as used in
such subparagraph, may be construed more broadly
than its ordinary usage so as to include any
government or agency of government; or

Regulator

Citation
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Regulator

FinCEN

Citation

31 U.S.C.
§ 5322

(a) A person willfully violating the recordkeeping
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act or a regulation
prescribed or order issued thereunder (except for
reporting requirements on foreign currency
transactions or the prohibition on structuring), or
willfully violating 1) a record-retention requirement
for insured depository institutions, or 2) any
regulation prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
related to recordkeeping for non-insured institutions,
shall be fined not more than $250,000, or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

Statutory Text

If the violation is in connection with violating any
other law or is part of a pattern of illegal activity
involving more than $100,000 in a year, the
potential fine and jail term double.

A CCO who willfully violates recordkeeping
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act may be
fined up to $250,000 or imprisoned for up to 5
years, or both.

Potential Impact on CCOs

In addition, this provision provides the following FinCEN found that “Haider failed to ensure that
penalties for violations of specific law:
MoneyGram implemented and maintained an
effective AML program.”
Structured transaction violation–The amount of any
civil money penalty for structuring transactions to 2. Unlike other agencies who have used publiclyevade Bank Secrecy Act reporting shall not exceed available matrices to determine whether and how
the amount of the coins and currency (or such other much to assess as a fine, FinCEN has made no such
monetary instruments as the Secretary may prescribe) public disclosure. Similarly, a person is not entitled
involved in the transaction with respect to which such to an APA hearing on the matter. See Robert B.
penalty is imposed. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(4).
Serino, It’s Anyone’s Guess How Fincen
Determines Fines, American Banker, March 9,
Foreign financial agency transaction violation–
available
at
greater of $100,000 or 50% of the amount of the 2016
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/itstransaction or balance of an unreported account; must
anyon
es-guess-how-fincen-determines-finesbe willful.
1079793-1.html.
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Citation

Regulator

(d) A financial institution or agency that violates 1)
any requirement to establish appropriate due
diligence procedures and controls with respect to the
detection and reporting of money laundering on bank
accounts involving foreign persons, or 2) the

(c) For a violation of the requirement that a financial
institution or non-financial business maintain
appropriate procedures to ensure compliance with the
recordkeeping requirements, a separate violation
occurs for each day the violation continues and at
each office, branch, or place of business at which a
violation occurs or continues.

Statutory Text

(b) A person willfully violating the recordkeeping
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act or a regulation
prescribed or order issued thereunder (except for
reporting requirements on foreign currency
transactions or the prohibition on structuring), or
willfully violating 1) a record-retention requirement
for insured depository institutions, or 2) any
regulation prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
related to recordkeeping for non-insured institutions
while violating another law of the United States or
as part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving
more than $100,000 in a 12-month period, shall be
fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned for not
more than 10 years, or both.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

FinCEN

Citation

31 U.S.C.
§ 5328

Potential Impact on CCOs

(b) Enforcement.--Any employee or former
employee who believes that such employee has been
discharged or discriminated against in violation of
subsection (a) may file a civil action in the
appropriate United States district court before the end

(a) Prohibition against discrimination.!No This statute provides protection to CCOs who blow
financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business the whistle on financial institutions.
may discharge or otherwise discriminate against any
employee with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because the
employee (or any person acting pursuant to the
request of the employee) provided information to the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, or
any Federal supervisory agency regarding a possible
violation of any provision of this subchapter or
section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of title 18, or any
regulation under any such provision, by the financial
institution or nonfinancial trade or business or any
director, officer, or employee of the financial
institution or nonfinancial trade or business.

Statutory Text

prohibition on maintaining correspondent accounts
with foreign shell banks, or any special measures
imposed with respect to types of accounts of primary
money laundering concern, shall be fined in an
amount equal to not less than 2 times the amount
of the transaction, but not more than $1,000,000.
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Citation

Regulator

(e) Coordination with other provisions of law.
!This section shall not apply with respect to any
financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business
which is subject to section 33 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, section 213 of the Federal Credit
Union Act, or section 21A(q) of the Home Owners'

(2) knowingly or recklessly provides substantially
false information to the Secretary, the Attorney
General, or any Federal supervisory agency.

(1) deliberately causes or participates in the alleged
violation of law or regulation; or

(d) Limitation.!The protections of this section shall
not apply to any employee who--

(3) take other appropriate actions to remedy any past
discrimination.

(2) pay compensatory damages; or

(1) reinstate the employee to the employee's former
position;

(c) Remedies.!If the district court determines that a
violation has occurred, the court may order the
financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business
which committed the violation to--

Statutory Text

of the 2-year period beginning on the date of such
discharge or discrimination.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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10 C.F.R.
§ 13.3

Energy

Citation

NRC

Regulator

(iv) Is for payment for the provision of property or
services which the person has not provided as
claimed, shall be subject, in addition to any other

(C) Is a statement in which the person making such
statement has a duty to include such material fact; or

(B) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent as a result of such
omission; and

(A) Omits a material fact;

(iii) Includes or is supported by any written statement
that—

(ii) Includes or is supported by any written statement
which asserts a material fact which is false, fictitious,
or fraudulent;

(i) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent;

(1) Any person who makes a claim that the person
knows or has reason to know—

(a) Claims.

REGULATIONS

Statutory Text

Loan Act (as added by section 251(c) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991).

The CCO could incur civil penalties for false
statements or false information given.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(5) If the Government has made any payment
(including transferred property or provided services)
on a claim, a person subject to a civil penalty under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall also be subject
to an assessment of not more than twice the amount
of such claim or that portion thereof that is
determined to be in violation of paragraph (a)(1) of
this section. Such assessment shall be in lieu of
damages sustained by the Government because of
such claim.

(4) Each claim for property, services, or money is
subject to a civil penalty regardless of whether such
property, services, or money is actually delivered or
paid.

(3) A claim shall be considered made to the authority,
recipient, or party when such claim is actually made
to an agent, fiscal intermediary or other entity,
including any State or political subdivision thereof,
acting for or on behalf of the authority, recipient, or
party.

(2) Each voucher, invoice, claim form, or other
individual request or demand for property, services,
or money constitutes a separate claim.

Statutory Text

remedy that may be prescribed by law, to a civil
penalty of not more than $10,781 for each such claim.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

(c) No proof of specific intent to defraud is required
to establish liability under this section.

(3) A statement shall be considered made to the
authority when such statement is actually made to an
agent, fiscal intermediary, or other entity, including
any State or political subdivision thereof, acting for
or on behalf of the authority.

(2) Each written representation, certification, or
affirmation constitutes a separate statement.

(ii) Contains or is accompanied by an express
certification or affirmation of the truthfulness and
accuracy of the contents of the statement, shall be
subject, in addition to any other remedy that may be
prescribed by law, to a civil penalty of not more than
$10,781 for each such statement.

(B) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent because it omits
a material fact that the person making the statement
has a duty to include in such statement; and

(A) Asserts a material fact which is false, fictitious,
or fraudulent; or

(i) The person knows or has reason to know—

(1) Any person who makes a written statement that—

(b) Statements.

2017
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Regulator

NRC

Citation

10 C.F.R.
§ 21.1

The regulations in this part establish procedures and
requirements for implementation of section 206 of the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. That section
requires any individual director or responsible officer
of a firm constructing, owning, operating or
supplying the components of any facility or activity
which is licensed or otherwise regulated pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, who obtains
information reasonably indicating: (a) That the
facility, activity or basic component supplied to such
facility or activity fails to comply with the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or any applicable
rule, regulation, order, or license of the Commission
relating to substantial safety hazards or (b) that the

(e) In any case in which it is determined that more
than one person is liable for making a claim under this
section on which the Government has made payment
(including transferred property or provided services),
an assessment may be imposed against any such
person or jointly and severally against any
combination of such persons.

Statutory Text

(d) In any case in which it is determined that more
than one person is liable for making a claim or
statement under this section, each such person may be
held liable for a civil penalty under this section.

A CCO must immediately notify the NRC if the
facility, activity, or basic component supplied to
such facility or activity contains defects, which
could create a substantial safety hazard unless they
have actual knowledge that the NRC has been
adequately informed.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

NRC

Citation

10 C.F.R.
§ 21.21

Potential Impact on CCOs

(2) Ensure that if an evaluation of an identified
deviation or failure to comply potentially associated
with a substantial safety hazard cannot be completed
within 60 days from discovery of the deviation or
failure to comply, an interim report is prepared and
submitted to the Commission through a director or
responsible officer or designated person as discussed

(1) Evaluate deviations and failures to comply to
identify defects and failures to comply associated
with substantial safety hazards as soon as practicable,
and, except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section, in all cases within 60 days of discovery, in
order to identify a reportable defect or failure to
comply that could create a substantial safety hazard,
were it to remain uncorrected, and

(a) Each individual, corporation, partnership, A CCO must develop appropriate procedures to
dedicating entity, or other entity subject to the evaluate compliance and ensure safety and
regulations in this part shall adopt appropriate regularly notify the NRC of hazardous conditions.
procedures to—

Statutory Text

facility, activity, or basic component supplied to such
facility or activity contains defects, which could
create a substantial safety hazard, to immediately
notify the Commission of such failure to comply or
such defect, unless he has actual knowledge that the
Commission has been adequately informed of such
defect or failure to comply.

2017
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Citation

Regulator

(b) If the deviation or failure to comply is discovered
by a supplier of basic components, or services
associated with basic components, and the supplier
determines that it does not have the capability to

(ii) Contains a defect.

(i) Fails to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation,
order, or license of the Commission or standard
design approval under part 52 of this chapter, relating
to a substantial safety hazard, or

(3) Ensure that a director or responsible officer
subject to the regulations of this part is informed as
soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within the 5
working days after completion of the evaluation
described in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section
if the manufacture, construction, or operation of a
facility or activity, a basic component supplied for
such facility or activity, or the design certification or
design approval under part 52 of this chapter—

Statutory Text

in § 21.21(d)(5). The interim report should describe
the deviation or failure to comply that is being
evaluated and should also state when the evaluation
will be completed. This interim report must be
submitted in writing within 60 days of discovery of
the deviation or failure to comply.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(i) The manufacture, construction or operation of a
facility or an activity within the United States that is
subject to the licensing requirements under parts 30,
40, 50, 52, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, or 72 of this chapter and
that is within his or her organization's responsibility;
or

(d)(1) A director or responsible officer subject to the
regulations of this part or a person designated under
§ 21.21(d)(5) must notify the Commission when he or
she obtains information reasonably indicating a
failure to comply or a defect affecting—

(2) Maintaining auditable records for the dedication
process.

(1) Identifying and evaluating deviations and
reporting defects and failures to comply associated
with substantial safety hazards for dedicated items;
and

(c) A dedicating entity is responsible for—

Statutory Text

perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists,
then the supplier must inform the purchasers or
affected licensees within five working days of this
determination so that the purchasers or affected
licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to
comply, pursuant to § 21.21(a).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(i) Initial notification by facsimile, which is the
preferred method of notification, to the NRC
Operations Center at (301)816–5151 or by telephone
at (301)816–5100 within two days following receipt
of information by the director or responsible
corporate officer under paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, on the identification of a defect or a failure to
comply. Verification that the facsimile has been
received should be made by calling the NRC

(3) Notification required by paragraph (d)(1) of this
section must be made as follows—

(2) The notification to NRC of a failure to comply or
of a defect under paragraph (d)(1) of this section and
the evaluation of a failure to comply or a defect under
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section, are not
required if the director or responsible officer has
actual knowledge that the Commission has been
notified in writing of the defect or the failure to
comply.

Statutory Text

(ii) A basic component that is within his or her
organization's responsibility and is supplied for a
facility or an activity within the United States that is
subject to the licensing, design certification, or
approval requirements under parts 30, 40, 50, 52, 60,
61, 63, 70, 71, or 72 of this chapter.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the
safety hazard which is created or could be created by
such defect or failure to comply.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility
or supplying the basic component which fails to
comply or contains a defect.

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the
basic component supplied for such facility or such
activity within the United States which fails to
comply or contains a defect.

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals
informing the Commission.

(4) The written report required by this paragraph shall
include, but need not be limited to, the following
information, to the extent known:

(ii) Written notification to the NRC at the address
specified in § 21.5 within 30 days following receipt
of information by the director or responsible
corporate officer under paragraph (a)(3) of this
section, on the identification of a defect or a failure to
comply.

Statutory Text

Operations Center. This paragraph does not apply to
interim reports described in § 21.21(a)(2).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(5) The director or responsible officer may authorize
an individual to provide the notification required by
this paragraph, provided that, this shall not relieve the
director or responsible officer of his or her
responsibility under this paragraph.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to
whom an early site permit was transferred.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to
comply about the facility, activity, or basic
component that has been, is being, or will be given to
purchasers or licensees.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being,
or will be taken; the name of the individual or
organization responsible for the action; and the length
of time that has been or will be taken to complete the
action.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains
a defect or fails to comply, the number and location
of these components in use at, supplied for, being
supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured,
or being manufactured for one or more facilities or
activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Statutory Text

(v) The date on which the information of such defect
or failure to comply was obtained.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Any director or responsible officer of an entity A CCO who knowingly or consciously fails to
(including dedicating entity) that is not otherwise provide notice to the NRC is subject to a civil
subject to the deliberate misconduct provisions of this penalty equal to the amount provided in the Act.
chapter but is subject to the regulations in this part
who knowingly and consciously fails to provide the
notice required as by § 21.21 shall be subject to a civil
penalty equal to the amount provided by section 234
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as A CCO may be held criminally liable for willful
amended, provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation, attempted violation, or conspiracy
violation of, attempted violation of, or conspiracy to violation of the Act.
violate, any regulation issued under sections 161b,
161i, or 161o of the Act. For purposes of section 223,
all the regulations in part 21 are issued under one or
more of sections 161b, 161i, or 161o, except for the
sections listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as A CCO may be held criminally liable for willful
amended, provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation, attempted violation, or conspiracy
violation of, attempted violation of, or conspiracy to violation of the Act.
violate, any regulation issued under sections 161b,
161i, or 161o of the Act. For the purposes of section

NRC

NRC

10 C.F.R.
§ 21.62(a)

NRC
10 C.F.R.
§ 26.825(a)

Potential Impact on CCOs

10 C.F.R.
§ 21.61(a)

Statutory Text

(e) Individuals subject to this part may be required by
the Commission to supply additional information
related to a defect or failure to comply. Commission
action to obtain additional information may be based
on reports of defects from other reporting entities.

Regulator

Citation
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Regulator

DOE
10 C.F.R.
§ 820.20(a)
-(b)

Citation

(3) Any program, plan or other provision required to
implement any requirement or order identified in
paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section.

(2) Any Compliance Order issued pursuant to subpart
C of this part; or

(1) Any DOE Nuclear Safety Requirement set forth
in the Code of Federal Regulations;

(b) Basis for civil penalties. DOE may assess civil
penalties against any person subject to the provisions
of this part who has entered into an agreement of
indemnification under 42 U.S.C. 2210(d) (or any
subcontractor or supplier thereto), unless exempted
from civil penalties as provided in paragraph (c) of
this section, on the basis of a violation of:

(a) Purpose. This subpart establishes the procedures
for investigating the nature and extent of violations of
the DOE Nuclear Safety Requirements, for
determining, whether a violation has occurred, for
imposing an appropriate remedy, and for adjudicating
the assessment of a civil penalty.

Statutory Text

223, all of the regulations in Part 26 are issued under
one or more of sections 161b, 161i, or 161o, except
for the sections listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(a) Claims.

DOE

10 C.F.R.
§ 1013.3

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

(i) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent;

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, any person who makes a claim that the
person knows or has reason to know—

Any person subject to a penalty under 42 U.S.C. A person subject to penalty may have civil penalty
2282a shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to $197,869 for each such violation.
not to exceed $197,869 for each such violation. If any
violation under 42 U.S.C. 2282a is a continuing one,
each day of such violation shall constitute a separate
violation for the purpose of computing the applicable
civil penalty.

DOE

10 C.F.R.
§ 820.81

The CCO could incur civil penalties for false
statements or false information given.

If there is reason to believe a criminal violation of the The DOE may refer the matter to the Attorney
Act or the DOE Nuclear Safety Requirements has General for investigation or prosecution.
occurred, DOE may refer the matter to the Attorney
General of the United States for investigation or
prosecution.

DOE

Potential Impact on CCOs

A CCO shall be subject to criminal sanctions if
they knowingly and willfully violate, cause to be
violated, attempt to violate, or conspire to violate
any section of the Act.

10 C.F.R.
§ 820.72

Statutory Text

If a person subject to the Act or the DOE Nuclear
Safety Requirements has, by act or omission,
knowingly and willfully violated, caused to be
violated, attempted to violate, or conspired to violate
any section of the Act or any applicable DOE Nuclear
Safety Requirement, the person shall be subject to
criminal sanctions under the Act.

Regulator

DOE

Citation

10 C.F.R.
§ 820.71

2017
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Citation

Regulator

(3) A claim shall be considered made to the
authority, recipient, or party when such claim is
actually made to an agent, fiscal intermediary, or
other entity, including any State or political

(2) Each voucher, invoice, claim form, or other
individual request or demand for property, services,
or money constitutes a separate claim.

(iv) Is for payment for the provision of property
or services which the person has not provided as
claimed, shall be subject, in addition to any
other remedy that may be prescribed by law, to
a civil penalty of not more than $10,781 for each
such claim.

(C) Is a statement in which the person
making such statement has a duty to include
such material fact; or

(B) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent as a
result of such omission; and

(A) Omits a material fact;

(iii) Includes or is supported by any written
statement that—

Statutory Text

(ii) Includes or is supported by any written
statement which asserts a material fact which is
false, fictitious, or fraudulent;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(A) Asserts a material fact which is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent; or

(i) The person knows or has reason to know—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, any person who makes a written statement
that—

(b) Statements.

(5) If the Government has made any payment
(including transferred property or provided
services) on a claim, a person subject to a civil
penalty under paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall
also be subject to an assessment of not more than
twice the amount of such claim or that portion
thereof that is determined to be in violation of
paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Such assessment
shall be in lieu of damages sustained by the
Government because of such claim.

(4) Each claim for property, services, or money is
subject to a civil penalty regardless of whether such
property, services, or money is actually delivered or
paid.

Statutory Text

subdivision thereof, acting for or on behalf of such
authority, recipient, or party.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(1) In the case of any claim or statement made by
any individual relating to any of the benefits listed
in paragraph (c)(2) of this section received by such
individual, such individual may be held liable for
penalties and assessments under this section only if
such claim or statement is made by such individual

(c) Application for certain benefits.

(3) A statement shall be considered made to the
authority when such statement is actually made to
an agent, fiscal intermediary, or other entity,
including any State or political subdivision thereof,
acting for or on behalf of such authority.

(2) Each written representation, certification, or
affirmation constitutes a separate statement.

(ii) Contains or is accompanied by an express
certification or affirmation of the truthfulness
and accuracy of the contents of the statement,
shall be subject, in addition to any other remedy
that may be prescribed by law, to a civil penalty
of not more than $10,781 for each such
statement.

Statutory Text

(B) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent because
it omits a material fact that the person
making the statement has a duty to include in
such statement, and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

Banks & Banking

Citation

(f) In any case in which it is determined that more than
one person is liable for making a claim under this
section on which the Government has made payment
(including transferred property or provided services),
an assessment may be imposed against any such
person or jointly and severally against any
combination of such persons.

(e) In any case in which it is determined that more
than one person is liable for making a claim or
statement under this section, each such person may be
held liable for a civil penalty under this section.

(d) No proof of specific intent to defraud is required
to establish liability under this section.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (c) of this section, the
term “benefits” means benefits under part A of the
Energy Conservation in Existing Buildings Act of
1976, which are intended for the personal use of the
individual who receives the benefits or for a
member of the individual's family.

Statutory Text

in making application for such benefits with respect
to such individual's eligibility to receive such
benefits.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

(2) Customer identification program. Each
national bank and each savings association is
subject to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5318(l)
and the implementing regulations jointly
promulgated by the OCC and the Department of
the Treasury at 31 CFR 1020.220, which require a
customer identification
program to be
implemented as part of the BSA compliance
program required under this section.

12 C.F.R.
Comptroller (c) Establishment of a BSA compliance program—
A CCO shall establish a compliance program. The
compliance program shall, at a minimum:
§ 21.21(c)- of Currency
(1) Program requirement. Each national bank and
(d)
each savings association shall develop and provide
(1) Provide for a system of internal controls to
for the continued administration of a program assure ongoing compliance;
reasonably designed to assure and monitor
(2) Provide for independent testing for
compliance with the recordkeeping and reporting
compliance to be conducted by national bank or
requirements set forth in subchapter II of chapter
savings association personnel or by an outside
53 of title 31, United States Code and the
party;
implementing regulations issued by the
(3) Designate an individual or individuals
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR Chapter X.
responsible for coordinating and monitoring dayThe compliance program must be written,
to-day compliance; and
approved by the national bank's or savings
association's board of directors, and reflected in
(4) Provide training for appropriate personnel.
the minutes of the national bank or savings
association.

450
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Failure to comply with order. Pursuant to [the first
tier of the CMP provision of § 1818(i) discussed
above] the OCC may assess a civil money penalty
against any national bank or Federal savings
association that violates or otherwise fails to comply
with any final safety and soundness order and against
any institution-affiliated party who participates in
such violation or noncompliance.

(a) In general. The civil money penalty shall be
assessed upon the service of a Notice of Assessment
which shall become final and unappealable unless the
respondent requests a hearing pursuant to
§ 308.19(c)(2).

OCC

FDIC

12 C.F.R.
§ 30.6(b)

12 C.F.R.
§ 308.116

(4) Provide training for appropriate personnel.

(3) Designate an individual or individuals
responsible for coordinating and monitoring dayto-day compliance; and

(2) Provide for independent testing for compliance
to be conducted by national bank or savings
association personnel or by an outside party;

(1) Provide for a system of internal controls to
assure ongoing compliance;

Statutory Text

(d) Contents of compliance program. The compliance
program shall, at a minimum:

Regulator

Citation

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

Any Violation:

The civil money penalty for a violation of the
Change in Bank Control Act or any rule,
regulation, or order issued by the FDIC is as
follows:

The CCO is entitled to an APA hearing to
determine the penalty.

The OCC may access a CMP against a CCO who
participates in the failure to comply with a safety
and soundness order. The amount of the CMP may
be up to $7,500 per day.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

A person shall forfeit and pay a civil money
penalty of not more than $5,000 for each day the
violation continues. After August 1, 2016:
$9,468.

(3) Any person who knowingly violates any
provision of the Change in Bank Control Act or any
rule, regulation, or order issued by the FDIC
pursuant thereto; or engages in any unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the affairs of a
depository institution; or breaches any fiduciary
duty; and knowingly or recklessly causes a

continues. After August 1, 2016: $1,893,610.

(1) Any person who violates any provision of the
Change in Bank Control Act or any rule, regulation,
or order issued by the FDIC pursuant thereto, shall
forfeit and pay a civil money penalty of not more Reckless Violation:
than $5,000 for each day the violation continues.
A person shall forfeit and pay a civil money
(2) Any person who violates any provision of the
penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day
Change in Bank Control Act or any rule, regulation,
such violation, practice or breach continues.
After August 1, 2016: $47,340.
or order issued by the FDIC pursuant thereto; or
recklessly engages in any unsafe or unsound Knowing Violation:
practice in conducting the affairs of a depository
institution; or breaches any fiduciary duty; which (i) In the case of a person other than a depository
institution—$1,000,000 per day for each day the
violation, practice or breach is part of a pattern of
violation, practice or breach continues; After
misconduct; or causes or is likely to cause more
than a minimal loss to such institution; or results in August 1, 2016: $1,893,610. or
pecuniary gain or other benefit to such person, shall
(ii) In the case of a depository institution—an
forfeit and pay a civil money penalty of not more
amount not to exceed the lesser of $1,000,000 or
than $25,000 for each day such violation, practice
one percent of the total assets of such institution
or breach continues.
for each day the violation, practice or breach

(b) Amount.
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Citation

Regulator

(ii) Any person who has engaged in a violation,
unsafe or unsound practice or breach of fiduciary
duty, as set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this

(i) Any person who has engaged in a violation as
set forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall
forfeit and pay a civil money penalty of not more
than $9,468 for each day the violation continued.

(4) Adjustment of civil money penalties by the rate
of inflation pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of
2015. On or after August 1, 2016:

(ii) In the case of a depository institution—an
amount not to exceed the lesser of $1,000,000 or
one percent of the total assets of such institution
for each day the violation, practice or breach
continues.

(i) In the case of a person other than a depository
institution—$1,000,000 per day for each day the
violation, practice or breach continues; or

Statutory Text

substantial loss to such institution or a substantial
pecuniary gain or other benefit to such institution or
a substantial pecuniary gain or other benefit to such
person by reason of such violation, practice or
breach, shall forfeit and pay a civil money penalty
not to exceed:

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(d) Failure to answer. Failure of a respondent to
file an answer required by this section within the

(c) Mitigating factors. In assessing the amount
of the penalty, the Board of Directors or its
designee shall consider the gravity of the
violation, the history of previous violations,
respondent's financial resources, good faith, and
any other matters as justice may require.

(B) In the case of a depository institution—an
amount not to exceed the lesser of $1,893,610 or
one percent of the total assets of such institution
for each day the violation, practice or breach
continued.

(A) In the case of a person other than a
depository institution—$1,893,610 per day for
each day the violation, practice or breach
continued; or

(iii) Any person who has knowingly engaged in a
violation, unsafe or unsound practice or breach of
fiduciary duty, as set forth in paragraph (b)(3) of
this section, shall forfeit and pay a civil money
penalty not to exceed:

Statutory Text

section, shall forfeit and pay a civil money penalty
of not more than $47,340 for each day such
violation, practice or breach continued.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

FDIC

Citation

12 C.F.R.
§ 308.502

The CCO could incur civil penalties for false
statements or false information given.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(iii) The claim includes, or is supported by, a
written statement that:

(ii) The claim includes, or is supported by, a
written statement that asserts a material fact
which is false, fictitious or fraudulent; or

(i) The claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or

(1) A person who makes a false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claim to the FDIC is subject to a civil
penalty of up to $5,000 per claim. A claim is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent if the person making the
claim knows, or has reason to know, that:

(a) Claims.

Statutory Text

time provided constitutes a waiver of his or her
right to appear and contest the allegations in the
notice of disapproval. If no timely answer is
filed, Enforcement Counsel may file a motion
for entry of an order of default. Upon a finding
that no good cause has been shown for the
failure to file a timely answer, the administrative
law judge shall file a recommended decision
containing the findings and relief sought in the
notice. A final order issued by the Board of
Directors based upon a respondent's failure to
answer is deemed to be an order issued upon
consent.

2017
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Citation

Regulator

(4) Each claim for property, services, or money that
constitutes any one of the elements in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section is subject to a civil penalty
regardless of whether the property, services, or
money is actually delivered or paid.

(3) A claim will be considered made to the FDIC,
recipient, or party when the claim is actually made
to an agent, fiscal intermediary, or other entity,
including any state or political subdivision thereof,
acting for or on behalf of the FDIC, recipient, or
party.

(2) Each voucher, invoice, claim form, or other
individual request or demand for property, services,
or money constitutes a separate claim.

(iv) The claim seeks payment for providing
property or services that the person has not
provided as claimed.

(C) Is a statement in which the person making
the statement has a duty to include the material
fact; or

(B) Is false, fictitious, or fraudulent as a result
of that omission; and

Statutory Text

(A) Omits a material fact; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(1) A person who submits to the FDIC a false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement is subject to a civil
penalty of up to $5,000 per statement. A statement
is false, fictitious or fraudulent if the person
submitting the statement to the FDIC knows, or has
reason to know, that:

(b) Statements.

(7) The penalty specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section is in addition to any other remedy allowable
by law.

(6) The amount of any penalty assessed under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be adjusted for
inflation in accordance with§ 308.132(d)(17) of this
part.

Statutory Text

(5) If the FDIC has made any payment (including
transferred property or provided services) on a
claim, a person subject to a civil penalty under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section will also be subject
to an assessment of not more than twice the amount
of such claim (or portion of the claim) that is
determined to constitute a false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claim under paragraph (a)(1) of this
section. The assessment will be in lieu of damages
sustained by the FDIC because of the claims.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(5) The penalty specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section is in addition to any other remedy allowable
by law.

(4) The amount of any penalty assessed under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be adjusted for
inflation in accordance with§ 308.132(d)(17) of this
part.

(3) A statement will be considered made to the
FDIC when the statement is actually made to an
agent, fiscal intermediary, or other entity, including
any state or political subdivision thereof, acting for
or on behalf of the FDIC.

(2) Each written representation, certification, or
affirmation constitutes a separate statement.

(iii) The statement contains or is accompanied by
an express certification or affirmation of the
truthfulness and accuracy of the contents of the
statement.

(ii) The statement omits a material fact that the
person making the statement has a duty to include
in the statement; and

Statutory Text

(i) The statement asserts a material fact which is
false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(2) In any case in which it is determined that more
than one person is liable for making a claim under
this section on which the FDIC has made payment
(including transferred property or provided
services), an assessment may be imposed against

(1) In any case in which it is determined that more
than one person is liable for making a claim or
statement under this section, each such person may
be held jointly and severally liable for a civil
penalty under this section.

(e) Liability.

(d) Civil money penalties that are assessed under this
subpart are subject to annual adjustments to account
for inflation as required by the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015
(Pub.L. 114–74, sec. 701, 129 Stat. 584) (see also 12
CFR 308.132(d)(17)).

Statutory Text

(c) Failure to file declaration/certification. Where, as
a prerequisite to conducting business with the FDIC,
a person is required by law to file one or more
declarations and/or certifications, and the person
intentionally
fails
to
file
such
declaration/certification, the person will be subject to
the civil penalties as prescribed by this subpart.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

Dept. of
Treasury

Citation

12 C.F.R.
§ 570.3

(b) Contents of plan. The compliance plan shall
include a description of the steps the savings
association will take to correct the deficiency and the
time within which those steps will be taken.

(2) Other plans. If a savings association is obligated
to file, or is currently operating under, a capital
restoration plan submitted pursuant to section 38 of
the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o), a cease-and-desist
order entered into pursuant to section 8 of the FDI
Act, a formal or informal agreement, or a response
to a report of examination, it may, with the
permission of the OTS, submit a compliance plan
under this section as part of that plan, order,
agreement, or response, subject to the deadline
provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

(1) In general. A savings association shall file a
written safety and soundness compliance plan with
the OTS within 30 days of receiving a request for a
compliance plan pursuant to § 570.2(b), unless the
OTS notifies the savings association in writing that
the plan is to be filed within a different period.

(a) Schedule for filing compliance plan—

Statutory Text

any such person or jointly and severally against any
combination of such persons.
If a savings association fails to submit an
acceptable plan within the time specified by the
OTS or fails in any material respect to implement
a compliance plan, then the OTS shall, by order,
require the savings association to correct the
deficiency and may take further actions provided
in the FDI Act.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(e) Amendment of compliance plan. A savings
association that has filed an approved compliance
plan may, after prior written notice to and approval by
the OTS, amend the plan to reflect a change in

(d) Failure to submit or implement a compliance plan.
If a savings association fails to submit an acceptable
plan within the time specified by the OTS or fails in
any material respect to implement a compliance plan,
then the OTS shall, by order, require the savings
association to correct the deficiency and may take
further actions provided in section 39(e)(2)(B) of the
FDI Act. Pursuant to section 39(e)(3), the OTS may
be required to take certain actions if the savings
association commenced operations or experienced a
change in control within the previous 24–month
period, or the savings association experienced
extraordinary growth during the previous 18–month
period.

Statutory Text

(c) Review of safety and soundness compliance plans.
Within 30 days after receiving a safety and soundness
compliance plan under this subpart, the OTS shall
provide written notice to the savings association of
whether the plan has been approved or seek additional
information from the savings association regarding
the plan. The OTS may extend the time within which
notice regarding approval of a plan will be provided.
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Regulator

CFPB
12 C.F.R.
§ 1007.104

Citation
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(b) Require that all employees of the covered
financial institution who are mortgage loan
originators be informed of the registration
requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act and this part and
be instructed on how to comply with such
requirements and procedures;

(a) Establish a process for identifying which
employees of the covered financial institution are
required to be registered mortgage loan originators;

A covered financial institution that employs one or A CCO must develop policies and procedures to
more mortgage loan originators must adopt and assure compliance.
The policies must be
follow written policies and procedures designed to appropriate with the financial institution.
assure compliance with this part. These policies and
procedures must be appropriate to the nature, size,
complexity, and scope of the mortgage lending
activities of the covered financial institution, and
apply only to those employees acting within the scope
of their employment at the covered financial
institution. At a minimum, these policies and
procedures must:

Statutory Text

circumstance. Until such time as a proposed
amendment has been approved, the savings
association shall implement the compliance plan as
previously approved.
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Citation

Regulator

(h) Establish a process for reviewing employee
criminal history background reports received
pursuant to this part, taking appropriate action
consistent with applicable Federal law, including

(g) Provide for appropriate action in the case of any
employee who fails to comply with the registration
requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act, this part, or the
covered financial institution's related policies and
procedures, including prohibiting such employees
from acting as mortgage loan originators or other
appropriate disciplinary actions;

(f) Provide for independent testing for compliance
with this part to be conducted at least annually by
covered financial institution personnel or by an
outside party;

(e) Establish reasonable procedures and tracking
systems for monitoring compliance with
registration and renewal requirements and
procedures;

(d) Establish reasonable procedures for confirming
the adequacy and accuracy of employee
registrations, including updates and renewals, by
comparisons with its own records;

Statutory Text

(c) Establish procedures to comply with the unique
identifier requirements in § 1007.105;
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Regulator

(i) Establish procedures designed to ensure that any
third party with which the covered financial
institution has arrangements related to mortgage
loan origination has policies and procedures to
comply with the S.A.F.E. Act, including
appropriate licensing and/or registration of
individuals acting as mortgage loan originators.

Statutory Text

section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1829), section 206 of the Federal Credit
Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1786(i)), and section 5.65(d)
of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended (12
U.S.C.
2277a–14(d)),
and
implementing
regulations with respect to these reports, and
maintaining records of these reports and actions
taken with respect to applicable employees; and

The act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or
other person acting for any individual, association,
partnership, corporation, or trust, within the scope of
his employment or office, shall be deemed the act,
omission, or failure of such individual, association,
partnership, corporation, or trust as well as of such
official, agent, or other person.

(a) Designation. Each futures commission merchant, The CCO could be liable for failing to develop
swap dealer, and major swap participant shall appropriate policies and procedures to fulfill the
designate an individual to serve as its chief duties in the Act and Commission regulations in

CFTC

CFTC

17 C.F.R.
§ 3.3

A CCO could be liable for failing to act within his
or her duties of his office or place of employment
or acting outside the scope of his or her office or
place of employment

Potential Impact on CCOs
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§ 1.2
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Citation
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Citation

Regulator

(2) Only the board of directors or the senior officer
of the futures commission merchant, swap dealer,
or major swap participant may remove the chief
compliance officer.

(1) The chief compliance officer shall report to the
board of directors or the senior officer of the futures
commission merchant, swap dealer, or major swap
participant. The board of directors or the senior
officer shall appoint the chief compliance officer,
shall approve the compensation of the chief
compliance officer, and shall meet with the chief
compliance officer at least once a year and at the
election of the chief compliance officer.

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

compliance officer, and provide the chief compliance relation to the swap dealer’s or swap participant’s
officer with the responsibility and authority to activities, or to the futures commission merchant’s
develop, in consultation with the board of directors or business.
the senior officer, appropriate policies and procedures
(1) The CCO could be liable for failure to report
to fulfill the duties set forth in the Act and
to the board of directors.
Commission regulations relating to the swap dealer's
(2) The CCO could be liable for failing to meet
or major swap participant's swaps activities, or to the
the qualifications to become a CCO.
futures commission merchant's business as a futures
(3) The CCO could be liable for failing to meet
commission merchant and to ensure compliance with
its duties
the Act and Commission regulations relating to the
swap dealer's or major swap participant's swaps
activities, or to the futures commission merchant's
business as a futures commission merchant.
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Citation

Regulator

(2) In consultation with the board of directors or the
senior officer, resolving any conflicts of interest
that may arise;

(1) Administering the registrant's policies and
procedures reasonably designed to ensure
compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations;

(d) Chief compliance officer duties. The chief
compliance officer's duties shall include, but are not
limited to:

(c) Submission with registration. Each application for
registration as a futures commission merchant under
§ 3.10, a swap dealer under § 23.21, or a major swap
participant under § 23.21, must include a designation
of a chief compliance officer by submitting a Form 8–
R for the chief compliance officer as a principal of the
applicant pursuant to § 3.10(a)(2).

Statutory Text

(b) Qualifications. The individual designated to serve
as chief compliance officer shall have the background
and skills appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities
of the position. No individual disqualified, or subject
to disqualification, from registration under section
8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may serve as a chief
compliance officer.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(e) Annual report. The chief compliance officer
annually shall prepare a written report that covers the
most recently completed fiscal year of the futures
commission merchant, swap dealer, or major swap
participant, and provide the annual report to the board
of directors or the senior officer. The annual report
shall, at a minimum:

(6) Preparing and signing the annual report required
under paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.

(5) Establishing procedures, in consultation with
the board of directors or the senior officer, for the
handling, management response, remediation,
retesting, and closing of noncompliance issues; and

(4) Establishing procedures, in consultation with
the board of directors or the senior officer, for the
remediation of noncompliance issues identified by
the chief compliance officer through a compliance
office review, look-back, internal or external audit
finding, self-reported error, or validated complaint;

Statutory Text

(3) Taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance
with the Act and Commission regulations relating
to the swap dealer's or major swap participant's
swaps activities, or to the futures commission
merchant's business as a futures commission
merchant;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(4) Describe the financial, managerial, operational,
and staffing resources set aside for compliance with
respect to the Act and Commission regulations,

(3) List any material changes to compliance policies
and procedures during the coverage period for the
report;

(iii) Discuss areas for improvement, and
recommend potential or prospective changes or
improvements to its compliance program and
resources devoted to compliance;

(ii) Provide an assessment as to the effectiveness
of these policies and procedures; and

(i) Identify the policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with
the requirement under the Act and Commission
regulations;

(2) Review each applicable requirement under the
Act and Commission regulations, and with respect
to each:

Statutory Text

(1) Contain a description of the written policies and
procedures, including the code of ethics and
conflicts of interest policies, of the futures
commission merchant, swap dealer, or major swap
participant;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(2) The annual report shall be furnished
electronically to the Commission not more than 60
days after the end of the fiscal year of the futures
commission merchant, swap dealer, or major swap
participant, simultaneously with the submission of
Form
1–FR–FCM,
as
required
under
§ 1.10(b)(2)(ii) of this chapter, simultaneously with
the Financial and Operational Combined Uniform
Single Report, as required under § 1.10(h) of this
chapter, or simultaneously with the financial

(1) Prior to furnishing the annual report to the
Commission, the chief compliance officer shall
provide the annual report to the board of directors
or the senior officer of the futures commission
merchant, swap dealer, or major swap participant
for its review. Furnishing the annual report to the
board of directors or the senior officer shall be
recorded in the board minutes or otherwise, as
evidence of compliance with this requirement.

(f) Furnishing the annual report to the Commission.

(5) Describe any material non-compliance issues
identified, and the corresponding action taken.

Statutory Text

including any material deficiencies in such
resources; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(6) A futures commission merchant, swap dealer, or
major swap participant may incorporate by
reference sections of an annual report that has been

(5) A futures commission merchant, swap dealer, or
major swap participant may request from the
Commission an extension of time to furnish its
annual report, provided the registrant's failure to
timely furnish the report could not be eliminated by
the registrant without unreasonable effort or
expense. Extensions of the deadline will be granted
at the discretion of the Commission.

(4) The futures commission merchant, swap dealer,
or major swap participant shall promptly furnish an
amended annual report if material errors or
omissions in the report are identified. An
amendment must contain the certification required
under paragraph (f)(3) of this section.

(3) The report shall include a certification by the
chief compliance officer or chief executive officer
of the registrant that, to the best of his or her
knowledge and reasonable belief, and under penalty
of law, the information contained in the annual
report is accurate and complete.

Statutory Text

condition report, as required under section 4s(f) of
the Act, as applicable.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(iii) Any records relevant to the annual report,
including, but not limited to, work papers and
other documents that form the basis of the

(ii) Copies of materials, including written
reports provided to the board of directors or the
senior officer in connection with the review of
the annual report under paragraph (e) of this
section; and

(i) A copy of the registrant's policies and
procedures reasonably designed to ensure
compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations;

(1) The futures commission merchant, swap dealer,
or major swap participant shall maintain:

(g) Recordkeeping.

Statutory Text

furnished within the current or immediately
preceding reporting period to the Commission. If
the futures commission merchant, swap dealer, or
major swap participant is registered in more than
one capacity with the Commission, and must submit
more than one annual report, an annual report
submitted as one registrant may incorporate by
reference sections in the annual report furnished
within the current or immediately preceding
reporting period as the other registrant.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 11.6

Potential Impact on CCOs

(b) Penalties for false statements and other false
information. Any person making false statements
under oath during the course of a Commission
investigation is subject to the criminal penalties for
perjury in 18 U.S.C. 1621. Any person who
knowingly and willfully makes false or fraudulent
statements, whether under oath or otherwise, or who
falsifies, conceals or covers up a material fact, or
submits any false writing or document, knowing it to

(a) Oath. At the discretion of the member of the The CCO could incur criminal penalties for false
Commission or staff member conducting the statements or false information given.
investigation, testimony of a witness may be taken
under oath.

(2) All records or reports that a futures commission
merchant, swap dealer, or major swap participant
are required to maintain pursuant to this section
shall be maintained in accordance with § 1.31 and
shall be made available promptly upon request to
representatives of the Commission and to
representatives of the applicable prudential
regulator, as defined in 1a(39) of the Act.

Statutory Text

report, and memoranda, correspondence, other
documents, and records that are created, sent or
received in connection with the annual report
and contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or
financial data related to the annual report.
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Regulator

CFTC

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 33.10

17 C.F.R.
§ 37.200

Potential Impact on CCOs

(b) Establish and enforce trading, trade processing,
and participation rules that will deter abuses and have
the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce those

(a) Establish and enforce compliance with any rule of
the swap execution facility, including the terms and
conditions of the swaps traded or processed on or
through the swap execution facility and any limitation
on access to the swap execution facility;

A swap execution facility shall:

in or in connection with an offer to enter into, the
entry into, the confirmation of the execution of, or the
maintenance of, any commodity option transaction.

(c) To deceive or attempt to deceive any other
person by any means whatsoever

(b) To make or cause to be made to any other person
any false report or statement thereof or cause to be
entered for any person any false record thereof;

The CCO could be liable for failing to establish
and enforce compliance with the swap execution
facility; failing to establish and enforce trading,
trade processing and deterring abuses; failing to
establish rules that govern the swap facility; or
failing to provide the rules when a swap dealer or
swap participant enters into or facilitates a swap.

It shall be unlawful for any person directly or The CCO could be liable for cheating, defrauding,
indirectly:
making or causing another to make false reports or
(a) To cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or statements or to deceive another by any means
done directly or indirectly.
defraud any other person;

Statutory Text

contain false, fictitious or fraudulent information, is
subject to the criminal penalties set forth in 18 U.S.C.
1001.
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Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 37.203

A CCO could be liable if it fails to establish and
enforce trading, trade processing and rules that
deter abuses or if it fails to investigate and enforce
said rules.
(a) A CCO could be liable if he or she engages
in abusive trading practices.
(b) A CCO could be liable if he or she fails to
detect and investigate potential rule
violations.
(c) failure to comply.

(a) Abusive trading practices prohibited. A swap
execution facility shall prohibit abusive trading
practices on its markets by members and market
participants. Swap execution facilities that permit
intermediation shall prohibit customer-related
abuses including, but not limited to, trading ahead

Potential Impact on CCOs

A swap execution facility shall establish and enforce
trading, trade processing, and participation rules that
will deter abuses and it shall have the capacity to
detect, investigate, and enforce those rules.

(d) Provide by its rules that when a swap dealer or
major swap participant enters into or facilitates a
swap that is subject to the mandatory clearing
requirement of section 2(h) of the Act, the swap
dealer or major swap participant shall be responsible
for compliance with the mandatory trading
requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the Act.

(c) Establish rules governing the operation of the
facility, including rules specifying trading procedures
to be used in entering and executing orders traded or
posted on the facility, including block trades; and

Statutory Text

rules, including means to provide market participants
with impartial access to the market and to capture
information that may be used in establishing whether
rule violations have occurred;

474
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6:2

Citation

Regulator

(b) Capacity to detect and investigate rule
violations. A swap execution facility shall have
arrangements and resources for effective
enforcement of its rules. Such arrangements shall
include the authority to collect information and
documents on both a routine and non-routine basis,
including the authority to examine books and
records kept by the swap execution facility's
members and by persons under investigation. A
swap execution facility's arrangements and
resources shall also facilitate the direct supervision

Statutory Text

of customer orders, trading against customer orders,
accommodation trading, and improper cross
trading. Specific trading practices that shall be
prohibited include front-running, wash trading, prearranged trading (except for block trades permitted
by part 43 of this chapter or other types of
transactions certified to or approved by the
Commission pursuant to the procedures under part
40 of this chapter), fraudulent trading, money
passes, and any other trading practices that a swap
execution facility deems to be abusive. A swap
execution facility shall also prohibit any other
manipulative or disruptive trading practices
prohibited by the Act or by the Commission
pursuant to Commission regulation.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(e) failure to keep real time marketing analysis
(f) failure
to
comply
or
complete
investigations or investigative reports
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(d) Automated trade surveillance system. A swap
execution facility shall maintain an automated trade
surveillance system capable of detecting potential
trade practice violations. The automated trade
surveillance system shall load and process daily
orders and trades no later than 24 hours after the
completion of the trading day. The automated trade
surveillance system shall have the capability to
detect and flag specific trade execution patterns and
trade anomalies; compute, retain, and compare
trading statistics; compute trade gains, losses, and
swap-equivalent positions; reconstruct the
sequence of market activity; perform market
analyses; and support system users to perform in-

(c) Compliance staff and resources. A swap
execution facility shall establish and maintain
sufficient compliance staff and resources to ensure
that it can conduct effective audit trail reviews,
trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, and
real-time market monitoring. The swap execution
facility's compliance staff shall also be sufficient to
address unusual market or trading events as they
arise, and to conduct and complete investigations in
a timely manner, as set forth in § 37.203(f).

Statutory Text

of the market and the analysis of data collected to
determine whether a rule violation has occurred.
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(1) Procedures. A swap execution facility shall
establish and maintain procedures that require
its compliance staff to conduct investigations of
possible rule violations. An investigation shall
be commenced upon the receipt of a request
from Commission staff or upon the discovery or
receipt of information by the swap execution
facility that indicates a reasonable basis for

(f) Investigations and investigation reports—

(e) Real-time market monitoring. A swap execution
facility shall conduct real-time market monitoring
of all trading activity on its system(s) or platform(s)
to identify disorderly trading and any market or
system anomalies. A swap execution facility shall
have the authority to adjust trade prices or cancel
trades when necessary to mitigate market disrupting
events caused by malfunctions in its system(s) or
platform(s) or errors in orders submitted by
members and market participants. Any trade price
adjustments or trade cancellations shall be
transparent to the market and subject to standards
that are clear, fair, and publicly available.

Statutory Text

depth analyses and ad hoc queries of trade-related
data.
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(3) Investigation reports when a reasonable
basis exists for finding a violation. Compliance
staff shall submit a written investigation report
for disciplinary action in every instance in which
compliance staff determines from surveillance
or from an investigation that a reasonable basis
exists for finding a rule violation. The
investigation report shall include the reason the
investigation was initiated; a summary of the
complaint, if any; the relevant facts; compliance
staff's analysis and conclusions; and a

(2) Timeliness. Each compliance staff
investigation shall be completed in a timely
manner. Absent mitigating factors, a timely
manner is no later than 12 months after the date
that an investigation is opened. Mitigating
factors that may reasonably justify an
investigation taking longer than 12 months to
complete include the complexity of the
investigation, the number of firms or individuals
involved as potential wrongdoers, the number of
potential violations to be investigated, and the
volume of documents and data to be examined
and analyzed by compliance staff.

Statutory Text

finding that a violation may have occurred or
will occur.
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CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 37.400
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A CCO could be liable for failing to establish and
enforce rules and conditions of a swap execution
(a) Establish and enforce rules or terms and
facility in regards to trading procedures and
conditions defining, or specifications detailing:
processing; monitoring trading in swaps.

The swap execution facility shall:

(g) Additional sources for compliance. A swap
execution facility may refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part to
demonstrate to the Commission compliance with
the requirements of § 37.203.

(5) Warning letters. No more than one warning
letter may be issued to the same person or entity
found to have committed the same rule violation
within a rolling twelve month period.

(4) Investigation reports when no reasonable
basis exists for finding a violation. If after
conducting an investigation, compliance staff
determines that no reasonable basis exists for
finding a rule violation, it shall prepare a written
report including the reason the investigation was
initiated; a summary of the complaint, if any; the
relevant facts; and compliance staff's analysis
and conclusions.

Statutory Text

recommendation as to whether disciplinary
action should be pursued.
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Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 37.1500

The CCO could be liable if he or she fails to
(3) In consultation with the board of the facility, a annually prepare and sign a report detailing the
body performing a function similar to that of a financials of the swap facility.

this subsection;

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) In general. Each swap execution facility shall A CCO could be liable for failing to comply with
designate an individual to serve as a chief compliance its duties in relation to the swap execution facility.
officer.
These include: reporting to the board or senior
officer,
reviewing compliance; resolving conflicts,
(b) Duties. The chief compliance officer shall:
establish and administer policies and procedures,
(1) Report directly to the board or to the senior complying with the Act and establishing
officer of the facility;
procedures for remediation of noncompliance
issues.
(2) Review compliance with the core principles in

(b) Monitor trading in swaps to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of
the delivery or cash settlement process through
surveillance, compliance, and disciplinary practices
and procedures, including methods for conducting
real-time monitoring of trading and comprehensive
and accurate trade reconstructions.

(2) Procedures for trade processing of swaps on
or through the facilities of the swap execution
facility; and

Statutory Text

(1) Trading procedures to be used in entering and
executing orders traded on or through the
facilities of the swap execution facility; and
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(1) In general. In accordance with rules prescribed
by the Commission, the chief compliance officer

(d) Annual reports—

(c) Requirements for procedures. In establishing
procedures under paragraph (b)(6) of this section, the
chief compliance officer shall design the procedures
to establish the handling, management response,
remediation, retesting, and closing of noncompliance
issues.

(6) Establish procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues found during compliance
office reviews, look backs, internal or external audit
findings, self-reported errors, or through validated
complaints.

(5) Ensure compliance with the Act and the rules
and regulations issued under the Act, including
rules prescribed by the Commission pursuant to
section 5h of the Act; and

(4) Be responsible for establishing and
administering the policies and procedures required
to be established pursuant to this section;

Statutory Text

board, or the senior officer of the facility, resolve
any conflicts of interest that may arise;
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Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 37.1501
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(a) Definition of board of directors. For purposes of Liability for failure to designate a CCO.
this part, the term “board of directors” means the
(1) A CCO could be liable for failure to carry
board of directors of a swap execution facility, or for
out the duties of a CCO in the Act and
those swap execution facilities whose organizational
Commission regulations
structure does not include a board of directors, a body
(2) Liability if the CCO does not meet the
performing a function similar to a board of directors.
designated qualifications.

(ii) Include in the report a certification that, under
penalty of law, the report is accurate and
complete.

(i) Submit each report described in paragraph
(d)(1) of this section with the appropriate
financial report of the swap execution facility that
is required to be submitted to the Commission
pursuant to section 5h of the Act; and

(2) Requirements. The chief compliance officer
shall:

(ii) The policies and procedures, including the
code of ethics and conflict of interest policies, of
the swap execution facility.

(i) The compliance of the swap execution facility
with the Act; and

Statutory Text

shall annually prepare and sign a report that
contains a description of:
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Regulator
of

chief

(c) Appointment, supervision, and removal of chief
compliance office—

(2) Qualifications of chief compliance officer. The
individual designated to serve as chief compliance
officer shall have the background and skills
appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities of the
position. No individual disqualified from
registration pursuant to sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of
the Act may serve as a chief compliance officer.

(ii) The chief compliance officer shall have
supervisory authority over all staff acting at the
direction of the chief compliance officer.

(i) The position of chief compliance officer shall
carry with it the authority and resources to
develop and enforce policies and procedures
necessary to fulfill the duties set forth for chief
compliance officers in the Act and Commission
regulations.

(1) Chief compliance officer required. Each swap
execution facility shall establish the position of
chief compliance officer and designate an
individual to serve in that capacity.

qualifications

Statutory Text

(b) Designation and
compliance officer—

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(2) Supervision of chief compliance officer. A swap
execution facility's chief compliance officer shall
report directly to the board of directors or to the
senior officer of the swap execution facility, at the
swap execution facility's discretion.

(iv) The chief compliance officer shall provide
any information regarding the swap execution
facility's self-regulatory program that is
requested by the board of directors or the
regulatory oversight committee.

(iii) The chief compliance officer shall meet with
the board of directors at least annually and the
regulatory oversight committee at least quarterly.

(ii) The board of directors or the senior officer
shall approve the compensation of the chief
compliance officer.

(i) A swap execution facility's chief compliance
officer shall be appointed by its board of directors
or senior officer. A swap execution facility shall
notify the Commission within two business days
of appointing any new chief compliance officer,
whether interim or permanent.

Statutory Text

(1) Appointment and compensation of chief
compliance officer.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Potential Impact on CCOs
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(i) Conflicts between business considerations and
compliance requirements;

(2) In consultation with the board of directors, a
body performing a function similar to the board of
directors, or the senior officer of the swap execution
facility, resolving any conflicts of interest that may
arise, including:

(1) Overseeing and reviewing the swap execution
facility's compliance with section 5h of the Act and
any related rules adopted by the Commission;

(d) Duties of chief compliance officer. The chief
compliance officer's duties shall include, but are not
limited to, the following:

(ii) The swap execution facility shall notify the
Commission of such removal within two business
days.

(i) Removal of a swap execution facility's chief
compliance officer shall require the approval of a
majority of the swap execution facility's board of
directors. If the swap execution facility does not
have a board of directors, then the chief
compliance officer may be removed by the senior
officer of the swap execution facility.

Statutory Text

(3) Removal of chief compliance officer.

2017
485

Citation

Regulator

(7) Establishing and administering a compliance
manual designed to promote compliance with the
applicable laws, rules, and regulations and a written

(6) Establishing and following appropriate
procedures for the handling, management response,
remediation,
retesting,
and
closing
of
noncompliance issues;

(5) Establishing procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues identified by the chief
compliance officer through a compliance office
review, look-back, internal or external audit
finding, self-reported error, or validated complaint;

(4) Taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance
with the Act and the rules of the Commission;

(3) Establishing and administering written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of the Act and the rules of the
Commission;

(iii) Conflicts between a swap execution facility's
management and members of the board of
directors;

Statutory Text

(ii) Conflicts between business considerations
and the requirement that the swap execution
facility provide fair, open, and impartial access as
set forth in § 37.202; and;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(e) Preparation of annual compliance report. The
chief compliance officer shall, not less than annually,
prepare and sign an annual compliance report that, at
a minimum, contains the following information
covering the time period since the date on which the
swap execution facility became registered with the
Commission or since the end of the period covered by

(9) Supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of
any regulatory services provided to the swap
execution facility by a regulatory service provider
in accordance with § 37.204.

(8) Supervising the swap execution facility's selfregulatory program with respect to trade practice
surveillance; market surveillance; real-time market
monitoring; compliance with audit trail
requirements; enforcement and disciplinary
proceedings; audits, examinations, and other
regulatory responsibilities with respect to members
and market participants (including ensuring
compliance with, if applicable, financial integrity,
financial reporting, sales practice, recordkeeping,
and other requirements); and

Statutory Text

code of ethics designed to prevent ethical violations
and to promote honesty and ethical conduct;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(4) A description of the financial, managerial, and
operational resources set aside for compliance with

(3) A list of any material changes to compliance
policies and procedures since the last annual
compliance report;

(iii) Discusses areas for improvement and
recommends potential or prospective changes or
improvements to its compliance program and
resources;

(ii) Provides a self-assessment as to the
effectiveness of these policies and procedures;
and

(i) Identifies the policies and procedures that are
designed to ensure compliance with each
subsection and core principle, including each
duty specified in section 5h(f)(15)(B) of the Act;

(2) A review of applicable Commission regulations
and each subsection and core principle of section 5h
of the Act, that, with respect to each:

(1) A description of the swap execution facility's
written policies and procedures, including the code
of ethics and conflict of interest policies;

Statutory Text

a previously filed annual compliance report, as
applicable:

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(1) Prior to submission to the Commission, the chief
compliance officer shall provide the annual
compliance report to the board of directors of the
swap execution facility for its review. If the swap
execution facility does not have a board of
directors, then the annual compliance report shall be
provided to the senior officer for his or her review.

(f) Submission of annual compliance report.

(6) A certification by the chief compliance officer
that, to the best of his or her knowledge and
reasonable belief, and under penalty of law, the
annual compliance report is accurate and complete.

(5) A description of any material compliance
matters, including noncompliance issues identified
through a compliance office review, look-back,
internal or external audit finding, self-reported
error, or validated complaint, and an explanation of
how they were resolved; and

Statutory Text

respect to the Act and Commission regulations,
including a description of the swap execution
facility's self-regulatory program's staffing and
structure, a catalogue of investigations and
disciplinary actions taken since the last annual
compliance report, and a review of the performance
of disciplinary committees and panels;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(4) A swap execution facility may request from the
Commission an extension of time to file its annual
compliance report based on substantial, undue

(3) Promptly upon discovery of any material error
or omission made in a previously filed annual
compliance report, the chief compliance officer
shall file an amendment with the Commission to
correct the material error or omission. An
amendment shall contain the certification required
under paragraph (e)(6) of this section.

(2) The annual compliance report shall be submitted
electronically to the Commission not later than 60
calendar days after the end of the swap execution
facility's fiscal year, concurrently with the filing of
the fourth fiscal quarter financial report pursuant
to§ 37.1306.

Statutory Text

Members of the board of directors and the senior
officer shall not require the chief compliance officer
to make any changes to the report. Submission of
the report to the board of directors or the senior
officer, and any subsequent discussion of the report,
shall be recorded in board minutes or a similar
written record, as evidence of compliance with this
requirement.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Potential Impact on CCOs
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(iv) Any records relevant to the swap execution
facility's annual compliance report, including, but

(iii) Copies of all materials, including written
reports provided to the board of directors or
senior officer in connection with the review of the
annual compliance report under paragraph (f)(1)
of this section and the board minutes or a similar
written record that documents the review of the
annual compliance report by the board of
directors or senior officer; and

(ii) Copies of all materials created in furtherance
of the chief compliance officer's duties listed in
paragraphs (d)(8) and (d)(9) of this section,
including records of any investigations or
disciplinary actions taken by the swap execution
facility;

(i) A copy of the written policies and procedures,
including the code of ethics and conflicts of
interest policies adopted in furtherance of
compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations;

(1) The swap execution facility shall maintain:

(g) Recordkeeping.

Statutory Text

hardship. Extensions of the filing deadline may be
granted at the discretion of the Commission.

2017
491

Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 38.158

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Procedures. A designated contract market must (a) A CCO could be liable for failure to start an
establish and maintain procedures that require its
investigation upon the receipt of a request
compliance staff to conduct investigations of possible
from Commission staff or discovery or receipt

SOURCE: 78 FR 33582, June 4, 2013, unless
otherwise noted.

(h) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby
delegates, until it orders otherwise, to the Director of
the Division of Market Oversight or such other
employee or employees as the Director may designate
from time to time, authority to grant or deny a swap
execution facility's request for an extension of time to
file its annual compliance report under paragraph
(f)(4) of this section.

(2) The swap execution facility shall maintain
records in accordance with § 1.31 and part 45 of this
chapter.

(B) Contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or
financial data related to the annual compliance
report.

(A) Created, sent, or received in connection
with the annual compliance report and

Statutory Text

not limited to, work papers and other documents
that form the basis of the report, and memoranda,
correspondence, other documents, and records
that are
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(c) Investigation reports when a reasonable basis
exists for finding a violation. Compliance staff must
submit a written investigation report for disciplinary
action in every instance in which compliance staff
determines from surveillance or from an investigation
that a reasonable basis exists for finding a rule
violation. The investigation report must include the
reason the investigation was initiated; a summary of

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

rule violations. An investigation must be commenced
of information by the designated contract
upon the receipt of a request from Commission staff
market.
or upon the discovery or receipt of information by the (b) liability for failure to complete the
designated contract market that indicates a reasonable
investigation in a timely manner
basis for finding that a violation may have occurred (c) liability for not submitting a written
or will occur.
investigation report when reasonable basis for
a
violation exists
(b) Timeliness. Each compliance staff investigation
(d)
liability
for not submitting a written report
must be completed in a timely manner. Absent
when a reasonable basis does not exist
mitigating factors, a timely manner is no later than 12
(e) liability for issuing more than one warning for
months after the date that an investigation is opened.
the same violation.
Mitigating factors that may reasonably justify an
investigation taking longer than 12 months to
complete include the complexity of the investigation,
the number of firms or individuals involved as
potential wrongdoers, the number of potential
violations to be investigated, and the volume of
documents and data to be examined and analyzed by
compliance staff.

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
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Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 39.10(c)

(1) Designation. Each derivatives clearing
organization shall establish the position of chief
compliance officer, designate an individual to serve
as the chief compliance officer, and provide the
chief compliance officer with the full responsibility
and authority to develop and enforce, in
consultation with the board of directors or the senior
officer, appropriate compliance policies and

(c) Chief compliance officer—

(e) Warning letters. No more than one warning letter
may be issued to the same person or entity found to
have committed the same rule violation within a
rolling twelve month period.

(d) Investigation reports when no reasonable basis
exists for finding a violation. If after conducting an
investigation, compliance staff determines that no
reasonable basis exists for finding a violation, it must
prepare a written report including the reason(s) the
investigation was initiated; a summary of the
complaint, if any; the relevant facts; and compliance
staff's analysis and conclusions.

Statutory Text

the complaint, if any; the relevant facts; compliance
staff's analysis and conclusions; and a
recommendation as to whether disciplinary action
should be pursued.

The CCO could be liable if they fail to fulfill their
responsibilities.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(2) Chief compliance officer duties. The chief
compliance officer's duties shall include, but are not
limited to:

(iv) A change in the designation of the individual
serving as the chief compliance officer of the
derivatives clearing organization shall be
reported to the Commission in accordance with
the requirements of § 39.19(c)(4)(ix) of this part.

(iii) The chief compliance officer shall meet with
the board of directors or the senior officer at least
once a year.

(ii) The chief compliance officer shall report to
the board of directors or the senior officer of the
derivatives clearing organization. The board of
directors or the senior officer shall approve the
compensation of the chief compliance officer.

(i) The individual designated to serve as chief
compliance officer shall have the background and
skills appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities
of the position. No individual who would be
disqualified from registration under sections
8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may serve as a chief
compliance officer.

Statutory Text

procedures, to fulfill the duties set forth in the Act
and Commission regulations.

Potential Impact on CCOs

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
495

Citation

Regulator

(vi) Establishing and following appropriate
procedures for the handling, management
response, remediation, retesting, and closing of
noncompliance issues.

(v) Establishing procedures for the remediation
of noncompliance issues identified by the chief
compliance officer through any compliance
office review, look-back, internal or external
audit finding, self-reported error, or validated
complaint; and

(iv) Taking reasonable steps to ensure
compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations relating to agreements, contracts, or
transactions, and with Commission regulations
prescribed under section 5b of the Act;

(iii) Establishing and administering written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to
prevent violation of the Act;

(ii) In consultation with the board of directors or
the senior officer, resolving any conflicts of
interest that may arise;

Statutory Text

(i) Reviewing the derivatives clearing
organization's compliance with the core
principles set forth in section 5b of the Act, and
the Commission's regulations thereunder;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(C) Discuss areas for improvement, and
recommend potential or prospective changes or
improvements to the derivatives clearing
organization's compliance program and
resources allocated to compliance;

(B) Provide an assessment as to the
effectiveness of these policies and procedures;

(A) Identify the compliance policies and
procedures that are designed to ensure
compliance with the core principle;

(ii) Review each core principle and applicable
Commission regulation, and with respect to each:

(i) Contain a description of the derivatives
clearing organization's written policies and
procedures, including the code of ethics and
conflict of interest policies;

Statutory Text

(3) Annual report. The chief compliance officer
shall, not less than annually, prepare and sign a
written report that covers the most recently
completed fiscal year of the derivatives clearing
organization, and provide the annual report to the
board of directors or the senior officer. The annual
report shall, at a minimum:

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(ii) The annual report shall be submitted
electronically to the Secretary of the Commission
in the format and manner specified by the
Commission not more than 90 days after the end
of the derivatives clearing organization's fiscal
year, concurrently with submission of the fiscal

(i) Prior to submitting the annual report to the
Commission, the chief compliance officer shall
provide the annual report to the board of directors
or the senior officer of the derivatives clearing
organization for review. Submission of the report
to the board of directors or the senior officer shall
be recorded in the board minutes or otherwise, as
evidence of compliance with this requirement.

(4) Submission of annual report to the Commission.

(v) Describe any material compliance matters,
including incidents of noncompliance, since the
date of the last annual report and describe the
corresponding action taken.

(iv) Describe the financial, managerial, and
operational resources set aside for compliance
with the Act and Commission regulations; and

Statutory Text

(iii) List any material changes to compliance
policies and procedures since the last annual
report;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(A) A copy of all compliance policies and
procedures and all other policies and
procedures adopted in furtherance of

(i) The derivatives clearing organization shall
maintain:

(5) Recordkeeping.

(iv) A derivatives clearing organization may
request from the Commission an extension of
time to submit its annual report in accordance
with § 39.19(c)(3) of this part.

(iii) The derivatives clearing organization shall
promptly submit an amended annual report if
material errors or omissions in the report are
identified after submission. An amendment must
contain the certification required under paragraph
(c)(4)(ii) of this section.

Statutory Text

year-end audited financial statement that is
required to be furnished to the Commission
pursuant to § 39.19(c)(3)(ii) of this part. The
report shall include a certification by the chief
compliance officer that, to the best of his or her
knowledge and reasonable belief, and under
penalty of law, the annual report is accurate and
complete.

Potential Impact on CCOs

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
499

Regulator

CFTC

Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 49.22

(a) Definition of Board of Directors. For purposes of
this part 49, the term “board of directors” means the
board of directors of a registered swap data
repository, or for those swap data repositories whose
organizational structure does not include a board of

(ii) The derivatives clearing organization shall
maintain records in accordance with § 1.31 of this
chapter and § 39.20 of this part.

(C) Any records relevant to the annual report,
including, but not limited to, work papers and
other documents that form the basis of the
report, and memoranda, correspondence,
other documents, and records that are created,
sent, or received in connection with the annual
report and contain conclusions, opinions,
analyses, or financial data related to the
annual report.

(B) Copies of materials, including written
reports provided to the board of directors or
the senior officer in connection with the
review of the annual report under paragraph
(c)(4)(i) of this section; and

Statutory Text

compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations;

The CCO could be liable for failure to carry out his
or her duties.

The Board of Directors could be liable if they do
not designate a CCO or if they are designate an
unqualified candidate.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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qualifications

of

chief

(2) Qualifications of chief compliance officer. The
individual designated to serve as chief compliance
officer shall have the background and skills
appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities of the
position and shall be subject to the following
requirements:

(ii) The chief compliance officer shall have
supervisory authority over all staff acting at the
direction of the chief compliance officer.

(i) The position of chief compliance officer shall
carry with it the authority and resources to
develop and enforce policies and procedures
necessary to fulfill the duties set forth for chief
compliance officers in the Act and Commission
regulations.

(1) Chief Compliance Officer required. Each
registered swap data repository shall establish the
position of chief compliance officer, and designate
an individual to serve in that capacity.

(b) Designation and
compliance officer.

Statutory Text

directors, a body performing a function similar to that
of a board of directors.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(1) Appointment and Compensation of Chief
Compliance Officer Determined by Board of
Directors. A registered swap data repository's chief
compliance officer shall be appointed by its board
of directors. The board of directors shall also
approve the compensation of the chief compliance
officer and shall meet with the chief compliance
officer at least annually. The appointment of the
chief compliance officer and approval of the chief
compliance officer's compensation shall require the
approval of the board of directors. The senior
officer of the swap data repository may fulfill these
responsibilities. A swap data repository shall notify
the Commission of the appointment of a new chief
compliance officer within two business days of
such appointment.

(c) Appointment, Supervision, and Removal of Chief
Compliance Officer.

(ii) The chief compliance officer may not be a
member of the swap data repository's legal
department or serve as its general counsel.

Statutory Text

(i) No individual disqualified from registration
pursuant to Sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may
serve as a chief compliance officer.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(d) Duties of chief compliance officer. The chief
compliance officer's duties shall include, but are not
limited to, the following:

(iii) The swap data repository shall notify the
Commission within two business days of
appointing any new chief compliance officer,
whether interim or permanent.

(ii) The swap data repository shall notify the
Commission of such removal within two business
days; and

(i) Removal of a registered swap data repository's
chief compliance officer shall require the
approval of the swap data repository's board of
directors. If the swap data repository does not
have a board of directors, then the chief
compliance officer may be removed by the senior
officer of the swap data repository;

(3) Removal of Chief Compliance Officer by Board
of Directors.

Statutory Text

(2) Supervision of Chief Compliance Officer. A
registered swap data repository's chief compliance
officer shall report directly to the board of directors
or to the senior officer of the swap data repository,
at the swap data repository's discretion.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(4) Taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance
with the Act and Commission regulations relating
to agreements, contracts, or transactions, and with
Commission regulations under Section 21 of the

(3) Establishing and administering written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violation of the Act and any rules adopted by the
Commission;

(iii) Conflicts between a registered swap data
repository's management and members of the
board of directors;

(ii) Conflicts between business considerations
and the requirement that the registered swap data
repository provide fair and open access as set
forth in § 49.27 of this part; and

(i) Conflicts between business considerations and
compliance requirements;

(2) In consultation with the board of directors, a
body performing a function similar to the board, or
the senior officer of the swap data repository,
resolving any conflicts of interest that may arise
including:

Statutory Text

(1) Overseeing and reviewing the swap data
repository's compliance with Section 21 of the Act
and any related rules adopted by the Commission;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(e) Annual compliance report prepared by chief
compliance officer. The chief compliance officer
shall, not less than annually, prepare and sign an
annual compliance report, that at a minimum,
contains the following information covering the time
period since the date on which the swap data
repository became registered with the Commission or
since the end of the period covered by a previously
filed annual compliance report, as applicable:

(7) Establishing and administering a written code of
ethics designed to prevent ethical violations and to
promote honesty and ethical conduct.

(6) Establishing and following appropriate
procedures for the handling, management response,
remediation,
retesting,
and
closing
of
noncompliance issues; and

(5) Establishing procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues identified by the chief
compliance officer through a compliance office
review, look-back, internal or external audit
finding, self-reported error, or validated complaint;

Statutory Text

Act, including confidentiality and indemnification
agreements entered into with foreign or domestic
regulators pursuant to Section 21(d) of the Act;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(4) A description of the financial, managerial, and
operational resources set aside for compliance with
respect to the Act and Commission regulations;

(3) A list of any material changes to compliance
policies and procedures since the last annual
compliance report;

(iii) Discusses areas for improvement, and
recommends potential or prospective changes or
improvements to its compliance program and
resources;

(ii) Provides a self-assessment as to the
effectiveness of these policies and procedures;
and

(i) Identifies the policies and procedures that are
designed to ensure compliance with each
subsection and core principle, including each
duty specified in Section 21(c);

(2) A review of applicable Commission regulations
and each subsection and core principle of Section
21 of the Act, that, with respect to each:

Statutory Text

(1) A description of the registered swap data
repository's written policies and procedures,
including the code of ethics and conflict of interest
policies;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(1) Prior to submission of the annual compliance
report to the Commission, the chief compliance
officer shall provide the annual compliance report
to the board of the registered swap data repository
for its review. If the swap data repository does not
have a board, then the annual compliance report
shall be provided to the senior officer for their
review. Members of the board and the senior officer
may not require the chief compliance officer to
make any changes to the report. Submission of the
report to the board or senior officer, and any
subsequent discussion of the report, shall be

(f) Submission of Annual Compliance Report by
Chief Compliance Officer to the Commission.

(6) A certification by the chief compliance officer
that, to the best of his or her knowledge and
reasonable belief, and under penalty of law, the
annual compliance report is accurate and complete.

Statutory Text

(5) A description of any material compliance
matters, including noncompliance issues identified
through a compliance office review, look-back,
internal or external audit finding, self-reported
error, or validated complaint, and explains how they
were resolved; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(1) The registered swap data repository shall
maintain:

(g) Recordkeeping.

(4) A registered swap data repository may request
the Commission for an extension of time to file its
compliance report based on substantial, undue
hardship. Extensions for the filing deadline may be
granted at the discretion of the Commission.

(3) Promptly upon discovery of any material error
or omission made in a previously filed compliance
report, the chief compliance officer shall file an
amendment with the Commission to correct any
material error or omission. An amendment shall
contain the oath or certification required under
paragraph (e)(67) of this section.

(2) The annual compliance report shall be provided
electronically to the Commission not more than 60
days after the end of the registered swap data
repository's fiscal year, concurrently with the filing
of the annual amendment to Form SDR that must be
submitted to the Commission pursuant to
§ 49.3(a)(5) of this part.

Statutory Text

recorded in board minutes or similar written record,
as evidence of compliance with this requirement.
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(B) Contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or
financial data related to the annual compliance
report.

(A) Created, sent or received in connection with
the annual compliance report and

(iii) Any records relevant to the registered swap
data repository's annual compliance report,
including, but not limited to, work papers and
other documents that form the basis of the report,
and
memoranda,
correspondence,
other
documents, and records that are:

(ii) Copies of all materials, including written
reports provided to the board of directors or
senior officer in connection with the review of the
annual compliance report under paragraph (f)(1)
of this section and the board minutes or similar
written record of such review, that record the
submission of the annual compliance report to the
board of directors or senior officer; and

Statutory Text

(i) A copy of the written policies and procedures,
including the code of ethics and conflicts of
interest policies adopted in furtherance of
compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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17 C.F.R.
§ 75.20(a)(d)

Citation

Potential Impact on CCOs

(1) Written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to document, describe, monitor and limit
trading activities subject to subpart B of this part
(including those permitted under §§ 75.3 to 75.6),
including setting, monitoring and managing
required limits set out in §§ 75.4 and 75.5, and
activities and investments with respect to a covered
fund subject to subpart C of this part (including
those permitted under §§ 75.11 through 75.14)

(b) Contents of compliance program. Except as
provided in paragraph (f) of this section, the
compliance program required by paragraph (a) of this
section, at a minimum, shall include:

(a) Program requirement. Each banking entity shall There could be liability if there is not a compliance
develop and provide for the continued administration program of trading and investments instituted in
of a compliance program reasonably designed to each banking entity.
ensure and monitor compliance with the prohibitions
and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered
fund activities and investments set forth in section 13
of the BHC Act and this part. The terms, scope and
detail of the compliance program shall be appropriate
for the types, size, scope and complexity of activities
and business structure of the banking entity.

Statutory Text

(2) The registered swap data repository shall
maintain records in accordance with § 1.31 of this
chapter.
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(5) Training for trading personnel and managers, as
well as other appropriate personnel, to effectively

(4) Independent testing and audit of the
effectiveness of the compliance program conducted
periodically by qualified personnel of the banking
entity or by a qualified outside party;

(3) A management framework that clearly
delineates responsibility and accountability for
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this
part and includes appropriate management review
of trading limits, strategies, hedging activities,
investments, incentive compensation and other
matters identified in this part or by management as
requiring attention;

(2) A system of internal controls reasonably
designed to monitor compliance with section 13 of
the BHC Act and this part and to prevent the
occurrence of activities or investments that are
prohibited by section 13 of the BHC Act and this
part;

Statutory Text

conducted by the banking entity to ensure that all
activities and investments conducted by the banking
entity that are subject to section 13 of the BHC Act
and this part comply with section 13 of the BHC Act
and this part;
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(2) The banking entity has reported total
consolidated assets as of the previous calendar year
end of $50 billion or more or, in the case of a foreign
banking entity, has total U.S. assets as of the
previous calendar year end of $50 billion or more
(including all subsidiaries, affiliates, branches and
agencies of the foreign banking entity operating,
located or organized in the United States); or

(1) The banking entity engages in proprietary
trading permitted under subpart B of this part and is
required to comply with the reporting requirements
of paragraph (d) of this section;

(c) Additional standards. In addition to the
requirements in paragraph (b) of this section, the
compliance program of a banking entity must satisfy
the requirements and other standards contained in
Appendix B of this part, if:

(6) Records sufficient to demonstrate compliance
with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part, which
a banking entity must promptly provide to the
Commission upon request and retain for a period of
no less than 5 years or such longer period as
required by the Commission.

Statutory Text

implement and enforce the compliance program;
and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(ii) In the case of a foreign banking entity, the
average gross sum of the trading assets and

(i) The banking entity (other than a foreign
banking entity as provided in paragraph (d)(1)(ii)
of this section) has, together with its affiliates and
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities
(excluding trading assets and liabilities involving
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States
or any agency of the United States) the average
gross sum of which (on a worldwide consolidated
basis) over the previous consecutive four
quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of
the four prior calendar quarters, equals or exceeds
the threshold established in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section;

(1) A banking entity engaged in proprietary trading
activity permitted under subpart B of this part shall
comply with the reporting requirements described
in Appendix A of this part, if:

(d) Reporting requirements under Appendix A of this
Part.

Statutory Text

(3) The Commission notifies the banking entity in
writing that it must satisfy the requirements and
other standards contained in Appendix B of this
part.
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(3) Frequency of reporting. Unless the Commission
notifies the banking entity in writing that it must
report on a different basis, a banking entity with $50
billion or more in trading assets and liabilities (as

(2) The threshold for reporting under paragraph
(d)(1) of this section shall be $50 billion beginning
on June 30, 2014; $25 billion beginning on April
30, 2016; and $10 billion beginning on December
31, 2016.

(iii) The Commission notifies the banking entity
in writing that it must satisfy the reporting
requirements contained in Appendix A of this
part.

Statutory Text

liabilities of the combined U.S. operations of the
foreign banking entity (including all subsidiaries,
affiliates, branches and agencies of the foreign
banking entity operating, located or organized in
the United States and excluding trading assets
and liabilities involving obligations of or
guaranteed by the United States or any agency of
the United States) over the previous consecutive
four quarters, as measured as of the last day of
each of the four prior calendar quarters, equals or
exceeds the threshold established in paragraph
(d)(2) of this section; or

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

17 C.F.R.
§ 165.16

The Commodity Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections provisions set forth in Section 23(h) of
Commodity Exchange Act and this part 165 do not
provide individuals who provide information to the
Commission with immunity from prosecution. The
fact that an individual may become a whistleblower
and assist in Commission investigations and
enforcement actions does not preclude the
Commission from bringing an action against the
whistleblower based upon the whistleblower's own
conduct in connection with violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act and the Commission's

Statutory Text

calculated in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of
this section) shall report the information required by
Appendix A of this part for each calendar month
within 30 days of the end of the relevant calendar
month; beginning with information for the month of
January 2015, such information shall be reported
within 10 days of the end of each calendar month.
Any other banking entity subject to Appendix A of
this part shall report the information required by
Appendix A of this part for each calendar quarter
within 30 days of the end of that calendar quarter
unless the Commission notifies the banking entity
in writing that it must report on a different basis.
The CCO could be liable in spite of being a
whistleblower based on the whistleblower’s own
conduct in connection with violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act and the Commission’s
regulations. The cooperation may be taken into
consideration when determining a sanction for the
whistleblower.

Potential Impact on CCOs

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
515

(a) In general. Each security-based swap data Liability for failure of CCO to comply with their
repository shall identify on Form SDR (17 CFR duties.
249.1500) a person who has been designated by the
board to serve as a chief compliance officer of the
security-based swap data repository. The
compensation, appointment, and removal of the chief
compliance officer shall require the approval of a

SEC

17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13n11

The CCO could receive criminal charges subject to
a fine or imprisonment if they knowingly or
willingly make any false or fraudulent statements
or representations within the jurisdiction of any
agency in the U.S. There also could be criminal
penalties for certain violations of the Privacy Act.

Penalties. Title 18 U.S.C. 1001 makes it a criminal
offense, subject to a maximum fine of $10,000, or
imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both, to
knowingly and willingly make or cause to be made
any false or fraudulent statements or representations
in any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of
the United States. 5 U.S.C. 552a(i) makes it a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$5,000 for any person knowingly and willfully to
request or obtain any record concerning an individual
from the Commission under false pretenses. 5 U.S.C.
552a(i) (1) and (2) provide criminal penalties for
certain violations of the Privacy Act by officers and
employees of the Commission.

SEC

Potential Impact on CCOs

17 C.F.R.
§ 200.311

Statutory Text

regulations. If such an action is determined to be
appropriate, however, the Commission's Division of
Enforcement will take the whistleblower's
cooperation into consideration in accordance with its
sanction recommendations to the Commission.

Regulator

Citation
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(6) Material compliance matter means any
compliance matter that the board would reasonably
need to know to oversee the compliance of the
security-based swap data repository and that
involves, without limitation:

(5) Material change means a change that a chief
compliance officer would reasonably need to know
in order to oversee compliance of the security-based
swap data repository.

(4) Interactive Data Financial Report has the same
meaning as set forth in Rule 11 of Regulation S–T
(17 CFR 232.11).

(3) EDGAR Filer Manual has the same meaning as
set forth in Rule 11 of Regulation S–T (17 CFR
232.11).

(2) Director means any member of the board.

(1) Board means the board of directors of the
security-based swap data repository or a body
performing a function similar to the board of
directors of the security-based swap data repository.

(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section—

Statutory Text

majority of the security-based swap data repository's
board.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(2) Review the compliance of the security-based
swap data repository with respect to the
requirements and core principles described in

(1) Report directly to the board or to the senior
officer of the security-based swap data repository;

(c) Duties. Each chief compliance officer of a
security-based swap data repository shall:

(9) Tag (including the term tagged) has the same
meaning as set forth in Rule 11 of Regulation S–T
(17 CFR 232.11).

(8) Senior officer means the chief executive officer
or other equivalent officer.

(7) Official filing has the same meaning as set forth
in Rule 11 of Regulation S–T (17 CFR 232.11).

(iii) A weakness in the design or implementation
of the policies and procedures of the securitybased swap data repository.

(ii) A violation of the policies and procedures of
the security-based swap data repository by the
security-based swap data repository, its officers,
directors, employees, or agents; or

Statutory Text

(i) A violation of the federal securities laws by the
security-based swap data repository, its officers,
directors, employees, or agents;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(v) Validated complaint; and

(iv) Self-reported error; or

(iii) Internal or external audit finding;

(ii) Look-back;

(i) Compliance office review;

(6) Establish procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues identified by the chief
compliance officer through any—

(5) Take reasonable steps to ensure compliance
with the Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder relating to security-based swaps,
including each rule prescribed by the Commission
under section 13 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78m);

(4) Be responsible for administering each policy
and procedure that is required to be established
pursuant to section 13 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78m)
and the rules and regulations thereunder;

(3) In consultation with the board or the senior
officer of the security-based swap data repository,
take reasonable steps to resolve any material
conflicts of interest that may arise;

Statutory Text

section 13(n) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78m(n)) and the
rules and regulations thereunder;

2017
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Citation

Regulator

(iii) Any recommendation for material changes to
the policies and procedures as a result of the
annual review, the rationale for such
recommendation, and whether such policies and
procedures were or will be modified by the

(ii) Any material changes to the policies and
procedures since the date of the preceding
compliance report;

(i) The security-based swap data repository's
enforcement of its policies and procedures;

(1) In general. The chief compliance officer shall
annually prepare and sign a report that contains a
description of the compliance of the security-based
swap data repository with respect to the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder and each policy
and procedure of the security-based swap data
repository (including the code of ethics and
conflicts of interest policies of the security-based
swap data repository). Each compliance report shall
also contain, at a minimum, a description of:

(d) Compliance reports—

Statutory Text

(7) Establish and follow appropriate procedures for
the handling, management response, remediation,
retesting, and closing of noncompliance issues.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(1) Be a complete set of financial statements of the
security-based swap data repository that are

(f) Financial reports. Each financial report filed with
a compliance report shall:

(e) The chief compliance officer shall submit the
annual compliance report to the board for its review
prior to the filing of the report with the Commission.

(2) Requirements. A financial report of the securitybased swap data repository shall be filed with the
Commission as described in paragraph (g) of this
section and shall accompany a compliance report as
described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section. The
compliance report shall include a certification by
the chief compliance officer that, to the best of his
or her knowledge and reasonable belief, and under
penalty of law, the compliance report is accurate
and complete. The compliance report shall also be
filed in a tagged data format in accordance with the
instructions contained in the EDGAR Filer Manual,
as described in Rule 301 of Regulation S–T (17
CFR 232.301).

(iv) Any material compliance matters identified
since the date of the preceding compliance report.

Statutory Text

security-based swap data repository
incorporate such recommendation; and
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(4) If the security-based swap data repository's
financial
statements
contain
consolidated
information of a subsidiary of the security-based
swap data repository, provide condensed financial
information, in a financial statement footnote, as to
the financial position, changes in financial position
and results of operations of the security-based swap
data repository, as of the same dates and for the
same periods for which audited consolidated
financial statements are required. Such financial
information need not be presented in greater detail
than is required for condensed statements by Rules
10–01(a)(2), (3), and (4) of Regulation S–X (17

(3) Include a report of the registered public
accounting firm that complies with paragraphs (a)
through (d) of Rule 2–02 of Regulation S–X (17
CFR 210.2–02);

(2) Be audited in accordance with the standards of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
by a registered public accounting firm that is
qualified and independent in accordance with Rule
2–01 of Regulation S–X (17 CFR 210.2–01);

Statutory Text

prepared in accordance with U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles for the most recent
two fiscal years of the security-based swap data
repository;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(g) Reports filed pursuant to paragraphs (d) and (f) of
this section shall be filed within 60 days after the end
of the fiscal year covered by such reports.

(5) Be provided as an official filing in accordance
with the EDGAR Filer Manual and include, as part
of the official filing, an Interactive Data Financial
Report filed in accordance with Rule 407 of
Regulation S–T (17 CFR 232.407).

Statutory Text

CFR 210.10–01). Detailed footnote disclosure that
would normally be included with complete
financial statements may be omitted with the
exception of disclosures regarding material
contingencies,
long-term
obligations,
and
guarantees. Descriptions of significant provisions
of the security-based swap data repository's longterm obligations, mandatory dividend or
redemption requirements of redeemable stocks, and
guarantees of the security-based swap data
repository shall be provided along with a five-year
schedule of maturities of debt. If the material
contingencies, long-term obligations, redeemable
stock requirements, and guarantees of the securitybased swap data repository have been separately
disclosed in the consolidated statements, then they
need not be repeated in this schedule; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15Fk
-1

Citation
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(i) Reviewing the compliance of the securitybased swap dealer or major security-based swap
participant with respect to the security-based

(2) Take reasonable steps to ensure that the
registrant establishes, maintains and reviews
written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to achieve compliance with the Act and
the rules and regulations thereunder relating to its
business as a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant by:

(1) Report directly to the board of directors or to the
senior officer of the security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant; and

(b) Duties. The chief compliance officer shall:

(a) In general. A security-based swap dealer and A CCO could be liable for failure to complete his
major security-based swap participant shall designate or her duties.
an individual to serve as a chief compliance officer on
its registration form.

Statutory Text

(h) No officer, director, or employee of a securitybased swap data repository may directly or indirectly
take any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or
fraudulently influence the security-based swap data
repository's chief compliance officer in the
performance of his or her duties under this section.

524
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6:2

Citation

Regulator

Potential Impact on CCOs

CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART

(iii) Taking reasonable steps to ensure that the
registrant establishes and follows procedures

(E) Complaint that can be validated; and

(D) Self-reporting to the Commission and other
appropriate authorities; or

(C) Internal or external audit finding;

(B) Look-back;

(A) Compliance office review;

(ii) Taking reasonable steps to ensure that the
registrant establishes, maintains and reviews
policies and procedures reasonably designed to
remediate non-compliance issues identified by
the chief compliance officer through any means,
including any:

Statutory Text

swap dealer and major security-based swap
participant requirements described in section 15F
of the Act, and the rules and regulations
thereunder, where the review shall involve
preparing the registrant's annual assessment of its
written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to achieve compliance with section 15F
of the Act, and the rules and regulations
thereunder, by the security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant;

2017
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(A) The security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant's assessment of

(i) Each compliance report shall also contain, at a
minimum, a description of:

(2) Requirements.

(1) In general. The chief compliance officer shall
annually prepare and sign a compliance report that
contains a description of the written policies and
procedures of the security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant described in
paragraph (b) of this section (including the code of
ethics and conflict of interest policies).

(c) Annual reports—

(4) Administer each policy and procedure that is
required to be established pursuant to section 15F
of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder.

(3) In consultation with the board of directors or the
senior officer of the security-based swap dealer or
major security-based swap participant, take
reasonable steps to resolve any material conflicts of
interest that may arise; and

Statutory Text

reasonably designed for the handling,
management response, remediation, retesting,
and resolution of non-compliance issues;
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(A) Be submitted to the Commission within 30
days following the deadline for filing the
security-based swap dealer's or major securitybased swap participant's annual financial report

(ii) A compliance report under paragraph (c)(1)
of this section also shall:

(E) The financial, managerial, operational, and
staffing resources set aside for compliance with
the Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder relating to its business as a securitybased swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant, including any material
deficiencies in such resources.

(D) Any material non-compliance matters
identified; and

(C) Any areas for improvement, and
recommended potential or prospective changes
or improvements to its compliance program
and resources devoted to compliance;

(B) Any material changes to the registrant's
policies and procedures since the date of the
preceding compliance report;

Statutory Text

the effectiveness of its policies and procedures
relating to its business as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based participant;
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(iii) Extensions of time. A security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant
may request from the Commission an extension
of time to submit its compliance report, provided
the registrant's failure to timely submit the report
could not be eliminated by the registrant without

(D) Include a certification by the chief
compliance officer or senior officer that, to the
best of his or her knowledge and reasonable
belief and under penalty of law, the
information contained in the compliance report
is accurate and complete in all material
respects.

(C) Be discussed in one or more meetings
conducted by the senior officer with the chief
compliance officer(s) in the preceding 12
months, the subject of which addresses the
obligations in this section; and

(B) Be submitted to the board of directors and
audit committee (or equivalent bodies) and the
senior officer of the security-based swap dealer
or major security-based swap participant prior
to submission to the Commission;

Statutory Text

with the Commission pursuant to section 15F
of the Act and rules and regulations thereunder;
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(e) Definitions. For purposes of this section,
references to:

(d) Compensation and removal. The compensation
and removal of the chief compliance officer shall
require the approval of a majority of the board of
directors of the security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant.

(v) Amendments. A security-based swap dealer
or major security-based swap participant shall
promptly submit an amended compliance report
if material errors or omissions in the report are
identified. An amendment must contain the
certification
required
under
paragraph
(c)(2)(ii)(D) of this section.

(iv) Incorporation by reference. A security-based
swap dealer or major security-based swap
participant may incorporate by reference sections
of a compliance report that have been submitted
within the current or immediately preceding
reporting period to the Commission.

Statutory Text

unreasonable effort or expense. Extensions of the
deadline will be granted at the discretion of the
Commission.
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(i) A violation of the federal securities laws
relating to its business as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant
by the firm or its officers, directors, employees or
agents;

(4) A material non-compliance matter means any
non-compliance matter about which the board of
directors of the security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant would reasonably
need to know to oversee the compliance of the
security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant, and that involves, without
limitation:

(3) Complaint that can be validated shall include
any written complaint by a counterparty involving
the security-based swap dealer or major securitybased swap participant or associated person of a
security-based swap dealer or major security-based
swap participant that can be supported upon
reasonable investigation.

(2) The senior officer shall include the chief
executive officer or other equivalent officer.

Statutory Text

(1) The board or board of directors shall include a
body performing a function similar to the board of
directors.
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(2) To be eligible for an award, you must submit
original information to the Commission in
accordance with the procedures and conditions
described in §§ 240.21F–4, 240.21F–8, and
240.21F–9 of this chapter.

This regulation could help eliminate liability for a
CCO if he or she submits the correct information
(1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with
to the SEC.
others, you provide the Commission with
information pursuant to the procedures set forth in
§ 240.21F–9(a) of this chapter, and the information
relates to a possible violation of the Federal
securities laws (including any rules or regulations
thereunder) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur. A whistleblower must be an
individual. A company or another entity is not
eligible to be a whistleblower.

(a) Definition of a whistleblower.

(iii) A weakness in the design or implementation
of the policies and procedures relating to its
business as a security-based swap dealer or major
security-based swap participant.

Statutory Text

(ii) A violation of the policies and procedures
relating to its business as a security-based swap
dealer or major security-based swap participant
by the firm or its officers, directors, employees or
agents; or
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(2) Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)), including any rules
promulgated thereunder, shall be enforceable in an
action or proceeding brought by the Commission.

(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply
whether or not you satisfy the requirements,
procedures and conditions to qualify for an
award.

(ii) You provide that information in a manner
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)(A)).

(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the
information you are providing relates to a
possible securities law violation (or, where
applicable, to a possible violation of the
provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
and;

(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections
afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act
(15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if:

Statutory Text

(b) Prohibition against retaliation.
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(1) Written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to document, describe, monitor and limit
trading activities subject to subpart B (including
those permitted under §§ 255.3 to 255.6 of subpart
B), including setting, monitoring and managing
required limits set out in § 2554 and § 2555, and
activities and investments with respect to a covered
fund subject to subpart C (including those permitted
under §§ 255.11 through 255.14 of subpart C)
conducted by the banking entity to ensure that all
activities and investments conducted by the banking
entity that are subject to section 13 of the BHC Act

(b) Contents of compliance program. Except as
provided in paragraph (f) of this section, the
compliance program required by paragraph (a) of this
section, at a minimum, shall include:

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Program requirement. Each banking entity shall A CCO could be liable for failure to develop,
develop and provide for the continued administration administer, and monitor a compliance program at
of a compliance program reasonably designed to each banking entity.
ensure and monitor compliance with the prohibitions
and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered
fund activities and investments set forth in section 13
of the BHC Act and this part. The terms, scope and
detail of the compliance program shall be appropriate
for the types, size, scope and complexity of activities
and business structure of the banking entity.
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(5) Training for trading personnel and managers, as
well as other appropriate personnel, to effectively
implement and enforce the compliance program;
and

(4) Independent testing and audit of the
effectiveness of the compliance program conducted
periodically by qualified personnel of the banking
entity or by a qualified outside party;

(3) A management framework that clearly
delineates responsibility and accountability for
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this
part and includes appropriate management review
of trading limits, strategies, hedging activities,
investments, incentive compensation and other
matters identified in this part or by management as
requiring attention;

(2) A system of internal controls reasonably
designed to monitor compliance with section 13 of
the BHC Act and this part and to prevent the
occurrence of activities or investments that are
prohibited by section 13 of the BHC Act and this
part;

Statutory Text

and this part comply with section 13 of the BHC Act
and this part;
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(2) The banking entity has reported total
consolidated assets as of the previous calendar year
end of $50 billion or more or, in the case of a foreign
banking entity, has total U.S. assets as of the
previous calendar year end of $50 billion or more
(including all subsidiaries, affiliates, branches and
agencies of the foreign banking entity operating,
located or organized in the United States); or

(1) The banking entity engages in proprietary
trading permitted under subpart B and is required to
comply with the reporting requirements of
paragraph (d) of this section;

(c) Additional standards. In addition to the
requirements in paragraph (b) of this section, the
compliance program of a banking entity must satisfy
the requirements and other standards contained in
Appendix B, if:

Statutory Text

(6) Records sufficient to demonstrate compliance
with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part, which
a banking entity must promptly provide to the SEC
upon request and retain for a period of no less than
5 years or such longer period as required by the
SEC.
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(ii) In the case of a foreign banking entity, the
average gross sum of the trading assets and
liabilities of the combined U.S. operations of the

(i) The banking entity (other than a foreign
banking entity as provided in paragraph (d)(1)(ii)
of this section) has, together with its affiliates and
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities
(excluding trading assets and liabilities involving
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States
or any agency of the United States) the average
gross sum of which (on a worldwide consolidated
basis) over the previous consecutive four
quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of
the four prior calendar quarters, equals or exceeds
the threshold established in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section;

(1) A banking entity engaged in proprietary trading
activity permitted under subpart B shall comply
with the reporting requirements described in
Appendix A, if:

(d) Reporting requirements under Appendix A to this
part.

Statutory Text

(3) The SEC notifies the banking entity in writing
that it must satisfy the requirements and other
standards contained in Appendix B to this part.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(3) Frequency of reporting: Unless the SEC notifies
the banking entity in writing that it must report on a
different basis, a banking entity with $50 billion or
more in trading assets and liabilities (as calculated
in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section)
shall report the information required by Appendix
A for each calendar month within 30 days of the end

(2) The threshold for reporting under paragraph
(d)(1) of this section shall be $50 billion beginning
on June 30, 2014; $25 billion beginning on April
30, 2016; and $10 billion beginning on December
31, 2016.

(iii) The SEC notifies the banking entity in
writing that it must satisfy the reporting
requirements contained in Appendix A.

Statutory Text

foreign banking entity (including all subsidiaries,
affiliates, branches and agencies of the foreign
banking entity operating, located or organized in
the United States and excluding trading assets
and liabilities involving obligations of or
guaranteed by the United States or any agency of
the United States) over the previous consecutive
four quarters, as measured as of the last day of
each of the four prior calendar quarters, equals or
exceeds the threshold established in paragraph
(d)(2) of this section; or

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(2) For each fund sponsored by the banking entity
(including all subsidiaries and affiliates) for which
the banking entity relies on one or more of the
exclusions from the definition of covered fund
provided by §§ 255.10(c)(1), 255.10(c)(5),

(1) Documentation of the exclusions or exemptions
other than sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 relied on by each
fund sponsored by the banking entity (including all
subsidiaries and affiliates) in determining that such
fund is not a covered fund;

(e) Additional documentation for covered funds. Any
banking entity that has more than $10 billion in total
consolidated assets as reported on December 31 of the
previous two calendar years shall maintain records
that include:

Statutory Text

of the relevant calendar month; beginning with
information for the month of January 2015, such
information shall be reported within 10 days of the
end of each calendar month. Any other banking
entity subject to Appendix A shall report the
information required by Appendix A for each
calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of that
calendar quarter unless the SEC notifies the
banking entity in writing that it must report on a
different basis.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(4) For any banking entity that is, or is controlled
directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is,
located in or organized under the laws of the United
States or of any State, if the aggregate amount of
ownership interests in foreign public funds that are
described in § 255.10(c)(1) of subpart C owned by
such banking entity (including ownership interests

(3) For each seeding vehicle described in
§ 255.10(c)(12)(i) or (iii) of subpart C that will
become a registered investment company or SEC–
regulated business development company, a written
plan
documenting
the
banking
entity's
determination that the seeding vehicle will become
a registered investment company or SEC–regulated
business development company; the period of time
during which the vehicle will operate as a seeding
vehicle; and the banking entity's plan to market the
vehicle to third-party investors and convert it into a
registered investment company or SEC–regulated
business development company within the time
period specified in § 255.12(a)(2)(i)(B) of subpart
C;

Statutory Text

255.10(c)(8), 255.10(c)(9), or 255.10(c)(10) of
subpart C, documentation supporting the banking
entity's determination that the fund is not a covered
fund pursuant to one or more of those exclusions;

Potential Impact on CCOs

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
539

Citation

Regulator

(f) Simplified programs for less active banking
entities—

(5) For purposes of paragraph (e)(4) of this section,
a U.S. branch, agency, or subsidiary of a foreign
banking entity is located in the United States;
however, the foreign bank that operates or controls
that branch, agency, or subsidiary is not considered
to be located in the United States solely by virtue of
operating or controlling the U.S. branch, agency, or
subsidiary.

Statutory Text

owned by any affiliate that is controlled directly or
indirectly by a banking entity that is located in or
organized under the laws of the United States or of
any State) exceeds $50 million at the end of two or
more consecutive calendar quarters, beginning with
the
next
succeeding
calendar
quarter,
documentation of the value of the ownership
interests owned by the banking entity (and such
affiliates) in each foreign public fund and each
jurisdiction in which any such foreign public fund
is organized, calculated as of the end of each
calendar quarter, which documentation must
continue until the banking entity's aggregate
amount of ownership interests in foreign public
funds is below $50 million for two consecutive
calendar quarters; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(2) Banking entities with modest activities. A
banking entity with total consolidated assets of $10
billion or less as reported on December 31 of the
previous two calendar years that engages in
activities or investments pursuant to subpart B or
subpart C (other than trading activities permitted
under § 255.6(a) of subpart B) may satisfy the
requirements of this section by including in its
existing compliance policies and procedures
appropriate references to the requirements of
section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and
adjustments as appropriate given the activities, size,
scope and complexity of the banking entity.

Statutory Text

(1) Banking entities with no covered activities. A
banking entity that does not engage in activities or
investments pursuant to subpart B or subpart C
(other than trading activities permitted pursuant to
§ 255.6(a) of subpart B) may satisfy the
requirements of this section by establishing the
required compliance program prior to becoming
engaged in such activities or making such
investments (other than trading activities permitted
pursuant to § 255.6(a) of subpart B).

Potential Impact on CCOs
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17 C.F.R.
§ 270.38a1

Regulator

SEC

(3) Annual review. Review, no less frequently than
annually, the adequacy of the policies and
procedures of the fund and of each investment
adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and

(2) Board approval. Obtain the approval of the
fund's board of directors, including a majority of
directors who are not interested persons of the fund,
of the fund's policies and procedures and those of
each investment adviser, principal underwriter,
administrator, and transfer agent of the fund, which
approval must be based on a finding by the board
that the policies and procedures are reasonably
designed to prevent violation of the Federal
Securities Laws by the fund, and by each
investment
adviser,
principal
underwriter,
administrator, and transfer agent of the fund;

Statutory Text

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) Each registered investment company and business A CCO could be liable for failing to comply with
development company (“fund”) must:
policies and procedures of an investment or
business development company.
(1) Policies and procedures. Adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent violation of the Federal
Securities Laws by the fund, including policies and
procedures that provide for the oversight of
compliance by each investment adviser, principal
underwriter, administrator, and transfer agent of the
fund;
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Citation

Regulator

(A) The operation of the policies and
procedures of the fund and each investment
adviser, principal underwriter, administrator,
and transfer agent of the fund, any material
changes made to those policies and procedures
since the date of the last report, and any
material changes to the policies and procedures

(iii) Who must, no less frequently than annually,
provide a written report to the board that, at a
minimum, addresses:

(ii) Who may be removed from his or her
responsibilities by action of (and only with the
approval of) the fund's board of directors,
including a majority of the directors who are not
interested persons of the fund;

(i) Whose designation and compensation must be
approved by the fund's board of directors,
including a majority of the directors who are not
interested persons of the fund;

(4) Chief compliance officer. Designate one
individual responsible for administering the fund's
policies and procedures adopted under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section:

Statutory Text

transfer agent and the effectiveness of their
implementation;

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(1) A copy of the policies and procedures adopted
by the fund under paragraph (a)(1) that are in effect,

(d) Recordkeeping. The fund must maintain:

(c) Undue influence prohibited. No officer, director,
or employee of the fund, its investment adviser, or
principal underwriter, or any person acting under such
person's direction may directly or indirectly take any
action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently
influence the fund's chief compliance officer in the
performance of his or her duties under this section.

(b) Unit investment trusts. If the fund is a unit
investment trust, the fund's principal underwriter or
depositor must approve the fund's policies and
procedures and chief compliance officer, must
receive all annual reports, and must approve the
removal of the chief compliance officer from his or
her responsibilities.

(iv) Who must, no less frequently than annually,
meet separately with the fund's independent
directors.

(B) Each Material Compliance Matter that
occurred since the date of the last report; and

Statutory Text

recommended as a result of the annual review
conducted pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this
section; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

(1) Federal Securities Laws means the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a-aa), the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a-mm), the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002)), the Investment Company Act of
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a), the Investment Advisers Act

(e) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(3) Any records documenting the fund's annual
review pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section
for at least five years after the end of the fiscal year
in which the annual review was conducted, the first
two years in an easily accessible place.

(2) Copies of materials provided to the board of
directors in connection with their approval under
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, and written reports
provided to the board of directors pursuant to
paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of this section (or, if the fund
is a unit investment trust, to the fund's principal
underwriter or depositor, pursuant to paragraph (b)
of this section) for at least five years after the end
of the fiscal year in which the documents were
provided, the first two years in an easily accessible
place; and

Statutory Text

or at any time within the past five years were in
effect, in an easily accessible place; and

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(iii) A weakness in the design or implementation
of the policies and procedures of the fund, its
investment adviser, principal underwriter,
administrator or transfer agent.

(ii) A violation of the policies and procedures of
the fund, its investment adviser, principal
underwriter, administrator or transfer agent, or

(i) A violation of the Federal securities laws by
the fund, its investment adviser, principal
underwriter, administrator or transfer agent (or
officers, directors, employees or agents thereof),

(2) A Material Compliance Matter means any
compliance matter about which the fund's board of
directors would reasonably need to know to oversee
fund compliance, and that involves, without
limitation:

Statutory Text

of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b), Title V of the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act (Pub.L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999), any rules adopted by the Commission
under any of these statutes, the Bank Secrecy Act
(31 U.S.C. 5311–5314; 5316–5332) as it applies to
funds, and any rules adopted thereunder by the
Commission or the Department of the Treasury.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Citation

Regulator

SEC

31 C.F.R.
§ 10.36(a)(b)

Money & Finance

17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(
4)-7

(a) Any individual subject to the provisions of this
part who has (or individuals who have or share)
principal authority and responsibility for overseeing a
firm's practice governed by this part, including the
provision of advice concerning Federal tax matters

(c) Chief compliance officer. Designate an
individual (who is a supervised person) responsible
for administering the policies and procedures that
you adopt under paragraph (a) of this section.

(b) Annual review. Review, no less frequently than
annually, the adequacy of the policies and
procedures established pursuant to this section and
the effectiveness of their implementation; and

(a) Policies and procedures. Adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent violation, by you and your
supervised persons, of the Act and the rules that the
Commission has adopted under the Act;

Statutory Text

A CCO may be liable if he or she willfully,
recklessly, or through gross incompetence (1) does
not take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has
adequate procedures governing Federal tax matters
or (2) does not take reasonable steps to ensure that

Potential Impact on CCOs

If you are an investment adviser registered or required A CCO could be liable for providing investment
to be registered under section 203 of the Investment advice to clients unless they adopt designated
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–3), it shall be policies and procedures
unlawful within the meaning of section 206 of the Act
(15 U.S.C. 80b–6) for you to provide investment
advice to clients unless you:

2017
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY CHART
547

Citation

Regulator

(1) The
individual
through
willfulness,
recklessness, or gross incompetence does not take
reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate
procedures to comply with this part, as applicable,
and one or more individuals who are members of,
associated with, or employed by, the firm are, or
have, engaged in a pattern or practice, in connection

(b) Any such individual who has (or such individuals
who have or share) principal authority as described in
paragraph (a) of this section will be subject to
discipline for failing to comply with the requirements
of this section if—

Statutory Text

and preparation of tax returns, claims for refund, or
other documents for submission to the Internal
Revenue Service, must take reasonable steps to
ensure that the firm has adequate procedures in effect
for all members, associates, and employees for
purposes of complying with subparts A, B, and C of
this part, as applicable. In the absence of a person or
persons identified by the firm as having the principal
authority and responsibility described in this
paragraph, the Internal Revenue Service may identify
one or more individuals subject to the provisions of
this part responsible for compliance with the
requirements of this section.

Potential Impact on CCOs

those procedures are properly followed.
Additionally, a CCO may be held liable if he or she
knows or should know that an employee does not
comply and the CCO willfully, recklessly, or
through gross incompetence fails to take prompt
action to correct the noncompliance.
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Regulator

OFAC and
DOJ

Citation

31 C.F.R.
§ 501.701

(1) Persons who willfully violate any provision of
TWEA or any license, rule, or regulation issued
thereunder, and persons who willfully violate,
neglect, or refuse to comply with any order of the
President issued in compliance with the provisions of
TWEA shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than

(3) The individual knows or should know that one
or more individuals who are members of, associated
with, or employed by, the firm are, or have, engaged
in a pattern or practice, in connection with their
practice with the firm, that does not comply with
this part, as applicable, and the individual, through
willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence
fails to take prompt action to correct the
noncompliance.

(2) The
individual
through
willfulness,
recklessness, or gross incompetence does not take
reasonable steps to ensure that firm procedures in
effect are properly followed, and one or more
individuals who are members of, associated with, or
employed by, the firm are, or have, engaged in a
pattern or practice, in connection with their practice
with the firm, of failing to comply with this part, as
applicable; or

Statutory Text

with their practice with the firm, of failing to
comply with this part, as applicable;

A CCO who knowingly participates in the
violation of the TWEA or associated rules and
regulations, and any CCO who willfully violates,
neglects, or refuses to comply with any order

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(3) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil
penalty of not more than $65,000 per violation on any
person who violates any license, order, or regulation
issued under TWEA.

…

Statutory Text

$1,000,000 or, if an individual, be fined not more than
$100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 years,
or both; and an officer, director, or agent of any
corporation who knowingly participates in such
violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not more
than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10
years, or both.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Willful or reckless violation;
Concealment;
Pattern of conduct;
Prior notice that the practice was illegal;
Management involvement;
Person’s level of awareness of the conduct
(actual knowledge or reason to know);
Harm to sanctions program objectives;
Commercial sophistication;
Size of operations and financial conditions;
Volume of transactions;
Sanctions history;
Adequacy of compliance program;
Remedial response;
Cooperation with OFAC, including
voluntary self-disclosure and agreement to
tolling agreement;

The factors that will be considered are:

1. OFAC adopted enforcement guidelines in 2009.
74 Fed. Reg. 57593 (Nov. 9, 2009) available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-1109/pdf/ E9-26754.pdf.

Additional Comments

Potential Impact on CCOs

thereunder may be fined up to $100,000 or
imprisoned for up to 10 years or both.
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Regulator

31 C.F.R.
FinCEN
§ 1010.820

Citation

A CCO who willfully violates the prohibition on
steering may be assessed a CMP of up to the
amount of money involved in the transaction.

A CCO who willfully violates any recordkeeping
requirement may be assessed a CMP of up to
$1000.

Potential Impact on CCOs

15. Future compliance/deterrence effect;
16. Other relevant factors on a case-by-case
basis.
A person who has received a prepenalty notice has
the right to respond in writing within 30 days. A
person also has the right to an agency hearing to
present defenses.

A CCO who willfully participates in the violation
of any reporting requirements for foreign accounts
or transactions may be assessed a CMP of the
(e) For any willful violation of the prohibition on
greater of $25,000 or the amount involved in the
structuring transactions to avoid currency reporting transaction up to $100,000.
requirements, the Secretary may assess upon any
person a civil penalty not to exceed the amount of
coins and currency involved in the transaction with
respect to which such penalty is imposed. The amount
of any civil penalty assessed under this paragraph
shall be reduced by the amount of any forfeiture to the
United States in connection with the transaction for
which the penalty was imposed.

(c) For any willful violation of any recordkeeping
requirement for financial institutions—except for
violating the requirement that each person having
financial interest in a foreign account keep specific
records—the Secretary may assess upon any
domestic financial institution, and upon any
partner, director, officer, or employee thereof who
willfully participates in the violation, a civil penalty
not to exceed $1,000 per violation.

Statutory Text
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Citation

Regulator

(1) In the case of a violation involving reports of
transactions with foreign financial agencies, a
civil penalty not to exceed the greater of the
amount (not to exceed $100,000) of the
transaction, or $25,000; and

(g) For any willful violation of any requirement of 1)
reports on foreign financial accounts, 2) reports on
transactions with foreign financial agencies, and or 3)
for violating the requirement that each person having
financial interest in a foreign account keep specific
records, the Secretary may assess upon any person, a
civil penalty:

Statutory Text

(f) For any willful violation of any reporting
requirement for financial institutions under this
chapter, except 1) reports on foreign financial
accounts, 2) reports on transactions with foreign
financial agencies, and 3) for violating the
requirement that each person having financial interest
in a foreign account keep specific records, the
Secretary may assess upon any domestic financial
institution, and upon any partner, director, officer,
or employee thereof who willfully participates in
the violation, a civil penalty not to exceed the greater
of the amount (not to exceed $100,000) involved in
the transaction or $25,000.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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Regulator

(h) For each negligent violation of any requirement of
this chapter, committed after October 27, 1986, the
Secretary may assess upon any financial institution a
civil penalty not to exceed $500 per violation.

Statutory Text

(2) In the case of a violation involving reports of
foreign financial accounts or involving a failure
to report the existence of an account or any
identifying information required to be provided
with respect to such account, a civil penalty not
to exceed the greater of the amount (not to exceed
$100,000) equal to the balance in the account at
the time of the violation, or $25,000.

1. FinCEN has authority to investigate financial
institutions and their partners, directors, officers,
and employees for violations of the BSA
pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810, which grants
FinCEN “[o]verall authority for enforcement and
compliance, including coordination and

Additional Comments

A CCO who willfully violates any provision of the
Bank Secrecy Act or related regulations shall be
fined between $10,000 and $500,000 and
imprisoned for up to 10 years, or both, depending
on the specific provision violated and any
connection to other criminal activity.

Potential Impact on CCOs
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(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision
of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act may, upon

31 C.F.R. FinCEN and (a) Any person who willfully violates any provision
§ 1010.840 DOJ
of the Bank Secrecy Act or related regulations may,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than
$1,000 or be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both. Such person may, in addition, if the violation is
of the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act, and if the violation is committed in
furtherance of the commission of any violation of
Federal law punishable by imprisonment for more
than 1 year, be fined not more than $10,000 or be
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

Citation

2017
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Regulator

State Bar

Citation

Rule 1.6

Potential Impact on CCOs

direction of procedures and activities of all other
agencies exercising delegated authority under
this chapter.”

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to This rule places an obligation on lawyers to
the representation of a client unless the client gives maintain client confidences. In doing so, it
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly encourages the client to trust the lawyer, which is
the “hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(d) Any person who knowingly makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation in
any report required by this chapter may, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000
or be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

may, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than $500,000 or be imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.

(2) Committed as part of a pattern of any illegal
activity involving more than $100,000 in any 12–
month period,

(1) Committed while violating another law of the
United States, or

(c) Any person who willfully violates any provision
of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting This includes compliance with the requirements
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, where the for the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports
(“SARs”) as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g).
violation is either

Statutory Text

conviction thereof, be fined not more than $250,000
or be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
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Citation

Regulator

Potential Impact on CCOs

However, this rule does not necessarily preclude a
lawyer, or a CCO who is a lawyer, from disclosing
otherwise confidential information. A lawyer may
disclose otherwise confidential information in any
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury of the following circumstances:
to the financial interests or property of another that
1. “To prevent the client from committing a
is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
result in substantial injury to the financial
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
interests or property of another and in
services;
furtherance of which the client has used or is
using
the lawyer’s services”;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's
2.
“To
prevent,
mitigate or rectify injury to the
compliance with these Rules;
financial interest or property of another that
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
from the client’s commission of a crime or
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
used the lawyer’s services.”
in which the client was involved, or to respond to

fraud that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer's services;

Statutory Text

authorized in order to carry out the representation or Ann. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 cmt. 2
the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). This rule not only applies
to matters communicated in confidence by the
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the
client, but also to all information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
representation, no matter the source. Id. at cmt. 3.
reasonably believes necessary:
Thus, this rule may impose liability on CCOs who
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or are lawyers if those CCOs disclose confidential
substantial bodily harm;
information to a regulator in the course of reporting
corporate
misconduct.
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or
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Regulator

State Bar

Citation

Rule 1.13

Potential Impact on CCOs

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization A CCO, who is a lawyer, is employed or retained
represents the organization acting through its duly by an organization, he or she represents the
authorized constituents.
organization itself and not the individuals who act
for it. Thus, if a CCO:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an
officer, employee or other person associated with the
[K]nows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
refuses to act in a matter related to the representation
in a matter related to the representation that is a
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably violation of a legal obligation to the organization,
might be imputed to the organization, and that is
or a violation of law that reasonably might be
likely to result in substantial injury to the
imputed to the organization, and that is likely to
organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
result in substantial injury to the organization,

(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent
the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or
unauthorized access to, information relating to the
representation of a client.

(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising
from the lawyer's change of employment or from
changes in the composition or ownership of a firm,
but only if the revealed information would not
compromise the attorney-client privilege or
otherwise prejudice the client.

(6) to comply with other law or a court order; or

Statutory Text

allegations in any proceeding concerning the Rule 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
lawyer's representation of the client;
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Citation

Regulator

In considering whether to disclose information
under this rule, a lawyer should consider the
following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) the
seriousness of the violation, (2) the consequences
of the violation; (3) the responsibility in the
organization and the motivation of the person
involved; and (4) the policies of the organization.
Rule 1.13 cmt. 4.

Rule 1.13(b). The lawyer may report such harm if
after they have referred the matter to a higher
authority the higher authority fails to address the
issue in a timely manner and the lawyer reasonably
believes that the violation is reasonably certain to
result in substantial harm to the corporation. Id.

Potential Impact on CCOs

then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization.
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(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to
information relating to a lawyer's representation of an

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation
is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury
to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation whether
or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if
and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization.

(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an
action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation
of law; and

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if

Statutory Text

reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter
to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the circumstances, to the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law.
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Citation

Regulator

(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also
represent any of its directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject
to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule

(f) In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the
client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.

(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she
has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions
taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who
withdraws under circumstances that require or permit
the lawyer to take action under either of those
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to assure that the organization's
highest authority is informed of the lawyer's
discharge or withdrawal.

Statutory Text

organization to investigate an alleged violation of
law, or to defend the organization or an officer,
employee or other constituent associated with the
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged
violation of law.
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Citation

Rule 4.1

Potential Impact on CCOs

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall A CCO who is a lawyer may face liability for
not knowingly:
making false statements or failing to disclose a
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by the
a third person; or
client.
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Statutory Text

1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate
official of the organization other than the individual
who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
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